GENKAUS

First, there is a problem with concluding that intelligent behavior is always a sign of actual intelligence. Not long ago, the ability to play chess was considered intelligent behavior. Today, very few people would consider any chess program intelligent, particularly one based on brute force. Then we have the Turing test. Some early testers were fooled by simple programs like EllaZ, made with only 200 lines of BASIC. Determining if something is actually intelligent or merely simulating intelligence is a judgment call based on very vague criteria. If you maintain that a clever brute force program can be conscious, then we are at a standstill. Your speculation counterbalances my incredulity.

But even if you decide that a machine is actually intelligent, concluding that its intelligence is accompanied by qualia is even more speculative. A system whose function it is to perform symbolic operations to produces other symbols does not require qualia, no matter how beautifully it dances and spins. You have no reason to suppose that it would. While it is true that humans, calculators, and abacuses can all perform symbolic operations, they clearly do so in a vastly different ways. Those differences are sufficient for doubting whether the mere ability to manipulate data qualifies as the criteria for whether a physical system experiences qualia.
You seem unwilling to distinguish between signs (the outward form of a text or image) and their significance (the meaning, or content, of a text or image). For example, the English word ‘dog’ has the same meaning as ‘le chien’ does in French.
A machine code, like EllaZ, is capable of manipulating symbols according to English syntax and spelling without any understanding of what those symbols signify. Without readers to interpret the results, symbols have no meaningful content.

You also seem to think that one machine process can serve as the “reader” for another machine process. That position, if it is one you hold, pushes the problem back without solving anything. You have no point where you can inject meaning into the system. For example, if you write the word “red” on a piece of paper, it has no meaning to a person that only understands French. Redness is not in the text. Likewise meaning is not IN the symbols that go into or come out of a machine.

Finally, consider the difference between an artist and a digital camera connected to a color printer. A camera can take data from the visual field, translate it into a set of instructions send it to the printer for reproduction, and thereby making a colored piece of paper simulating the view. This set-up can do so completely without any understanding. But when an artist does nearly the same thing with artistic media, he/she works with a content rich impression to produce a meaningful product, even though the reasoning and bodily processes that allow the artist to create happen just below the conscious awareness of the artist. In terms of input and output, the camera/printer is functionally equivalent to the artist. Again, if you maintain that outward behavior can be taken as an indication consciousness, then we are at a standstill. Your speculation counterbalances my incredulity.

As someone who studies computer science, I should point out that those who thought playing chess was a sign of intelligence weren't really in a very good position to make assertions like that. They were often enthusiastic, but ignorant (on cognitive science and philosophy of mind), and made similar claims with regards to coding programs that made coherent stories. And of course, this was back in like the 70s and 80s.

(December 10, 2013 at 2:09 am)bennyboy Wrote: WITHOUT TAKING AS GIVEN its correctness.

You are taking as given that certain behaviors necessarily imply qualia. It's not logical to take this position, as behaviors are mechanical by definition.

Once again - that is not taken as a given. That is concluded based on my own qualia and behavior.

(December 10, 2013 at 2:09 am)bennyboy Wrote: That's a philosophical position, not a scientific or logical one. Until you can show anyone both qualia and its resultant behavior, you've got nothing. You say you have qualia-- fine, prove it.

Sure - once we agree on the meaning of qualia.

(December 10, 2013 at 2:09 am)bennyboy Wrote: Stop. Forget about proving a behavior can't be reproduced without qualia. You haven't yet proven that there's a case where qualia exists, with or without any particular behavior to let you "know" about it.

That is something you proposed as brute fact. You are the one who keeps insisting on accepting one's own qualia as a a brute fact. So, you should know of a case where qualia exists - your own.

(December 10, 2013 at 2:09 am)bennyboy Wrote: You're still running in circles:

-Only qualia can be responsible for particular mechanics (i.e. behaviors)
-I know qualia exist because I see those particular mechanics

A circle is a circle is a circle.

There is no circle here.

(December 10, 2013 at 2:09 am)bennyboy Wrote: You've done nothing else. Your "evidence" shows that brains cause bodily motions, not that those brains are subjectively experiencing qualia.

