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(July 18, 2024 at 5:31 am)Sheldon Wrote:

(July 18, 2024 at 3:57 am)The Grand Nudger Wrote: Well, that's good.  It's nice to have some point of agreement to build on.  So, at least descriptively, we should be able to agree that when I tell you why a thing is good or bad in this case I'm referring to facts of the matter itself.  I'm not saying "x is bad because of some fact about me" or "x is bad because of some fact about my society" - I'm saying "x is bad because of some fact about x".  We together this far?

So What I mean is that our basis for morality is subjective, I don't think it can be otherwise, for example in this instance we both think harming someone unnecessarily is wrong, we could both say why if asked, but the idea it is wrong isn't true in any objective way. As you say, once we both hold the subjective view that harming someone unnecessarily is wrong, then we can make objective assertions about actions that violate our subjective moral worldview.

It seems that our basis for calling the thing that makes things fall gravity is also subjective in this sense.  Words and word choice in general, about everything.  Relative if we prefer..the subjective extended to the group - a thing is a cat to me and a gato to someone else because we speak different languages and nothing about a cat. Thing is, metaethical objectivity isn't about picking the right word or whether people agree with the words we use - it's about accurately reporting alleged factual content on a matter x itself with whatever words we choose to use to report it.  As opposed to reporting allegedly factual content about ourselves, or allegedly factual content about our societies - as the other two cognitive options.  

You're not objecting to the content or it's fact status.  You're not objecting to the content being about the thing x rather than me or my society, and you believe that the content is true.   I'm fine with using any other word...but no matter what word we settle on we'll be discussing metaethical objectivity by another name.  Just as we could call a cat a dog or really, whatever we want, and still be talking about cats.

Quote:Parenthetically, because we hold the subjective view harming someone unnecessarily is wrong, we would both be able to say objectively that rape is wrong, as it is an objective fact it causes lasting trauma. We could of course point out that we wouldn't want anyone harming us unnecessarily, and infer it is likely most people feel the same way, but we cannot say it is objectively wrong to harm anyone. 

It's not because we agree that I can say x is objectively wrong, and I would continue to say it even if we didn't.  I say that x is objectively wrong because the fact I'm referring to is about x, and is true.  Even if I wanted someone to x me, or wanted to x....I would still say that x is objectively wrong.  It wouldn't be the first time I've liked a bad thing or found other people who also liked it.  

There is another possibility for miscommunication, here, though.  Even as a moral realist that employs a harm base I can allow for there to be harm that is not wrong in a final calculus or summary.  I can allow for space between a thing being wrong and a person being in-the-wrong.  As opposed to simply mistaken, or circumstantially responsible.  Fwiw.. as a moral realist, I can also allow for a thing to be wrong but permissible, wrong but not actionably so..etc etc etc.  

Quote:I can see why this notion scares a lot of people, but there is no objective evidence to suggest that when we understand that our morality involves a subjective choice, we become any "less moral" on any level playing field.

As before, it doesn't scare me - or, at least, it doesn't scare me in any particular or unusual way.  I'm pretty familiar with it.  Descriptive moral subjectivity is a fact even in a world where metaethical objectivity is possible.   I do, ofc, think that descriptive subjectivity leads to a great deal of misery.  Where we conflate an individual or cultural belief as some fact of the matter in question or universe and act accordingly to the detriment of some poor subject.  OTOH..people also have beneficial subjective beliefs.  Beliefs where outcomes are perhaps better (by what standard..lol, right?) than they would be in the absence of the same. 

Quote:I would far prefer the world was populated by people who questioned moral choices carefully, than people who were taught or indoctrinated to accept unquestioningly that X is wrong and Y is right. At the risk of fulfilling Godwin's law, even a "good Nazis" can blindly follow rules. The parallels between religious indoctrination are of course hard to miss, the misogyny, homophobia, racism and bigotry it has peddled as immutable truths, has cause incalculable harm, and still is. 

As would I...but we won't get such a world from subjectivist or relativist moralities.  In those types of moralities the only thing you have to consider to "do morality right" is whether or not you or your society hold a particular opinion about a thing.  There is no other qualifier.  The opinion doesn't have to be a factual one in any sense other than the fact of holding it.  Those things, and not facts of a matter itself - true or false, are the morality makers in metaethical subjectivism and relativism.  It is only in metaethical objectivity that the truth or falsity of alleged facts about a given matter x are informative or relevant of x's moral status.  It is only in metaethical objectivity that a moral statement can be true or false in any non novel sense, to have anything to consider carefully in the first place.  

Don't even get me started about the various religious moralities we have to choose from, lol.  Had people out there burnin folks cuz they were witches.  A claim that fails even on it's own grounds, as there never were any goddamned witches.  Objectively speaking....

Quote:NB religions evolve and improve only if adherents are willing to set aside what they teach, when that conflicts with their own subjective moral worldview. It's not all bad news of course, as like other species that have evolved to live in societal groups, we have evolved to be empathetic, any species that evolved to live in societal groups would also necessarily have to know and be able to learn what were and were not acceptable behaviours to that group, it is likely the precursor to human morality we now see, which has had a leg up from us evolving a problem solving brain, and the extra time we have to examine complex moral choices, that  our ancestors did not, courtesy of the agricultural and then industrial revolutions.

When what conflicts with their own subjective worldview?  In a metaethically subjective world nothing -can- conflict with our subjective worldviews.  They are statements of fact about ourselves - and not correctable by externalities.  The rest we're both on board with I suspect.  I don't think that we evolved to find the truth in the sense important to metaethical objectivism.  I think we evolved to find dinner, and avoid becoming dinner.  That alot of our historic rules and moral claims boil down to our hypersociality because it/they helped with those two goals.  That even more boils down to facts about ourselves, chief amongst them being incompetence, lol.

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