(August 10, 2013 at 6:07 am)genkaus Wrote: I think you should accept my given definitions because they are, in fact, the given definitions, i.e. indicative of what most people mean by the word when they use it. And this happens to be one of the few cases where appeal to popularity is not a logical fallacy.

I guess I'm not done after all, though I still don't have much hope of us arriving at anything more useful than brain exerecise.

Most of the people who use the word "mind" might readily agree that it seems the mind is somewhere to be found in brain function; I'm not sure even that's true-- the confirmed monists you see everywhere aren't as ubiquitous as you think. However, when people refer to "my mind," they are distinguishing their mental experience from that brain function. All the words we use to talk about subjective experience are like that: when someone says they're in love, they may recognize the importance of hormones, but what they're talking about is their world view, and how their feelings are affecting it. The words are used, and used ONLY, to describe their subjective narrative; and for the most part, explaining the mechanism behind their feelings will add little to that narrative.

Quote:I do accept that certain words are intrinsically dualistic or idealistic - words such as "soul" or "spirit". What I do not accept is that "mind", "sentience" or "will" are some of those words. I do not accept it because when I look at their 'correct' definitions, I find them to be equally applicable in monist, dualist or idealist contexts.

I do not accept that the meanings you take as 'correct' are correct, and the quotes do nothing to mediate that fact. There is data processing all over the place; some computers have rudimentary "awareness" in that they can identify patterns in their environment and interact to them in useful ways. On a bigger scale, you could say that the whole universe, and every subsystem in it, is processing information, and the output (at least in a deterministic model) is the state at t+1.

But we don't talk about any other system as thinking, or feeling, or being sentient. That's because, however we juggle words around to pretend otherwise, we recognize that mind is more than just processing data.

Let me ask you this: if a computer simulation can take in visual and auditory input, process it, and output behavior to a cyborg body so that it passes the Turing test, would you believe that it was actually experiencing the universe?

Quote:I also do not think that a disagreement in definitions should be an end of the debate especially when one definition is more inclusive than the other. For example, if we disagree on "free" where you consider it to mean "free from determinism" and I consider it to mean "free from certain constraints which may or may not be determinism", then the next logical step is to discuss which constraints make sense and whether or not determinism is one of them. Similarly, if you consider "will" to mean "non-physical attribute of the mind that makes decisions" and I consider it to be "attribute of the mind that makes decisions", the next step would be to discuss if "will" would have to be necessarily non-physical or physical.

Okay, let's get super-inclusive, because that makes words better, right? Let's define "will" as the possibility that a collection of wave functions ("A") might do something, and let's define "freedom" as the absence of any other collection of wave functions ("B") that prevent A from doing it.

Now, we don't have to goof around with a bunch of arbitrary shorthand for properties that we can't independently verify even exist. Love: can't put it next to a ruler. Beauty: we know in our heart of hearts that it exists only in the brain, but can't even define it precisely. Free will: can't touch this.

(August 11, 2013 at 9:01 am)bennyboy Wrote: Most of the people who use the word "mind" might readily agree that it seems the mind is somewhere to be found in brain function; I'm not sure even that's true-- the confirmed monists you see everywhere aren't as ubiquitous as you think. However, when people refer to "my mind," they are distinguishing their mental experience from that brain function. All the words we use to talk about subjective experience are like that: when someone says they're in love, they may recognize the importance of hormones, but what they're talking about is their world view, and how their feelings are affecting it. The words are used, and used ONLY, to describe their subjective narrative; and for the most part, explaining the mechanism behind their feelings will add little to that narrative.

When people talk about how an app works or how a program functions, they are talking about software as an entity distinct from the underlying hardware. Even though the working of a program is reducible to a series of electronic signals moving within the machine and even if I recognize the significance of this fact that is not what I'm talking about or even thinking about when considering how a program works. The words used to describe the functioning of the app are used to describe the software narrative and explaining the hardware mechanism behind it does little to add to that narrative.

(August 11, 2013 at 9:01 am)bennyboy Wrote: I do not accept that the meanings you take as 'correct' are correct, and the quotes do nothing to mediate that fact.

Does the fact that they are taken from a dictionary do nothing either? If not, then you'd be the one guilty of redefinition.

(August 11, 2013 at 9:01 am)bennyboy Wrote: There is data processing all over the place; some computers have rudimentary "awareness" in that they can identify patterns in their environment and interact to them in useful ways. On a bigger scale, you could say that the whole universe, and every subsystem in it, is processing information, and the output (at least in a deterministic model) is the state at t+1.

But we don't talk about any other system as thinking, or feeling, or being sentient. That's because, however we juggle words around to pretend otherwise, we recognize that mind is more than just processing data.

