A bloke walks into a garage and asks the repairman "How does a car work?"

The salesperson comes over and tells the bloke that he can buy one of four cars...

(October 30, 2018 at 7:33 am)Khemikal Wrote: ...
The error theorists facts are hypothetical.  We don't know what they are, but we know that we don't have them.
...

So, I'm being asked to buy a car that doesn't exist?  Seems odd.

Let's see what some random page has to say:


Ah, OK.  This seems like the fourth Catuṣkoṭi i.e. not (P or not P)

Sounds OK but it's about (non-)existence, or rather "at which information layers does something qualify as real?"

(October 30, 2018 at 7:33 am)Khemikal Wrote: ...
The subjectivists facts are variable.  They are facts about peoples perceptions or states of belief.  Facts about their opinions and minds.  They may even be intersubjective facts.
-This culture has a strong taboo against waving with their left hand.  They think it causes lethal bad juju.  They think this because.... [insert -long winded observations of cultural development and it's historical context and/or explanation of the relevant areas of the mind that might cause this common belief as an artifact of biology- here]  
...

So, I'm being asked to buy this car on the basis of tradition?  Seems odder.

'Tradition' is an input to 'organisational ethics' and thus an indirect influencer on individual behaviour so I can see how a moral-event might be processed but I'm no closer to understanding whether 'moral facts' are a thing.

(October 30, 2018 at 7:33 am)Khemikal Wrote: ...
The non naturalists facts are mind independent and non-natural.  They can be empirically known but not physically shown because they are not facts about anything...meaningfully speaking...physical or amenable to scientific investigation.  
-These facts are the facts of what's been called "the sensible world", and are those things that we can experience and assess by pure reason.  
...

This seems to again relate to which information layers are deemed to be real or natural.  

This must the super-natural car.  I don't think I'll buy that.

Is reasoning involved in the moral-event process?  Not initially.  Initially, it's all about auto-response.  Reasoning is required when considering the cause.

(October 30, 2018 at 7:33 am)Khemikal Wrote: ...
The  cornell realists facts are those mind independent facts of some matter or act x that substantiate themselves in the natural world.  They are facts about what we contend to be able to know empirically and are capable of providing both physical evidence and a convincing demonstration of.
-We can establish by scientific process that some act x causes pain or harm by a variety of mind independent metrics.  If causing pain or harm is wrong, this act objectively does that, and so is wrong.  
...

So, this must be the conditional branching (the if/then) car.   If I want everyone to think I'm an arrogant prick then my car turns into a BMW.



It was nice chatting to the salesperson and thanks for the offer of BMW-club membership but I still need to talk to the mechanic to find out what a moral fact actually might be.

@DLJ

Moral facts are "a thing" in all four positions.  The differences between them boil down to what a person thinks about those facts.  Whether we can get them right (skepticism/error theory), whether they are mind independent (objectivism/subjectivism), whether they are natural (non naturalism/cornell realism).

That there are moral facts is established below the divisions between these...from a cognitivist assertion.  At that fundamental level we're asked if we think that moral propositions aim at truth.  If we think that they do, the differences between us can only be which facts we think they aim at, and how well we hit them.  

Understanding these divisions and common assumptions -across- divisions will allow you to identify the entire set of potential moral facts for any given position, an exhaustive and exclusive description of the full category........you won't have to be sold on anything, or by anyone...but yourself.  Ultimately, every position has a valid comment to make on the subject.

This does, ofc, require that you make the attempt.

You were given an example of a moral fact from cornell realism. Can you think of other facts like that (or why it's not a fact)? You were given an example of a moral fact from subjectivism. Can you think of other facts like that (or why it's not a fact)? Do you have concerns regarding our agency or ability to get the facts right? Do you think that the facts are non natural?

(October 30, 2018 at 1:49 pm)Khemikal Wrote: ...
moral propositions aim at truth. 
...
which facts ... they aim at 
...

I didn't notice the 'facts' that you say I was given. This shows me that I'm not seeing what you're seeing.

I really don't care about the categories. Please give it one more shot...

For any category, please give an example of
a) a moral proposition
b) a truth at which it aims
c) a fact at which it aims.

Cheers.

(October 30, 2018 at 7:33 am)Khemikal Wrote: The subjectivists facts are variable.  They are facts about peoples perceptions or states of belief.  Facts about their opinions and minds.  They may even be intersubjective facts.
-This culture has a strong taboo against waving with their left hand.  They think it causes lethal bad juju.  They think this because.... [insert -long winded observations of cultural development and it's historical context and/or explanation of the relevant areas of the mind that might cause this common belief as an artifact of biology- here]  

-and

Quote:The  cornell realists facts are those mind independent facts of some matter or act x that substantiate themselves in the natural world.  They are facts about what we contend to be able to know empirically and are capable of providing both physical evidence and a convincing demonstration of.
-We can establish by scientific process that some act x causes pain or harm by a variety of mind independent metrics.  If causing pain or harm is wrong, this act objectively does that, and so is wrong.  

