What represents self-interest? It is the sense of agency. It think, therefore I am, isn't just a general sense of qualia, IMO, it's also a mythological archetype-- that of the individual agency of self. Benjamin isn't so much a thing, as a complex of ideas and feelings attached to a name.

Non naturalist conjectures don't represent an issue for realism, since non naturalism is one of the forms of moral realism.

---

Do the complexes of ideas and feelings with names attached have beliefs, do they make observations?  Are their beliefs sometimes true?  Are their observations sometimes accurate?

(November 7, 2018 at 11:49 am)bennyboy Wrote: What represents self-interest?  It is the sense of agency.  It think, therefore I am, isn't just a general sense of qualia, IMO, it's also a mythological archetype-- that of the individual agency of self.  Benjamin isn't so much a thing, as a complex of ideas and feelings attached to a name.

Actions which lead to the dissolution of the agent cannot be in the self interest of the agent because you have to have an agent to be a self. Thus those acts which encourage the dissolution of the agent, rather than discourage it, are against that agent's self interest. The rest can be derived from that. It's a lot like asking the question of what is health. The answer may be subjectively based, but the difference between health and it's lack is based upon objective considerations based upon the undesirability of pathology and dysfunction. Likewise, the interest of the agent may be subjectively defined, but it is based on objective facts.

(November 7, 2018 at 11:49 am)bennyboy Wrote: What represents self-interest?  It is the sense of agency.  It think, therefore I am, isn't just a general sense of qualia, IMO, it's also a mythological archetype-- that of the individual agency of self.  Benjamin isn't so much a thing, as a complex of ideas and feelings attached to a name.

Careful there, bennyboy. By criticizing the logic or coherence of an ethical theory, and asking the question "What represents self-interest?" you'd be doing moral philosophy... the kind that assumes the existence of moral facts...

***

Oh great then. The matter is settled. Morality is just as real as my friend Ben. I do have a friend named Ben, and he is very real to me. So when you say moral facts aren't real, you mean it in the sense that my friend Ben isn't real. What did you call him? A complex of ideas and feelings? Okay. I'll be sure to tell him you said that. 

When you first said that you doubted the existence of moral facts, I thought you were saying that they were less real than my friend Ben. Now I understand your position: they are only as real as my friend Ben. I agree with you there. And I'm glad we're on the same page now.

(November 7, 2018 at 12:01 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote:

(November 7, 2018 at 11:49 am)bennyboy Wrote: What represents self-interest?  It is the sense of agency.  It think, therefore I am, isn't just a general sense of qualia, IMO, it's also a mythological archetype-- that of the individual agency of self.  Benjamin isn't so much a thing, as a complex of ideas and feelings attached to a name.

Actions which lead to the dissolution of the agent cannot be in the self interest of the agent because you have to have an agent to be a self.  Thus those acts which encourage the dissolution of the agent, rather than discourage it, are against that agent's self interest.  The rest can be derived from that.  It's a lot like asking the question of what is health.  The answer may be subjectively based, but the difference between health and it's lack is based upon objective considerations based upon the undesirability of pathology and dysfunction.  Likewise, the interest of the agent may be subjectively defined, but it is based on objective facts.

Well wait a minute, there.  Why is existence itself in the best interest of the agency of self?  Why should we favor existence over non-existence?

My position is still the same: that we have an instinct to survive, and that this instinct expresses it through the agency of self as a feeling.  Or to put it more precisely, that instinct to survive, along with other core elements of agency, ARE the self.

What if you found out we were living in a simulation, for sure, scientifically proven?  What if we were in the Matrix or in the mind of God?  Do you feel this would fundamentally change human morality?  I believe it would not.  Some people might start worshiping the Great Programmer in the Sky, but in essence, it would still be about our feelings about things.

---

(November 7, 2018 at 12:10 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote:

(November 7, 2018 at 11:49 am)bennyboy Wrote: What represents self-interest?  It is the sense of agency.  It think, therefore I am, isn't just a general sense of qualia, IMO, it's also a mythological archetype-- that of the individual agency of self.  Benjamin isn't so much a thing, as a complex of ideas and feelings attached to a name.

Careful there, bennyboy. By criticizing the logic or coherence of an ethical theory, and asking the question "What represents self-interest?" you'd be doing moral philosophy... the kind that assumes the existence of moral facts...