That we can regard awareness as data processing does not mean all forms of data processing can be regarded as awareness. Its a pretty simple argument:

A. Awareness is a type of data processing (Cats are a type of mammals).
B. All data processing can be regarded as awareness (All mammals can be regarded as cats).

B here is clearly invalid.

So, while we have no reason to believe that awareness is anything more than processing data, the question remains exactly at what point would be consider a data-processing system to be aware? What is the definitive and verifiable feature of awareness that separates it from any other form of data processing?

Its not identification of patterns - since understanding is not a necessary element of awareness.

Its not the capacity for interaction - the response-stimulus model isn't a necessary element of awareness either.

Do we consider sensory input to be the defining feature? Sunflowers seem to be aware of the sun's position. Touch-me-not seems to be aware of physical contact.

Is it a matter of complexity? Do we consider micro-organisms to be aware? Or is there some specific feature of a biological system which leads to awareness?

The point is, though we've not yet figured out exactly what features of a data-processing system are required for it to be "aware", be capable of experience and have a mind, there is however no evidence to suggest that mind is something more than a data-processing system.

(August 11, 2013 at 9:01 am)bennyboy Wrote: Let me ask you this: if a computer simulation can take in visual and auditory input, process it, and output behavior to a cyborg body so that it passes the Turing test, would you believe that it was actually experiencing the universe?

Yes, I would. It may not be the same manner of experience as us, but it'd be experience nonetheless.

(August 11, 2013 at 9:01 am)bennyboy Wrote: Okay, let's get super-inclusive, because that makes words better, right? Let's define "will" as the possibility that a collection of wave functions ("A") might do something, and let's define "freedom" as the absence of any other collection of wave functions ("B") that prevent A from doing it.

Goo. Now that we've established the generalized form, let's get to the specifics - what specific wave-functions does A refer to, what does doing 'something' mean, what does the other collection of wave-functions B refer to, etc.?

(August 11, 2013 at 9:01 am)bennyboy Wrote: Now, we don't have to goof around with a bunch of arbitrary shorthand for properties that we can't independently verify even exist. Love: can't put it next to a ruler. Beauty: we know in our heart of hearts that it exists only in the brain, but can't even define it precisely. Free will: can't touch this.

Your mistake is to assume that they are arbitrary or that they can't be verified independently.

(August 11, 2013 at 11:18 am)genkaus Wrote: That we can regard awareness as data processing does not mean all forms of data processing can be regarded as awareness. Its a pretty simple argument:

A. Awareness is a type of data processing (Cats are a type of mammals).
B. All data processing can be regarded as awareness (All mammals can be regarded as cats).

B here is clearly invalid.

Now you're starting to understand me.

A. I am capable of actual experience, and have a brain which functions in certain ways.
B. Everything with a brain which functions in certain ways is actually experiencing.

B here is clearly invalid.

Quote:So, while we have no reason to believe that awareness is anything more than processing data, the question remains exactly at what point would be consider a data-processing system to be aware? What is the definitive and verifiable feature of awareness that separates it from any other form of data processing?

Its not identification of patterns - since understanding is not a necessary element of awareness.

Its not the capacity for interaction - the response-stimulus model isn't a necessary element of awareness either.

Do we consider sensory input to be the defining feature? Sunflowers seem to be aware of the sun's position. Touch-me-not seems to be aware of physical contact.

Is it a matter of complexity? Do we consider micro-organisms to be aware? Or is there some specific feature of a biological system which leads to awareness?

The point is, though we've not yet figured out exactly what features of a data-processing system are required for it to be "aware", be capable of experience and have a mind, there is however no evidence to suggest that mind is something more than a data-processing system.

You just listed all the aspects of brain function which are considered defining features of awareness, and yet you're not willing to concede that any OTHER system which has those features is necessarily aware. This means that looking at brain function and finding the ability to identify, or to process, or to interect, or any level of complexity of these things is NOT sufficient to prove awareness.

Now, your fMRI isn't looking like the be-all end-all that it was a couple of posts ago.

Quote:

(August 11, 2013 at 9:01 am)bennyboy Wrote: Let me ask you this: if a computer simulation can take in visual and auditory input, process it, and output behavior to a cyborg body so that it passes the Turing test, would you believe that it was actually experiencing the universe?

Yes, I would. It may not be the same manner of experience as us, but it'd be experience nonetheless.

With this, I categorically disagree. First of all, you've just said that none of these abilities necessarily constitute awareness. You'll have to explain how it both CAN and also CANNOT.
Second, I define experience as my ability to really feel feelings, really see colors, not just for my brain to process them. I know this special ability exists, because I happen to have it. I assume people have it, because they behave much as I behave, and so I believe they are like me in other ways, as well.