B and c are redundant, but a subjectivist thinks that our moral facts aim at truth about mind dependent judgement (and hit it). The realist contends that our moral facts aim at mind independent variables, and hit them.

(October 30, 2018 at 8:46 am)Jörmungandr Wrote:

(October 30, 2018 at 4:56 am)bennyboy Wrote: There's a pretty important difference.  A cat, presumably, is more than an idea.  Whether or not there's really (really really) a cat there, I can see something, and can call it cat.

The moral realist would say that morals are more than simply ideas as well, that it's true, our conception of morals is an idea, but that it is an idea that refers to something in the real world.  In the same way, physical realism consists of ideas, as that is the only access we have to reality and the world, but the ideas themselves are postulated to refer to something, a cat, which exists in a reality that is independent of the idea itself.  There really is no difference between cat realism and physical realism, both depend on ideas which are inferred to represent independently existing realities, but neither actually has access to that reality.  The only difference is you're willing to make that inference with regard to physical realism, but not with respect to moral realism.  But the fact of the matter is we have no different access to the existence of an independent physical reality than we have to an indepently existing realm of moral facts.  You simply have a double standard regarding the two, likely based upon some hypothetical difference between the phenomenology of morals relative to the phenomenology of the physical world within our thoughts (our perceptual experience).   There is definitely a difference in the phenomenology of the two, but that fact alone isn't decisive.  There is a difference between the phenomenology of numbers and that of physical reality, but we don't on that account conclude that numbers are necessarily subjective.

"It's wrong to kick cats."  This debatable moral assertion is dependent on the real existence of cats.  If cats are not real, then it's not wrong to kick them.  Very few people would get outraged on either side of the debate about whether it's wrong to kick unicorns, methinks.

Let's take an extreme world view, and assume that EVERYTHING is experiential, and NOTHING is real beyond that experience.  It will still be true that there are experiences we call things, experiences we call properties of things, and much more dependent feelings and ideas about the properties of things.

"All is mind so far as I can know" is a fine philosophical position.  But there's still a need to differentiate between ideas which are shaped like cats, meow like cats and rudely ignore you like cats, and ideas which are about feelings and beliefs about how people ought to treat cats.

In short, whatever world view you take, they cannot be on the same semantic level.  There's no reason to say, "The descriptions about our experience of shapes and colors which we call cats are not substantially different than descriptions of our feelings about those shapes and colors."  They ARE substantially different, because ideas and feelings which are intrinsically ABOUT things are not peers to words which are labels for things-- whatever thing-ness might be.

The only caveat would be the material monist view that we argued about once upon a time (with regard to free will, I believe)-- if you argue that feelings and ideas are really just physically deterministic mechanisms, and that the agency of thought is essentially an illusory byproduct, then okay. But at that point, morality ceases to mean much anyway.

So no moral facts then.

If anyone can think of one, please let me know.

Cheers.

Earlier on we had the claim that rape is factually immoral (I’d argue that unethical should be used here, factually immoral is an oxymoron) because it is damaging to the victim and toxic to society.

There are a number of problems with such a claim, even if we let it go that "damage to individuals" and "societal health" have been inserted as factual ethical criteria. Before I start, it is my opinion that rape is unethical, by the standards of ethics I promote.

1) Societies take on many forms. Judging exactly what is good and bad for it as a whole is hardly a simple matter. Maybe in some societies it serves some kind of purpose, and its removal would upset things in a way that makes things worse overall. If we merely assert that it must be judged that any society is better without it, before hearing any specifics of a society, then we're making tautological statements, not ethical facts.

2) Socities change. Humans have changed, and will change. Will the effect of rape, upon both the individual and society, always be comparable to how it is now? I don’t think anyone can say that. So our "fact" is limited to a specific historical period / stage of human evolution.

Even after all this, we're left with a statement which most people (that we're likely to discuss such things with) would find such an obvious thing to say that it’s virtually pointless to try and argue it into fact. For it to be a fact that "rape is unethical", the ethical standard being used must be specified, and the fact is then specific to those standards. The only other thing to do is to claim that one particular set of standards is somehow superior. If anything, this is what should be the subject of what an "ethical fact" is, not a logical result of applying that standard.

(October 30, 2018 at 1:49 pm)Khemikal Wrote: we're asked if we think that moral propositions aim at truth.  If we think that they do, the differences between us can only be which facts we think they aim at, and how well we hit them.  