Except not all aspects of behavior are limited to bodily motions - which is where subjective experience comes in.

(December 10, 2013 at 2:09 am)bennyboy Wrote: Don't believe me? Take me up on my offer-- we'll both make accounts on a science thread, and you can go explain how your knowledge of your own qualia stands as evidence that anything which behaves in certain ways must have qualia.

The gauntlet has been thrown.

Sorry - not picking it up. You can ask someone over there to come here if you like, but I limit myself to the Community, Humor and The Pit.

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(December 11, 2013 at 5:07 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: First, there is a problem with concluding that intelligent behavior is always a sign of actual intelligence. Not long ago, the ability to play chess was considered intelligent behavior. Today, very few people would consider any chess program intelligent, particularly one based on brute force. Then we have the Turing test. Some early testers were fooled by simple programs like EllaZ, made with only 200 lines of BASIC. Determining if something is actually intelligent or merely simulating intelligence is a judgment call based on very vague criteria. If you maintain that a clever brute force program can be conscious, then we are at a standstill. Your speculation counterbalances my incredulity.

Actually, I would regard intelligent behavior as a sign of actual intelligence (as opposed to what? fake intelligence?). Your problem would be the criteria by which intelligent behavior is determined. For example, the ability to play chess was regarded as a criteria for intelligence because the assumption was made that without a capacity for abstract thought and reasoning, playing chess would be impossible.

Now, I don't know the algorithm used to design the chess program, so I'll go with a simpler example - Tic-tac-toe. A game in which only a limited moves are possible and every move and its counter can be pre-programed. The the chess program has be designed similarly, then the reason why playing chess was regarded as a sign of intelligence has been negated. However, if what it has been designed on are not the moves but the abstract principles behind chess, then the program is capable of reasoning and thinking at an abstract level and therefore is intelligent. It no longer fits your definition of a "brute force program".

(December 11, 2013 at 5:07 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: But even if you decide that a machine is actually intelligent, concluding that its intelligence is accompanied by qualia is even more speculative. A system whose function it is to perform symbolic operations to produces other symbols does not require qualia, no matter how beautifully it dances and spins. You have no reason to suppose that it would. While it is true that humans, calculators, and abacuses can all perform symbolic operations, they clearly do so in a vastly different ways. Those differences are sufficient for doubting whether the mere ability to manipulate data qualifies as the criteria for whether a physical system experiences qualia.
You seem unwilling to distinguish between signs (the outward form of a text or image) and their significance (the meaning, or content, of a text or image). For example, the English word ‘dog’ has the same meaning as ‘le chien’ does in French.
A machine code, like EllaZ, is capable of manipulating symbols according to English syntax and spelling without any understanding of what those symbols signify. Without readers to interpret the results, symbols have no meaningful content.

Your error here is the assumption that qualia is some form of basic, indivisible unit of experience that is either inherent to the system or isn't. Which is why, no matter what level of data-manipulation a machine is capable of, you'd always be skeptical of its capacity for subjective experience.

... and why you just assert that qualia is algorithmic without presenting any clear reason that justifies your assertion.

(December 12, 2013 at 7:53 am)genkaus Wrote: Once again - that is not taken as a given. That is concluded based on my own qualia and behavior.

There's no physical tell which can extend the knowledge of self to knowledge about others. Just because I have qualia and do behavior X doesn't necessarily mean that behavior X implies qualia. It's a false syllogism no matter how you word it. Now, it's true that believing in a false syllogism isn't the same as taking something as given. But for someone who DOES see the false syllogism, they will only be able to accept the argument if they are willing to assume it.

Quote:There is no circle here.

It's not dead. It's pining!

Quote:Except not all aspects of behavior are limited to bodily motions - which is where subjective experience comes in.

Is this a new equivocation? I can't think of a behavior that isn't defined in mechanical terms. Blushing? No, that's just blood flow-- no qualia required. Crying? Nope, just an opening of tear ducts combined with cyclical shuddering and modified breathing-- no qualia required.

I would go further, bennyboy, and say that verbal reports like, "I am in pain," do not guarantee that the person giving that report are actually in pain. No qualia required.