This is a problem, because if you want to prove that awareness is a particular kind of data processing, you'll have to show that there is no fundamental awareness in rocks, or in the sun, or in every particle in the universe. Having evidence for a theory for which contrary evidence cannot, even hypothetically, be produced is not to have a workable theory-- it's a very good signal that question-begging is accompanying philosophical assumptions.

Quote:

(August 11, 2013 at 9:01 am)bennyboy Wrote: Okay, let's get super-inclusive, because that makes words better, right? Let's define "will" as the possibility that a collection of wave functions ("A") might do something, and let's define "freedom" as the absence of any other collection of wave functions ("B") that prevent A from doing it.

Goo. Now that we've established the generalized form, let's get to the specifics - what specific wave-functions does A refer to, what does doing 'something' mean, what does the other collection of wave-functions B refer to, etc.?

Any collection. A drop of water might land on my head; a gust of wind blows it off course; the drop therefore has no free will. My dog might go to his food bowl; he can see that my wife has not put food in the bowl; my dog therefore has no free will.

Quote:

(August 11, 2013 at 9:01 am)bennyboy Wrote: Now, we don't have to goof around with a bunch of arbitrary shorthand for properties that we can't independently verify even exist. Love: can't put it next to a ruler. Beauty: we know in our heart of hearts that it exists only in the brain, but can't even define it precisely. Free will: can't touch this.

Your mistake is to assume that they are arbitrary or that they can't be verified independently.

And again, we're down to operational definitions. Don't believe me? Define beauty, and say how it can be "verified independently."

______

Okay, I think I'm confirmed that we're not going to make any progress here. I'm happy to argue about physical monism, idealism and substance dualism, but I really feel we should move to a different thread.

(August 11, 2013 at 8:30 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Now you're starting to understand me.

A. I am capable of actual experience, and have a brain which functions in certain ways.
B. Everything with a brain which functions in certain ways is actually experiencing.

B here is clearly invalid.

Except, I never implied B. In fact, IIRC, my argument makes the opposite point.

A. I am capable of actual experience and that capacity comes from a specific brain function (sentience).

B. Not everything with a functioning brain necessarily has that capacity. Therefore, not everything with a brain is necessarily sentient.

C. Other brain functions do not necessarily imply sentience either.

(August 11, 2013 at 8:30 pm)bennyboy Wrote: You just listed all the aspects of brain function which are considered defining features of awareness, and yet you're not willing to concede that any OTHER system which has those features is necessarily aware. This means that looking at brain function and finding the ability to identify, or to process, or to interect, or any level of complexity of these things is NOT sufficient to prove awareness.

Now, your fMRI isn't looking like the be-all end-all that it was a couple of posts ago.

On the contrary, I'm saying that any other system where all those aspects are present would be considered as "aware". If we look at a complex brain function capable of identifying, processing, interacting etc. we would consider it to be aware. What we have not identified yet is which of these features are the definitive aspects of awareness and which are incidental. Its a question similar to asking "how many grains of sand does it take to make a heap?". We know that too few grains do not make a heap and that too many do - but we do not know at what number should be draw the line. Similarly, we know that a system with all the features would be aware and one with one or two combinations would not be - but we do not know where to draw the line.

(August 11, 2013 at 8:30 pm)bennyboy Wrote: With this, I categorically disagree. First of all, you've just said that none of these abilities necessarily constitute awareness. You'll have to explain how it both CAN and also CANNOT.

What I said was none of these abilities on their own can be considered to necessarily constitute awareness. As of now, we simply do not know which combination of the given abilities are required for awareness and which are the optional extras.

(August 11, 2013 at 8:30 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Second, I define experience as my ability to really feel feelings, really see colors, not just for my brain to process them. I know this special ability exists, because I happen to have it. I assume people have it, because they behave much as I behave, and so I believe they are like me in other ways, as well.

You should also be aware of the difference between "experience" and "awareness". Experience is a specialized form of internal awareness, i.e. you being aware of the working of your own mind. When an apple is put in front of you, your eyes receive the visual data and transfer it to the brain where it is processed. All the while, you are aware of this process occurring and you refer to it as the experience of seeing the color red. When your stomach is empty, it leads to a biological reaction resulting in the desire for food and your awareness of this process is regarded as feeling hungry.

For a machine to pass the Turing test, I believe it'd need to have a certain level self-awareness, if it is to talk intelligibly about its internal state. Thus, I believe it to be capable of experience as well.

