(June 15, 2021 at 11:38 pm)The Grand Nudger Wrote: A cultural relativist can make any criticism of any moral system that a realist might, and, like a realist, believe that a person can be morally incorrect.  Relativism is a position on the referent of those facts, just as any other moral position.  That being said, suppose we found a relativist who gave us that advice.  It's good advice, isn't it?  To be mindful of the judgements we make.  A realist would have the same problems with a judgement specifically dependent on an individual pov that a cultural relativist would.  Relativists and realists agree, together, that subjectivism is wrong.

It depends on what you mean by "subjectivism." Because there is a relativist theory "individual relativism" (sometimes called "subjectivism") and it's not quite clear if you meant the theory subjectivism or subjectivism in a broader sense.

I think is is good advice to be mindful of the judgments we make. A moral realist can make that determination: "it is good to be mindful of my own judgments" based on reason and axioms. James Rachels tackled that very issue in his essay about cultural relativism. He analyzed the practice of infanticide in Eskimo culture.

Quote:Consider again the Eskimos, who often kill perfectly normal infants, especially
girls. We do not approve of such things; a parent who killed a baby in our society
would be locked up. Thus there appears to be a great difference in the values of
our two cultures. But suppose we ask why the Eskimos do this. The explanation is
not that they have less affection for their children or less respect for human life.
An Eskimo family will always protect its babies if conditions permit. But they
live in a harsh environment, where food is in short supply. A fundamental
postulate of Eskimos thought is: “Life is hard, and the margin of safety small.” A
family may want to nourish its babies but be unable to do so.

...Moreover, the Eskimos are a nomadic people—unable to farm, they must
move about in search of food. Infants must be carried, and a mother can carry
only one baby in her parka as she travels and goes about her outdoor work. Other
family members help whenever they can.

Infant girls are more readily disposed of because, first, in this society the males
are the primary food providers—they are the hunters, according to the traditional
division of labor—and it is obviously important to maintain a sufficient number of
food providers. But there is an important second reason as well. Because the
hunters suffer a high casualty rate, the adult men who die prematurely far
outnumber the women who die early. Thus if male and female infants survived in
equal numbers, the female adult population would greatly outnumber the male
adult population. Examining the available statistics, one writer concluded that
“were it not for female infanticide…there would be approximately one-and-a-half
times as many females in the average Eskimo local group as there are food
producing males.”


So among the Eskimos, infanticide does not signal a fundamentally different
attitude toward children. Instead, it is a recognition that drastic measures are
sometimes needed to ensure the family’s survival. Even then, however, killing the
baby is not the first option considered. Adoption is common; childless couples are
especially happy to take a more fertile couple’s “surplus.” Killing is only the last
resort. I emphasize this in order to show that the raw data of the anthropologists
can be misleading; it can make the differences in values between cultures appear
greater than they are. The Eskimos’ values are not all that different from our
values. It is only that life forces upon them choices that we do not have to make.

https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/...chels1.pdf

In the end, I think the realist (and the nihilist) are just as capable of factoring in differences in culture as well as any relativist. I think Rachels' analysis of Eskimo culture (seen through a realist's lens) demonstrates this. What makes cultural relativism attractive in the first place is the realist assertion that we ought to be understanding and careful with our judgments. Ironically, those who embrace this particular value, use this value to attack the idea of valuation. It seems like there is a contradiction in there.

Maybe cultural relativism as moral theory needs revision. Since it could be argued that "There is no half-way house called “moral relativism,” in which we continue to use normative vocabulary with the stipulation that it is to be understood as relativized to particular moral codes" (Boghossian), then perhaps it is more accurate to see "relativism" as a kind of cognitivist nihilism... in the same vein as error theory. Just as the error theorist says: "No moral fact can be true," the relativist says "No moral fact can be true, except in relation to a cultural code." That's basically what the theory says only put in a more nihilistic manner.

You may be arguing against moral defeatism-as-moral relativism, bit more by the end. Cognitive nihilism would besomething like the claim, as indeed it is, that we can get it right, but we get it wrong. This is not relativism. In relativism, we can get it right, and do, and it's about culture.

Since a relativist believes that the truth value of a moral proposition is dependent on culture, there's no other way a moral statement could be accurate. All moral statements are thus accurate or inaccurate with respect to culture. When you say, put in a more nihilistic manner..I think you might be hitting something. You're actually arguing against nihilism, even in the disagreement about whether we can rationally judge another culture.