(December 12, 2013 at 10:44 am)ChadWooters Wrote: ... and why you just assert that qualia is algorithmic without presenting any clear reason that justifies your assertion.

I've given the reason plenty of times. The fact that subjective experience can be altered by altering the brain chemistry indicates that the relationship between the two is similar to that between hardware and software.

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(December 12, 2013 at 3:23 pm)bennyboy Wrote: There's no physical tell which can extend the knowledge of self to knowledge about others.

Only because you start with that assumption.

(December 12, 2013 at 3:23 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Just because I have qualia and do behavior X doesn't necessarily mean that behavior X implies qualia.

Unless, you do behavior X because of your qualia and have no reasonable alternate explanation for behavior X - in which case, it does imply qualia.

(December 12, 2013 at 3:23 pm)bennyboy Wrote: It's a false syllogism no matter how you word it. Now, it's true that believing in a false syllogism isn't the same as taking something as given. But for someone who DOES see the false syllogism, they will only be able to accept the argument if they are willing to assume it.

Except, its not a false syllogism and wording has nothing to do with it.

(December 12, 2013 at 3:23 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Is this a new equivocation? I can't think of a behavior that isn't defined in mechanical terms. Blushing? No, that's just blood flow-- no qualia required. Crying? Nope, just an opening of tear ducts combined with cyclical shuddering and modified breathing-- no qualia required.

Really? So you have evidence of these behavior occurring in you or others where they take place without qualia?

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(December 12, 2013 at 5:28 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: I would go further, bennyboy, and say that verbal reports like, "I am in pain," do not guarantee that the person giving that report are actually in pain. No qualia required.

No - what guarantees it is all the rest of the stuff associated with pain - such as grimacing, flinching, changes in body chemistry and activation of cerebral centers associated with pain.

I've found QualiaSoup's 2 videos on this topic interesting:

I admire the quality of content and presentation of qualiasoup’s videos. He did a very good job summarizing the basic arguments supporting physicalist theories. But, he did not fairly represent the counter-arguments. Fortunately, some response videos give at least a basic overview of the counter-arguments.

Genkaus, we have both already accepted the close relationship and correlation between brain states/processes and mental properties. You take that correlation as evidence for a causal link between low-level physical processes and qualia, apparently defined as a high-level emergent property. None of your replies justify this assumption. You either dismiss counter-arguments with hand-waving or restate your assumption by wrapping it in behaviorism. My objections (emergence as a linguistic convention, the implicit over-determination or epiphenomenalism of causal closure, evolution’s blindness to qualitative states, and the sign/significance relationship) stand unanswered.

Few of the additional empirical features you mention (in addition to verbal reports of pain) would be present in a machine intelligence, like the hypothetical Cyberboy. Biological similarities allow you to reasonably conclude that other humans experience subjective states of awareness. You have no similar basis for extending that capacity to radically different physiologies, from huge Babbage computers to silicon-based life forms. If there is a specific physical property you have in mind that allows consciousness to be realized across multiple platforms, then you need to be clear about what you think that property could be.

(December 13, 2013 at 2:16 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: I admire the quality of content and presentation of qualiasoup’s videos. He did a very good job summarizing the basic arguments supporting physicalist theories. But, he did not fairly represent the counter-arguments. Fortunately, some response videos give at least a basic overview of the counter-arguments.

Genkaus, we have both already accepted the close relationship and correlation between brain states/processes and mental properties. You take that correlation as evidence for a causal link between low-level physical processes and qualia, apparently defined as a high-level emergent property. None of your replies justify this assumption. You either dismiss counter-arguments with hand-waving or restate your assumption by wrapping it in behaviorism. My objections (emergence as a linguistic convention, the implicit over-determination or epiphenomenalism of causal closure, evolution’s blindness to qualitative states, and the sign/significance relationship) stand unanswered.

(emphasis mine)

When you decide to stop equivocating just to make room for your god, you let us know, Chad, okay?

It is evidence. Not 100% conclusive evidence, but nothing ever is. Shall we apply the same standard for your theories for which there is no evidence? You'd love us to do that. It just grates on your nerves that we're not that stupid.