***

Oh great then. The matter is settled. Morality is just as real as my friend Ben. I do have a friend named Ben, and he is very real to me. So when you say moral facts aren't real, you mean it in the sense that my friend Ben isn't real. What did you call him? A complex of ideas and feelings? Okay. I'll be sure to tell him you said that. 

When you first said that you doubted the existence of moral facts, I thought you were saying that they were less real than my friend Ben. Now I understand your position: they are only as real as my friend Ben. I agree with you there. And I'm glad we're on the same page now.

Nom nom.  Words. . . in mouth. . . mffffff.  Can't breathe. 

Let's be clear hear.  I'm not saying there are no facts which are considered in the process of moral consideration.  I'm saying there are no facts which are categorically moral in nature-- especially, which are objectively right/wrong valued.  There's no particular fact about a murder, for example, which may be objectively observed, and known by anyone who observes them to represent a moral wrong.

This view, that rightness exists out there independent of subjective agency, and that some people correctly perceive it, and some do not, is quite dangerous, actually.  It's easy when you're in a culture with certain views to say, "Oh. . . well everyone KNOWS that's morally acceptable.  Everyone KNOWS that's objectively wrong."  But what if everyone KNOWS that women are morally inferior to men, and that this is considered an objective truth?  What if almost every white person considers the savagery of black people an objective moral truth?  What if everyone in a subculture KNOWS that human beings are a scourge to the world, and that the complete elimination of the species represents a tremendous good?

(November 7, 2018 at 6:38 pm)bennyboy Wrote: This view, that rightness exists out there independent of subjective agency, and that some people correctly perceive it, and some do not, is quite dangerous, actually. It's easy when you're in a culture with certain views to say, "Oh. . . well everyone KNOWS that's morally acceptable.  Everyone KNOWS that's objectively wrong."  But what if everyone KNOWS that women are morally inferior to men, and that this is considered an objective truth?  What if almost every white person considers the savagery of black people an objective moral truth?  What if everyone in a subculture KNOWS that human beings are a scourge to the world, and that the complete elimination of the species represents a tremendous good?

Absolutist knowledge of any type can be dangerous. But you seem to be referring to dogma, not facts. After all, some people KNOW that their God is the ruler of the universe. The thing about that is, we can argue against such notions. We can posit that they are wrong... and wrong in an OBJECTIVE sense. Their feelings (however strong they may be) have no bearing on whether God really exists or not. And we can argue as much, despite the fact that we cannot scientifically demonstrate God's nonexistence.

Likewise, people can be WRONG about moral facts. But if they are open to reasoned debate on the matter, we can attempt to show those who endorse savagery toward blacks that they are wrong.

Note that we 1) can use logic and reason to debate the issue and 2) we can make the case that (whatever a person's feelings are toward black people) it is wrong to behave in an interpersonally destructive way towards them. After all, I'm not fond at all of Christian fundamentalists who preach hate against homosexuals--but I am also aware that it would be immoral for me to physically hurt one of them. (Trust me though, if it were possible for me to reach inside a YouTube video and slap another person, I'd have done it on certain occasions. But that would have been a moral transgression on my part.)

Since we can deem feelings irrelevant to a debate moral debate, we can say (at the very least) that our moral conceptions are divorable from our emotional misgivings. Something to think about. Of course, feelings are sometimes involved in a debate about objective facts ("You atheists deny God because you are hateful sinners!" for example), but that doesn't make such debates nonobjective.

I posted this in another thread for Jorm to read. It's a quick and easy read (20-ish minutes tops). It doesn't address emotivism, but it does make a pretty sound logical case that morality has nothing to do with cultural mores.




@Jörmungandr: Did you ever read, "The Challenge of Cultural Relativism"? I'm curious what your impressions are if you did.

Quote:People can be WRONG about moral facts.

How would you ever know? I think you might as well say people can be WRONG about God or about unicorns.

I'd still very much like an objective moral fact to consider. Is it very hard to produce them?

Also, please accept a clarification: I didn't say that all morality is emotional at the time of application, but that ultimately it is all predicated upon emotion. Once you've accepted (through an emotional process) that Liberty is an important quality, then you may or may not have feelings about it in your efforts to discuss it or to enforce it.