Mind...we're both still realists - I think relativists are wrong too..but they actually couldn't be wrong for the reasons we've been discussing.

Everyone is right, everyone gets a participation trophy.

A statement that neither a realist or a relativist could maintain - for example. To a relativist or realist, we can't all be right, and getting a trophy is the least of the wrong participants worries.

Tell that to Oprah.

(June 17, 2021 at 9:42 pm)The Grand Nudger Wrote: You may be arguing against moral defeatism-as-moral relativism, bit more by the end.  Cognitive nihilism would besomething like the claim, as indeed it is, that we can get it right, but we get it wrong.  This is not relativism.  In relativism, we can get it right, and do, and it's about culture.

Since a relativist believes that the truth value of a moral proposition is dependent on culture, there's no other way a moral statement could be accurate.  All moral statements are thus accurate or inaccurate with respect to culture.  When you say, put in a more nihilistic manner..I think you might be hitting something.  You're actually arguing against nihilism, even in the disagreement about whether we can rationally  judge another culture.

Mind...we're both still realists - I think relativists are wrong too..but they actually couldn't be wrong for the reasons we've been discussing.

Well, then maybe this is our impasse, because I think Rachels and Boghossian produce valid criticisms of relativism. I think you actually accept Rachels arguments (as he doesn't argue that relativism is incoherent... he thinks it's just plain wrong). So (correct me if I'm wrong) your real issue is with Boghossian's criticism.

So I want to ask then: doesn't Boghossian's argument say at least something significant? I mean, if a completely unbiased, newly minted philosopher were shopping for a good metaethical theory, would Boghossian's viewpoint serve (at the very least) as a strike against relativism? Would it be worth consideration at all?

Do you think Boghossian's argument is (to borrow the term) incoherent?

I do accept the argument that relatavism is plain wrong, yes, and..yes, in the reliance on moral absolutes and the slippery slope of defeatism as an argument against relativism...well, I simply cant be so unfair to the position.

I do think boghossians argument relies on indefensible positions (to the realist) which paint an unrepresentative picture of genuine relativism, yes. A flase relativism, where the nihilist pretends to be a relativist, is what I would call it. I think that the critics of relativism have been very successful in framing the discussion.

(June 17, 2021 at 10:46 pm)The Grand Nudger Wrote: I do accept the argument that relatavism is plain wrong, yes, and..yes, in the reliance on moral absolutes and the slippery slope of defeatism as an argument against relativism...well, I simply cant be so unfair to the position.  

I do think boghossians argument relies on indefensible positions (to the realist)  which paint an unrepresentative picture of genuine relativism, yes.   A flase relativism, where the nihilist pretends to be a relativist, is what I would call it.   I think that the critics of relativism have been very successful in framing the discussion.

Well, if you are going to assert that moral facts can only be true relative to a certain (arbitrary) moral code, then you're basically a nihilist. Just a nihilist with some arbitrary rules. (That's the criticism anyway.) I don't see the strawman. I totally see where Boghossian is coming from. Sure, relativists have a reply to Bogossian. But I think that they are replying to a genuine criticism. Not a fallacious argument.

If anything, I think Boghossian does a good job of questioning the sort of "default relativism" that many atheists (including myself) are prone to find appealing. At the very least, he raises good objections against a certain kind of relativism: a relativism that thinks it's more well founded than it actually is.

I'd need to think more about whether this is a slippery slope argument or not. Maybe his point is fallacious in this way. But maybe not. The problem with slippery slope arguments is that they are ambiguous. (Yes A leads to B, but that doesn't mean B leads to C, C leads to D, then D leads to E.) He doesn't seem to rely on ambiguity of this sort. I think he draws a direct line and explains each step, and explains the implications of each conclusion. But, as I said before, I need to give it more thought.

Perhaps a genuine relativist doesn't believe that there's anything arbitrary about anyone's moral code? Sure, nihilists might say that these things are arbitrary-but you're cool with nihilism, right? Relativists....not so much.

(June 17, 2021 at 11:54 pm)The Grand Nudger Wrote: Perhaps a genuine relativist doesn't believe that there's anything arbitrary about anyone's moral code?

Let's hear this new and improved relativist theory that actually says something about the status of moral facts. Nobody in this thread as yet has defined a kind of relativism that survives Boghossian's criticisms. It isn't strawmanning unless you replace the better argument with a worse one. But I haven't heard the better argument. So let's hear it.