(August 11, 2013 at 8:30 pm)bennyboy Wrote: This is a problem, because if you want to prove that awareness is a particular kind of data processing, you'll have to show that there is no fundamental awareness in rocks, or in the sun, or in every particle in the universe. Having evidence for a theory for which contrary evidence cannot, even hypothetically, be produced is not to have a workable theory-- it's a very good signal that question-begging is accompanying philosophical assumptions.

This is not a problem for me because the very nature of a data-processing system rules out the possibility of fundamental awareness in the rocks or sun or particles of the universe. Secondly, identifying the definitive features of awareness would require justification - which means that any such theory would have to be falsifiable.

(August 11, 2013 at 8:30 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Any collection. A drop of water might land on my head; a gust of wind blows it off course; the drop therefore has no free will. My dog might go to his food bowl; he can see that my wife has not put food in the bowl; my dog therefore has no free will.

If we use the phrase to refer to just any collection, then there is no point in defining the term at all. The whole point of starting with a generalization is to determine, form that point onwards, which particular specifics would be sensible - not to exclude specifics altogether.

(August 11, 2013 at 8:30 pm)bennyboy Wrote: And again, we're down to operational definitions. Don't believe me? Define beauty, and say how it can be "verified independently."

Beauty is a characteristic of a person, animal, place, object, or idea that provides a perceptual experience of pleasure or satisfaction.

Such a perceptual experience would take a specific form within your brain and - should the means of observation be developed - it'd be verifiable.

(August 11, 2013 at 11:29 pm)genkaus Wrote:

(August 11, 2013 at 8:30 pm)bennyboy Wrote: With this, I categorically disagree. First of all, you've just said that none of these abilities necessarily constitute awareness. You'll have to explain how it both CAN and also CANNOT.

What I said was none of these abilities on their own can be considered to necessarily constitute awareness. As of now, we simply do not know which combination of the given abilities are required for awareness and which are the optional extras.

You are defining awareness in functional terms, rather than experiential terms. I think you'll be unsurprised to find that I do not accept your definition, or the process at which you are arriving at it.

Quote:

(August 11, 2013 at 8:30 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Second, I define experience as my ability to really feel feelings, really see colors, not just for my brain to process them. I know this special ability exists, because I happen to have it. I assume people have it, because they behave much as I behave, and so I believe they are like me in other ways, as well.

You should also be aware of the difference between "experience" and "awareness". Experience is a specialized form of internal awareness, i.e. you being aware of the working of your own mind. When an apple is put in front of you, your eyes receive the visual data and transfer it to the brain where it is processed. All the while, you are aware of this process occurring and you refer to it as the experience of seeing the color red. When your stomach is empty, it leads to a biological reaction resulting in the desire for food and your awareness of this process is regarded as feeling hungry.

The issue is not how the brain translates light into a composite symbol "apple." The issue is how a physical system has arrived at the actual experience of redness. You are clearly confident in this narrative, but you are lacking even a beginning theory about how this might happen. Given ANY kind of processing, or ANY physical structure, how is it that the actual experience we have supervenes on it?

Quote:For a machine to pass the Turing test, I believe it'd need to have a certain level self-awareness, if it is to talk intelligibly about its internal state. Thus, I believe it to be capable of experience as well.

That's a philosophical position, which will undoubtedly be "proven" by similar question-begging: well, we've shown that certain kinds of self-referential processing represent sentience, and we've shown that the Cyberboy 2000 processes in this way. Therefore it's experiencing.

And THAT is exactly why I don't allow the non-dualistic use of dualistic words. The reality is that when the Cyberboy fires up, it may just be processing data, and not experiencing it as colors, or as beautiful patterns, or as delightful scents; I, on the other hand, know for sure that I am engaged in a rich experience of my envrionment. Your semantic convenience (read: "sensible adaptation of the words to new contexts") could one day have real consequences: like people choosing to put their "consciousness" into mechanical brains, and thereby erasing their actual consciousness from the universe, and dying maybe 50 years early.

Quote:

(August 11, 2013 at 8:30 pm)bennyboy Wrote: This is a problem, because if you want to prove that awareness is a particular kind of data processing, you'll have to show that there is no fundamental awareness in rocks, or in the sun, or in every particle in the universe. Having evidence for a theory for which contrary evidence cannot, even hypothetically, be produced is not to have a workable theory-- it's a very good signal that question-begging is accompanying philosophical assumptions.

This is not a problem for me because the very nature of a data-processing system rules out the possibility of fundamental awareness in the rocks or sun or particles of the universe. Secondly, identifying the definitive features of awareness would require justification - which means that any such theory would have to be falsifiable.

The existence of experience is neither provable nor falsifiable. Therefore, the most sensible hypothesis is that you do not actually experience, but just seem to.