I've been following along on the thread, though not as diligently as some. I admire your explanations here, and would like to chime in with some reactions, if that's OK.

First, I think that there continues to be a disconnect on what different people think of when they think of moral facts. The model continues to be facts about the material world, and if we can't provide examples of material moral facts, then people aren't satisfied. They want something to be rooted in nature which isn't mental -- which is what they usually call "subjective." 

So for example, we are mostly comfortable with the idea that redness doesn't exist in the "outside world," but we perceive it mentally. This has its material correlate in that we can prove that light vibrating at certain frequencies gives people the perception of red. Physics can demonstrate this. I think that some people imagine goodness, or moral quality, as a mental reaction like color, but continue to want some physical correlate that physics can demonstrate. As if, for example, scientists could quantify some influence of an action which, when perceived, leads the mind to interpret it as good. And absent that, they are unwilling to grant goodness factual status. This is what they mean, I think, by the dreaded word "objective." 

One way around that might be to accept that the field of ethics, historically, has been the study of what contributes to human flourishing. So ethicists don't have to prove that human flourishing is good in some material, objective, abstract way. As if flourishing is an arbitrarily chosen goal and the whole field of ethics is undermined if they have no way of proving that flourishing is desirable. That would be like asking a chess strategist to prove that the goal of the game is to win. 

If we accept that ethics is the field which asks, "how best may we flourish?" then I think that the concept of moral facts becomes quite easy to accept. And this is demonstrable by pointing to some obvious cases. "If I cut the head off this healthy baby, is it likely to help him flourish?" That's such a blatant case that its facticity seems not in doubt. 

I don't know if you're a fan of Nietzsche at all, but this article helped me to think about the subject at hand:

https://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/nietzsch...ourishing/

Nietzsche puts himself in the category of ethicists who work on flourishing. They begin with biological or psychological knowledge derivable from empirical evidence, interpret how historical contingencies (like traditions of work or the family) manipulate these givens, and draw conclusions which they think are factual concerning how best to flourish. I find all of this very persuasive, and think that it settles a number of (in my view) irrelevant objections made by others. 

But you know more about all this than I do. 

Here's a bit from the interview I linked to above:

Quote:The general idea is that ethics aspires to provide a specification of what it is to live well, to flourish.  Now, that claim is complex and contestable in several ways.  For example, it’s possible to deny that ethics aims at a specification of human flourishing.  As Nietzsche points out, theistic ethical views typically deny this, taking service to God or some other end to be a higher and worthier pursuit than flourishing.  But suppose, like Nietzsche, we take these theistic views to be discredited.  And suppose, like Nietzsche, we look at ourselves and others, we look at culture, at history, and we wonder whether we could be in some way better than we are.  For Nietzsche I think these problems arose when he contrasted the urgency and vitality of Greek life with the bovine mediocrity of contemporary life.  They arose also when he contrasted the perceived meaningfulness and the stringent devotion that arose in religious contexts (think of the peasants laboring to construct cathedrals that wouldn’t be completed in their lifetime) with the anomie and open-endedness of contemporary life, the lack of overriding goals, the perceived inability to justify devotion to any particular goal.  All of this leads Nietzsche to want to make claims about human flourishing.  His texts are brimming with claims about health, power, flourishing, splendor, vitality, growth, and so forth.

But what are those notions?  What is health, or power, or flourishing?  To figure that out, we need to examine human psychology.  We need to ask what our deepest aims are, what we’re driven toward, what’s changeable in us and what’s fixed, what’s reinterpretable and what’s past our reach.  We need to examine how our conscious lives relate to what’s non-conscious, how our social and cultural judgments about value impact us, how our conceptual repertories and our languages affect what we see and do.  We need an accurate and unprejudiced moral psychology.  And that’s what Nietzsche aspires to give us.

(October 31, 2018 at 2:18 am)DLJ Wrote: So no moral facts then.

If anyone can think of one, please let me know.

Cheers.

, lol, 10/10 on the troll.

(October 31, 2018 at 5:59 am)Belaqua Wrote: ...
If we accept that ethics is the field which asks, "how best may we flourish?" then I think that the concept of moral facts becomes quite easy to accept.
...

Agreed. And if we don't accept that premise? What then?

Rob's thread on the Harris's Moral Landscape covered this ground.

Sam Harris, Michael Shermer and Matt Dillahunty have all bought into this notion.

Incidentally, a few years ago I had a good face-to-face conversation with the latter, over a pint or three, to put him straight. He agreed with me but thought that the semantics of my version of morality would be too confusing for yer average audience so continues to espouse 'objective' morality but now at least when he does so he will note that this is axiomatic. So, I'll claim a minor victory on that one.