Proof Mind is Fundamental and Matter Doesn't Exist

[bennyboy]

I don't agree with the word "account for" at all, because it doesn't answer the philosophical questions about mind: what is it, and why does it exist? It obviously seems to have a lot to do with HOW, but not necessarily WHY, we experience.

But I can say that I suspect if I go to a brain lab and watch people do experiments and stuff, my observations will be pretty consistent with what you are saying.

[emjay]

I don't agree with the word "account for" at all, because it doesn't answer the philosophical questions about mind: what is it, and why does it exist?  It obviously seems to have a lot to do with HOW, but not necessarily WHY, we experience.

But I can say that I suspect if I go to a brain lab and watch people do experiments and stuff, my observations will be pretty consistent with what you are saying.

I didn't mean to offend you Benny. I just wanted to clarify that point to understand your position better. But I wasn't judging - I'm in no position to judge because you three are far more intelligent than I will ever be, and that's just a fact. So whether the answer was yes or no, it would make no difference to me, because I just want to understand it. Just as I want to understand Rhythm's and AKD's positions.

[bennyboy]

I didn't mean to offend you Benny. I just wanted to clarify that point to understand your position better. But I wasn't judging - I'm in no position to judge because you three are far more intelligent than I will ever be, and that's just a fact. So whether the answer was yes or no, it would make no difference to me, because I just want to understand it. Just as I want to understand Rhythm's and AKD's positions.

I'm not offended, and I doubt that I'm smarter than anyone here. But from the idealist perspective, let me say this: the brain is something we experience: we look at it, dissect it, etc. And it seems connected to consciousness, for sure. But on a philosophical perspective, you have to be suspicious of circles like that, even if they feel so "right."

[ApeNotKillApe]

I don't agree with the word "account for" at all, because it doesn't answer the philosophical questions about mind: what is it, and why does it exist?  It obviously seems to have a lot to do with HOW, but not necessarily WHY, we experience.

But I can say that I suspect if I go to a brain lab and watch people do experiments and stuff, my observations will be pretty consistent with what you are saying.

The Universe exists within our minds, what lies outside the mind is the chaos from which we emerged and it's where we all return.
Existence is not going to explain itself to you, the universe doesn't think. Humans think, humans make sense of things, they find the reason for things, and reason grants meaning.

[bennyboy]

I don't agree with the word "account for" at all, because it doesn't answer the philosophical questions about mind: what is it, and why does it exist?  It obviously seems to have a lot to do with HOW, but not necessarily WHY, we experience.

But I can say that I suspect if I go to a brain lab and watch people do experiments and stuff, my observations will be pretty consistent with what you are saying.

The Universe exists within our minds, what lies outside the mind is the chaos from which we emerged and it's where we all return.
Existence is not going to explain itself to you, the universe doesn't think. Humans think, humans make sense of things, they find the reason for things, and reason grants meaning.

The universe as we experience it definitely exists within our minds.  This stuff about chaos and emergence. . . don't know where you are getting this form.  Making it up, I guess?

[ApeNotKillApe]

The Universe exists within our minds, what lies outside the mind is the chaos from which we emerged and it's where we all return.
Existence is not going to explain itself to you, the universe doesn't think. Humans think, humans make sense of things, they find the reason for things, and reason grants meaning.

The universe as we experience it definitely exists within our minds.  This stuff about chaos and emergence. . . don't know where you are getting this form.  Making it up, I guess?

Didn't just make it up on the spot, but yes.

[emjay]

I didn't mean to offend you Benny. I just wanted to clarify that point to understand your position better. But I wasn't judging - I'm in no position to judge because you three are far more intelligent than I will ever be, and that's just a fact. So whether the answer was yes or no, it would make no difference to me, because I just want to understand it. Just as I want to understand Rhythm's and AKD's positions.

I'm not offended, and I doubt that I'm smarter than anyone here.  But from the idealist perspective, let me say this: the brain is something we experience: we look at it, dissect it, etc.  And it seems connected to consciousness, for sure.  But on a philosophical perspective, you have to be suspicious of circles like that, even if they feel so "right."