Quote:

(August 11, 2013 at 8:30 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Any collection. A drop of water might land on my head; a gust of wind blows it off course; the drop therefore has no free will. My dog might go to his food bowl; he can see that my wife has not put food in the bowl; my dog therefore has no free will.

If we use the phrase to refer to just any collection, then there is no point in defining the term at all. The whole point of starting with a generalization is to determine, form that point onwards, which particular specifics would be sensible - not to exclude specifics altogether.

EVERY collection is "just any collection," unless you have a real-life, sentient human mind capable of experience to dub one system significant, and others not.

You're mixing modes: you insist on a physical monism, but keep using words in which mind, will, etc. exist in some meaningful way. But they don't. What separates the chemical/energetic/gravitational interactions of the brain from any other system from one in which "mind" exists? Nothing except an idea.

Quote:

(August 11, 2013 at 8:30 pm)bennyboy Wrote: And again, we're down to operational definitions. Don't believe me? Define beauty, and say how it can be "verified independently."

Beauty is a characteristic of a person, animal, place, object, or idea that provides a perceptual experience of pleasure or satisfaction.

Such a perceptual experience would take a specific form within your brain and - should the means of observation be developed - it'd be verifiable.

So beauty is NOT a property of things, but a reaction of the brain to things. And in fact, thing-ness is not a property of things either; even this exists only at the conceptual level (i.e. of a sentient, thinking being).

(August 12, 2013 at 12:33 am)bennyboy Wrote: You are defining awareness in functional terms, rather than experiential terms. I think you'll be unsurprised to find that I do not accept your definition, or the process at which you are arriving at it.

Given experience itself is a form of awareness, defining it in experiential terms would give rise to circular reasoning. Besides, when talking about what constitutes awareness we are automatically required to give a functional definition.

(August 12, 2013 at 12:33 am)bennyboy Wrote: The issue is not how the brain translates light into a composite symbol "apple." The issue is how a physical system has arrived at the actual experience of redness. You are clearly confident in this narrative, but you are lacking even a beginning theory about how this might happen. Given ANY kind of processing, or ANY physical structure, how is it that the actual experience we have supervenes on it?

Read it again. I'm specifically addressing the issue of "how a physical system arrives at the actual experience of redness". The theory here is that the aspect of self-awareness by which we become aware of the internal workings of the brain is what we call experience. Simply put:
1. A physical system becomes 'aware of', i.e. processes external information as a result of which certain changes take place within it.
2. A physical system further processes this act of processing itself, due to which further changes take place within it.

If 1. occurs, we can regard the system as 'aware'. If both 1 and 2 occur we can regard it as experiencing something.

(August 12, 2013 at 12:33 am)bennyboy Wrote: That's a philosophical position, which will undoubtedly be "proven" by similar question-begging: well, we've shown that certain kinds of self-referential processing represent sentience, and we've shown that the Cyberboy 2000 processes in this way. Therefore it's experiencing.

And THAT is exactly why I don't allow the non-dualistic use of dualistic words. The reality is that when the Cyberboy fires up, it may just be processing data, and not experiencing it as colors, or as beautiful patterns, or as delightful scents; I, on the other hand, know for sure that I am engaged in a rich experience of my envrionment.

Once again, you are the only one begging the question here. You start with the assumption that experience is not and cannot be a form of data-processing and therefore, any data-processing physical system cannot be - by definition - capable of experience no matter how apparent its capacity for experience maybe. So, even if the Cyberboy 2000 says "This apple is red, round, smooth to touch and tastes sweet", you'd regard it simply as a machine processing visual, tactile and chemical data - not as an entity experiencing something.

My position, on the other hand, is falsifiable. I do assume that experience is a form of self-referential data-processing which means I would expect a physical system with human level of complexity and capacity for self-awareness to be capable of experience. Notice the use of the term "expect" - which means, I won't simply assume that it is capable of experience. But, if my assumption is correct then such an entity entity would be capable of experience - though specific to its physiological make-up and needs. I would expect it to find certain patterns as beautiful, certain scents as delightful and the taste of motor oil preferable to that of an apple. But, if it gives no such indications, then I'd have to accept that there is something more to experience than data-processing.

(August 12, 2013 at 12:33 am)bennyboy Wrote: Your semantic convenience (read: "sensible adaptation of the words to new contexts") could one day have real consequences: like people choosing to put their "consciousness" into mechanical brains, and thereby erasing their actual consciousness from the universe, and dying maybe 50 years early.

I long for the day. I do not accept the assumption that a person's 'real' consciousness is something inexorably tied to their biological brain. And I do not attempt to study consciousness in functional terms simply as a matter semantic convenience. This is the very real consequence that I not only expect, but wish for. All I can hope for is that it would become a possibility within my lifetime. Transhumanism FTW.