(November 7, 2018 at 11:14 am)bennyboy Wrote:

(November 7, 2018 at 10:04 am)Jörmungandr Wrote: Morality isn't predicated on feelings, but rather upon the supposed facts to which those feelings refer.  If morality were solely predicated on feelings, you would be right in saying that morality is subjective.  Since they are not, your belief that morality is subjective seems unsupported.

I'd like an example of any moral idea that isn't predicated on negative feelings.  Maybe I'm wrong, though you can imagine that I kind of doubt it.

Fine. Rape is wrong. That isn't predicated upon negative feelings. I may have negative feeling about rape, but my belief that it is wrong isn't predicated on them. Satisfied?

(November 7, 2018 at 11:14 am)bennyboy Wrote: Remember my original description of morality-- that it is a mediation among feelings, ideas, and environment, but that it is predicated upon the feelings-- without them, there's really nothing that could sensibly be called morality.  The Googletron Mind might have lots of ideas about how people should behave, but they are only moral ideas if it cares.  If not-- they are just behavioral recommendations (or demands).

Something caring about the morality of something isn't a demonstration that morality is predicated upon those feelings. We might not be motivated to do anything about immoral acts if we have no feelings about them, but that doesn't mean that the moral facts themselves are predicated upon feelings. If murder is objectively wrong, us having feelings about it isn't evidence that morals are predicated upon those feelings, only that we can have feelings about objective facts. If a rapist violates my consent to sex, his act is immoral because the act is wrong, not because I have bad feelings about it. Your entire argument is a non sequitur. I can have feelings about someone's dick being less than 6" long, but that does not imply that the length of his dick is predicated on my feelings about its length. Your argument simply doesn't follow unless you beg the question by defining morals that way. Doing so doesn't refute moral realism so much as make you out to be a dick.

---

(November 7, 2018 at 6:38 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Let's be clear hear.  I'm not saying there are no facts which are considered in the process of moral consideration.  I'm saying there are no facts which are categorically moral in nature-- especially, which are objectively right/wrong valued.  There's no particular fact about a murder, for example, which may be objectively observed, and known by anyone who observes them to represent a moral wrong.

This view, that rightness exists out there independent of subjective agency, and that some people correctly perceive it, and some do not, is quite dangerous, actually. 

And it's been pointed out repeatedly that you don't have an argument which adequately supports your view that there are no such facts. As I pointed out earlier, moral facts refer in much the same way that physical facts refer, and phenomenologically they refer in a way that is similar to numbers. If you don't have a good argument why numbers don't refer, and you don't, then you don't have a good argument that morals may not in fact refer. When this was pointed out to you, you deflected that it comes down to definitions, and that with your definitions, morality is subjective. Well I have to ask you then, what is your definition of morals and moral. And try to define it without begging the question as to whether morals are subjective or not.

(November 7, 2018 at 6:38 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Let's be clear hear.  I'm not saying there are no facts which are considered in the process of moral consideration.

-and that's how I know that you're a realist, lol. The idea that there are facts which are considered in that process is very literally a realist description. It's how realism fundamentally defines itself. If you accept that there are facts which are considered in a process of moral consideration, you have indicated your full throated support for moral realism.

I think that your idea of realism was supplied to you by interaction with nitwits, is all.

(November 7, 2018 at 8:26 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote:

(November 7, 2018 at 11:14 am)bennyboy Wrote: I'd like an example of any moral idea that isn't predicated on negative feelings.  Maybe I'm wrong, though you can imagine that I kind of doubt it.

Fine.  Rape is wrong.  That isn't predicated upon negative feelings.  I may have negative feeling about rape, but my belief that it is wrong isn't predicated on them.  Satisfied?

As I said in my last post, "predicated upon" doesn't mean that once established, moral feelings aren't verbalized. If nobody cared about rape, and strongly so, there would be no moral rule about it.

The entire code of law is pretty dry, but I'd argue that under the hood, 100% of all of it represents a mediation among various feelings (read: instincts, if you want). We have feelings about property, about health, and so on.

How does one arrive at any value judgment rationally, if it does not have at its foundation some desire or fear? All we can do is say, "We've arrived at the idea of social contract, through a desire from mutual protection from harm (which we fear), and for opportunity (which we hope for). We each want liberty, and are willing to extend it." And then say that rape constitutes a violation of those ultimately emotional value judgments?

I suppose you could talk about something like moral-fact-in-context. GIVEN the sanctity of liberty, then you can say that the restraint of another person for sexual purposes constitutes a violation of that moral rule.