I am suspicious of circles like that, and even more so after reading this thread and being formally introduced to the ideas of idealism and monistic idealism. I have absolute faith in neuroscience to find those correlations but in the end that's what they are - it doesn't say anything about how that experience would be 'created' by - or not even created but just co-existing with/equivalent to - processing/computation in the brain. So I'll always have doubts, no matter how strong those correlations appear to be, because of that unbridged gap. In this thread it is particularly the quantum stuff that makes me question even more, especially the "delayed choice quantum eraser experiment", as that seems decidedly influenced by consciousness rather than the physical, but I don't know enough about it (and probably haven't understood it correctly) so I'm looking forward to learning about it. As to the claimed proof in the OP, it's run the gauntlet now and I've tried my best to understand all the arguments for and against it put forward in this thread, but not being a master of logic I'm at a disadvantage and certainly in no position to judge it on my own or with any certainty. But nonetheless with everything that's been said in this thread, it has failed to convince me as a rock solid proof of monistic idealism. Likewise the first YouTube video I watched of Johanan Raatz's Introspective Argument, as referenced in the OP, didn't fill me confidence as when calling in to some sort of logic TV programme, the presenters just listened dismissively for a while, then concluded by telling him to put it in an email. But despite it failing to convince me on that score I still think it's very interesting and intriguing, but I realise that without proof it's just speculation or a theory.

[robvalue]

I can probably settle all this. When I wake up, I'll see who out of you lot are real. Then I'll let you all know tomorrow night.

[Captain Scarlet]

We'd agreed to that -long- ago, but it's uninformative /w regards to proving a metaphysical claim and more specifically uninformative with regards to any implication-sans-proof between idealism or materialism.   What's the problem...and does idealism incorporate this, as materialism does with comp and information theories, or does it simply state their existence as brute fact?  That would be important, to me.

Generally, when one model is capable of explaining what another refers to as a brute fact...I abandon the latter in favor of the former.

I find the explanations of physicalism with regards to (for example) mind to be so question begging that they are equally useless-- no matter how detailed they are.  Saying "the brain causes mind" feels right, but actually it's a non-sequitur if you don't know where our experiences of brains ultimately come from. . . and no, you don't get to just say, "the brain, of course," because circles are bad.

But I think this can be delivered back to the door of Idealism with interest:

- the often repeated mantra on this thread is "we can doubt matter, but we cannot doubt mind".  This simply begs the question by assuming that the mind is not matter from the outset. 
- there is a epistemic and ontological confusion.  To state: "I am certain I have a mind, but not certain of existents outside of my mind" is an epistemic problem not an ontoligical one, ie it does nothing to say I know what my mind is made of because I cannot be certain object x exists.  It is perfectly consistent to say "I am certain I have a mind, but not certain of existents outside of my mind, but my mind is an emergent property of brain structures".  

I think both of these problems too often confuse the issue, as the next step is to then leap to mind is fundamental and matter is not.  Using the same faulty reasoning we could argue (and we do not) thus:

1. If god exists then he is fundamental
2. I can doubt the existence of god
3. If I can doubt the existence of god, then he cannot be fundamental
C. God does not exist.

[bennyboy]

But I think this can be delivered back to the door of Idealism with interest:

- the often repeated mantra on this thread is "we can doubt matter, but we cannot doubt mind".  This simply begs the question by assuming that the mind is not matter from the outset. 

No, those competing ideas are not peers, like opposite sides of a coin. The knowledge of mind supercedes all other knowledge-- I think therefore I am, and all that. So I know for sure there IS mind-- I just don't know exactly what it is or where it comes from. No assumptions about substance or source are required at all.

- there is a epistemic and ontological confusion.  To state: "I am certain I have a mind, but not certain of existents outside of my mind" is an epistemic problem not an ontoligical one, ie it does nothing to say I know what my mind is made of because I cannot be certain object x exists.  It is perfectly consistent to say "I am certain I have a mind, but not certain of existents outside of my mind, but my mind is an emergent property of brain structures".  

You had me until that last sentence, which is clearly a non sequitur. At best you can say, in my experience, it seems that my mind is an emergent property of brain structures, with emphasis on "seems."

I think both of these problems too often confuse the issue, as the next step is to then leap to mind is fundamental and matter is not.

No, those first steps aren't fait accompli, and you don't get to proceed to the next steps.

Using the same faulty reasoning we could argue (and we do not) thus:

1. If god exists then he is fundamental
2. I can doubt the existence of god
3. If I can doubt the existence of god, then he cannot be fundamental
C. God does not exist.

I haven't made this reasoning about mind, nor asserted the things you are asserting. Are you responding to the OP maybe?