(August 12, 2013 at 12:33 am)bennyboy Wrote: The existence of experience is neither provable nor falsifiable. Therefore, the most sensible hypothesis is that you do not actually experience, but just seem to.

And why would you assume that it is neither provable nor falsifiable?

(August 12, 2013 at 12:33 am)bennyboy Wrote: EVERY collection is "just any collection," unless you have a real-life, sentient human mind capable of experience to dub one system significant, and others not.

I was under the impression that both of us qualified for that. Just me then?

(August 12, 2013 at 12:33 am)bennyboy Wrote: You're mixing modes: you insist on a physical monism, but keep using words in which mind, will, etc. exist in some meaningful way. But they don't. What separates the chemical/energetic/gravitational interactions of the brain from any other system from one in which "mind" exists? Nothing except an idea.

I though I had settled this point with my ingenious software-hardware analogy. We know that all software is reducible to particular forms as functions of the hardware. All your applications and programs can be explained by and described as a series of electronic pulses represented as 1's and 0's. And yet, we do not argue if software exists or if the terms can be used in any meaningful way. We can talk about all the different aspects of software without any regard or reference to the underlying hardware. Clearly, we accept the fact that an entity being explicable by or reducible to its underlying cause does not detract from its existence or meaningfulness. And for precisely the same reason, we can regard mind and will to have meaningful existence within physical monism.

(August 12, 2013 at 12:33 am)bennyboy Wrote: So beauty is NOT a property of things, but a reaction of the brain to things.

No, the reaction would be the experience of pleasure or satisfaction. Pursuant to this reaction, the property referred to as 'beauty' gets assigned to the thing. However, since this property depends on the person perceiving the thing and not the thing itself, it is a subjective property.

(August 12, 2013 at 12:33 am)bennyboy Wrote: And in fact, thing-ness is not a property of things either; even this exists only at the conceptual level (i.e. of a sentient, thinking being).

Yes. Though sentience is unnecessary for establishment of identity and this particular conceptual imposition is neither arbitrary nor subjective.

(August 12, 2013 at 3:28 am)genkaus Wrote: Given experience itself is a form of awareness, defining it in experiential terms would give rise to circular reasoning. Besides, when talking about what constitutes awareness we are automatically required to give a functional definition.

No we aren't. A descriptive definition works, too-- to explain what it IS LIKE to experience. It just doesn't work for you, because such subjective language is too imprecise to take into a lab.

Quote:Read it again. I'm specifically addressing the issue of "how a physical system arrives at the actual experience of redness". The theory here is that the aspect of self-awareness by which we become aware of the internal workings of the brain is what we call experience. Simply put:
1. A physical system becomes 'aware of', i.e. processes external information as a result of which certain changes take place within it.
2. A physical system further processes this act of processing itself, due to which further changes take place within it.

If 1. occurs, we can regard the system as 'aware'. If both 1 and 2 occur we can regard it as experiencing something.

All systems "process" all other systems to some degree, since they are all linked by gravity, and by the exchange of photons. Anyway, who's to say a particular collection of particles is a "system," and another is just a bunch of particles?

We are in the realm of ideology here, not one of objective reality.

Quote:Once again, you are the only one begging the question here. You start with the assumption that experience is not and cannot be a form of data-processing and therefore, any data-processing physical system cannot be - by definition - capable of experience no matter how apparent its capacity for experience maybe. So, even if the Cyberboy 2000 says "This apple is red, round, smooth to touch and tastes sweet", you'd regard it simply as a machine processing visual, tactile and chemical data - not as an entity experiencing something.

The old "No, I'm not. You are!" defense. I'll be using that one liberally, as well.

I'm not begging the question-- I'm describing the world view that people generally have: that people have minds, and that machines do not. Now, it is possible that a machine CAN theoretically experience, just as I do. That's an exciting possibility, but I'm curious how you would confirm or disprove that possibility. I'm willing to extend the status of "sentient being" to people because I'm one, and I'm willing to assume that degree of similarity. But why would I extend it to a machine, regardless of how convincingly it mimics the behavior of actual humans?

Quote:My position, on the other hand, is falsifiable. I do assume that experience is a form of self-referential data-processing which means I would expect a physical system with human level of complexity and capacity for self-awareness to be capable of experience. Notice the use of the term "expect" - which means, I won't simply assume that it is capable of experience. But, if my assumption is correct then such an entity entity would be capable of experience - though specific to its physiological make-up and needs. I would expect it to find certain patterns as beautiful, certain scents as delightful and the taste of motor oil preferable to that of an apple. But, if it gives no such indications, then I'd have to accept that there is something more to experience than data-processing.

I wish we could see this happen in our lives. Do androids dream of electric sheep?

But let's say your Cyberboy 2000 takes in Beethoven's 5th, simulates the musculature of a "moved" human being, or possibly sheds a tear in response. Does this prove it's more than just an elaborate, but nevertheless unfeeling, machine? Should we give such machines rights? Should we allow them equal status in social programs, or allow them to govern themselves (or us)?

Quote:And why would you assume that it [the existence of experience] is neither provable nor falsifiable?

Because I have access to experience, and cannot prove it other than by insisting verbally that I have it. I cannot otherwise show that I actually experience, rather than seem to.

Bored now.

(August 12, 2013 at 5:03 am)bennyboy Wrote: No we aren't. A descriptive definition works, too-- to explain what it IS LIKE to experience.

An accurate descriptive definition would require more than describing awareness in terms of experience - given that experience itself is a form of awareness.

(August 12, 2013 at 5:03 am)bennyboy Wrote: It just doesn't work for you, because such subjective language is too imprecise to take into a lab.

True enough. Your definition doesn't work for two specific reasons:

1. Adequacy - An adequate definition should be able to explain the concept or the phenomena to a person not already familiar with it. Do you think your definition can explain the meaning of awareness to an entity not capable of experience?

2. Operationalization - While studying the concept you do need to first operationalize it, i.e. specify the underlying principles, defined the limits etc. basically, make it good enough to be taken to the lab.

(August 12, 2013 at 5:03 am)bennyboy Wrote: All systems "process" all other systems to some degree, since they are all linked by gravity, and by the exchange of photons. Anyway, who's to say a particular collection of particles is a "system," and another is just a bunch of particles?

We are in the realm of ideology here, not one of objective reality.

Equivocation much? When we talk about data-processing systems, the "process" refers to a specific actions taking place with specific results - it does not automatically apply to all systems. And we are to say which collection of particles constitutes a system and which do not. And there is no such realm as ideology.

(August 12, 2013 at 5:03 am)bennyboy Wrote: The old "No, I'm not. You are!" defense. I'll be using that one liberally, as well.

I'm not begging the question-- I'm describing the world view that people generally have: that people have minds, and that machines do not. Now, it is possible that a machine CAN theoretically experience, just as I do. That's an exciting possibility, but I'm curious how you would confirm or disprove that possibility. I'm willing to extend the status of "sentient being" to people because I'm one, and I'm willing to assume that degree of similarity. But why would I extend it to a machine, regardless of how convincingly it mimics the behavior of actual humans?

Well, if you accept the theoretical possibility of machines being capable of experience, then you are not begging the question. However, if that possibility were shown to be true, you would also have to accept that phenomena such as mind/sentience/experience are not limited to dualism and have meaningful existence within monist context as well.

As for the question of determining actual, Id say not all aspects of human behavior can be mimicked. In fact, not even the behavior of your goldfish can be mimicked without there being the capacity for experience. Certain facts of your consciousness - such as your preferences, your tastes, your aversions etc. develop and change over time as a result of your capacity to experience. Should the machine not be capable of experience, this development would not be seen in it.

(August 12, 2013 at 5:03 am)bennyboy Wrote: I wish we could see this happen in our lives. Do androids dream of electric sheep?

But let's say your Cyberboy 2000 takes in Beethoven's 5th, simulates the musculature of a "moved" human being, or possibly sheds a tear in response. Does this prove it's more than just an elaborate, but nevertheless unfeeling, machine? Should we give such machines rights? Should we allow them equal status in social programs, or allow them to govern themselves (or us)?

Now this is where things get complicated. We do not yet know which elements of consciousness define it, which elements are necessary consequences and which are biological extras and how they all interact with each-other. Would androids need to dream, or even sleep at all? Why would we create something capable of feeling pain or suffering or sadness? Maybe we could just get rid of those elements. Would we be able to simulate the emotion of sadness completely - not just the the external signs of it? I mean, we all have faked emotions from time to time, so within that context we are acting like an unfeeling machine. But if anyone was looking at our brains in that moment, they'd know that whether or not we were actually experiencing those emotions.

Their status in society would be a different matter altogether. Currently, we don't grant rights based on sentience. That's why animals don't have the same rights as us. But, if we foolishly keep trying to deny them their rights, te world of matrix might easily become a reality (though not the human batteries part - that's just stupid).

(August 12, 2013 at 5:03 am)bennyboy Wrote: Because I have access to experience, and cannot prove it other than by insisting verbally that I have it. I cannot otherwise show that I actually experience, rather than seem to.

That's a rather defeatist attitude. Tell me then, why should I believe that you are an actual human being and not a philosophical zombie? Or, try a simpler problem: how would you - without referring to mutually accessible visual data, convince me that you are not blind?

(August 12, 2013 at 6:38 am)genkaus Wrote: True enough. Your definition doesn't work for two specific reasons:

1. Adequacy - An adequate definition should be able to explain the concept or the phenomena to a person not already familiar with it. Do you think your definition can explain the meaning of awareness to an entity not capable of experience?

Only if it thinks experience is the same as brain function, and if it has access to an fMRI. But it's not the fault of the "entity" if it is not capable of experiencing as I do.

Quote:2. Operationalization - While studying the concept you do need to first operationalize it, i.e. specify the underlying principles, defined the limits etc. basically, make it good enough to be taken to the lab.

"Good" enough is just a euphemism for "compatible." And that's begging the question-- you make a definition in physical terms, and later, once the dust has settled and nobody realizes that an operational definition is different than the original, you say, "Look-- there's a picture of someone's mind-- right there on the computer screen." But you're not talking about their experience-- you're talking about blood flow in the brain.

Quote:

(August 12, 2013 at 5:03 am)bennyboy Wrote: All systems "process" all other systems to some degree, since they are all linked by gravity, and by the exchange of photons. Anyway, who's to say a particular collection of particles is a "system," and another is just a bunch of particles?

We are in the realm of ideology here, not one of objective reality.

Equivocation much? When we talk about data-processing systems, the "process" refers to a specific actions taking place with specific results - it does not automatically apply to all systems. And we are to say which collection of particles constitutes a system and which do not.

Well, if we are defining reality based on our ideas, rather than vice versa, then maybe we should talk about some kind of idealistic monism. Because I think if you strip away all the ideas in physical monism, you are left with a bunch of wave functions, and no objects which can have attributes like will or the ability to experience.

Quote:Well, if you accept the theoretical possibility of machines being capable of experience, then you are not begging the question. However, if that possibility were shown to be true, you would also have to accept that phenomena such as mind/sentience/experience are not limited to dualism and have meaningful existence within monist context as well.

As I said, I accept the theoretical possibility, but I challenge you to prove it. It must be assumed, just as I assume that the text ascribed to "genkaus" comes from a sentient human mind. This is a pragmatic assumption-- but it cannot be "shown to be true."

Quote:As for the question of determining actual, Id say not all aspects of human behavior can be mimicked. In fact, not even the behavior of your goldfish can be mimicked without there being the capacity for experience. Certain facts of your consciousness - such as your preferences, your tastes, your aversions etc. develop and change over time as a result of your capacity to experience. Should the machine not be capable of experience, this development would not be seen in it.

No, it doesn't actually have to be capable of experience. It just has to be able to process data AS THOUGH it were capable of experience. Because if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, we know for sure it feels like a duck-- right?

Quote:Now this is where things get complicated. We do not yet know which elements of consciousness define it, which elements are necessary consequences and which are biological extras and how they all interact with each-other. Would androids need to dream, or even sleep at all? Why would we create something capable of feeling pain or suffering or sadness? Maybe we could just get rid of those elements. Would we be able to simulate the emotion of sadness completely - not just the the external signs of it? I mean, we all have faked emotions from time to time, so within that context we are acting like an unfeeling machine. But if anyone was looking at our brains in that moment, they'd know that whether or not we were actually experiencing those emotions.

We don't know. . . yet? I think what you meant to say is, "We don't know. . ." "Yet" is a predictive word, and I don't think you can demonstrate that the discovery of the elements you mentioned is guaranteed. . . or even possible.

Quote:That's a rather defeatist attitude. Tell me then, why should I believe that you are an actual human being and not a philosophical zombie? Or, try a simpler problem: how would you - without referring to mutually accessible visual data, convince me that you are not blind?

As I've already said, non-solipsism is a pragmatic assumption, not a provable fact. I accept this assumption, because interacting with people I consider "real" is more interesting to me, and feels more natural to me, than not doing so.

As for blindness-- let's change your example. How would you explain to a worm (if you could speak wormy) what it means to see? Or how could a bat explain to you what it feels like to use natural sonar?

Most importantly, what is the chance that ALL human beings have some shortcoming of which they are unaware, which makes their view on the reality of the universe so hopelessly skewed that they get it all wrong? Are we as clever, and as capable of objective observation, as we think we are? I'm going to say-- almost for sure not. And yet we insist on defining reality exactly by those limitations. I suppose a worm would say, "What's all this seeing business you keep going on about? Make me taste it, or it's not real."