Mind is the brain?

[Thumpalumpacus]

Let me fix this for you:

"Minds have never been shown to exist."

There, that's a little simpler.

Then what is the difference between a conscious and an unconscious person?

[bennyboy]

Let me fix this for you:

"Minds have never been shown to exist."

There, that's a little simpler.

Then what is the difference between a conscious and an unconscious person?

One moves around more and says stuff.

[The Grand Nudger]

Wait a minute, I'm not arguing against materialism with the thing you quoted. 

Who's arguing?  I said you objected for this reason, and this reason alone.  In our many discussions on this subject, that's been my takeaway.

It is whether the unique function, properties or whatever that allow mind are of the brain specifically, or of certain kinds of processing more generally.

Too special to be material, and too special to be anything other than unique to gear you possess if it happens to be material.  I agree here, sort of...it's far too special.

[Brian37]

There is no "paradigm". There is no mystery.

You are literally your brain in motion. No different than a car with fuel will run and a car without fuel will not run. Human simply are stuck on old claims and gap fill out of a sense of false comfort and or fear. 

You smash up your computer into unusable parts it will not function as if it were int tact with no damage. YOU are your brain in motion. No, it isn't sexy, but it is reality.

That's a lot of assertions, but you will have a hard time supporting them without begging the question, I think.  But let's find out-- can you please support your many factual statements with logic, evidence, or ideally proof?

If there were life after death or something separate called a "spirit" or "soul" one could easily prove that by decapitating their own head sew it back on, and have it come back fully functioning. Now again, it is no different than your computer, try smashing it up into unusable parts and see if it functions the same way as if you didn't do that.

No assertions, we are finite.  An molecule outside the context of an in tact brain won't function as the in tact brain. An atom outside the in tact brain also will not function as the entire in tact brain. It would be just as stupid to think you could blow up your car to bits, and expect the tire to work like the in tact car.

A single cell or dead cell beyond repair will not work like a functioning in tact cell, much less an entire fully functioning brain. Have enough cells die beyond repair, you die.

Our brains in our healthy lucid state have a very specific order, brake the parts apart, deny it fuel it is no different than any other living thing or even a broken unusable mechanical object. WE DO NOT survive after our brains are dead and beyond repair.

It is why when someone suffers brain damage to the point of being a vegetable you are not the full version. Or when you have a degenerative brain disease like cancer or Alzheimers while you may fade in and out of your lucidity, it always gets progressively worse when diagnosed as terminal, to the point you are not there and until your brain dies to the point of your other organs being affected to the point of permanent death.

We DO NOT SURVIVE OUR DEATHS. The thing we call "I" is our brain with fuel and motion.

[LadyForCamus]

*Someone called my name?*

The problem for a material monism is this: it completely disregards, and has no capacity for discussing or explaining, qualia. Qualia are the "what it's like" of experience-- what it's like to taste pineapple, for example, cannot be explained by any observations outside the direct experience of tasting pineapple.

When we talk about mind, 99% of people are talking about what it's like to think and feel. Materialists are more likely to frame this in terms of information input, processing and output, and will define mind without regard to what it's like to think and feel. The reason for this is obvious: we cannot see qualia, touch them, measure them, or even demonstrate that they exist. In fact, I can only assume that other sentient beings exist at all-- I cannot really know whether my wife experiences qualia.

In other words, all so-called "evidence" depends on assumptions which beg the question. First, that what seems to be must be: my desk seems to be solid, so it must be. However, the current state of science is NOT, in fact, consistent with that idea. Science itself demonstrates that there is a massive disconnect between how we experience things and what they "really" are. In other words, we have evidence that evidence is unreliable in establishing an accurate view of reality.

It's fine to shout (literally, in little_monkey's case) that mind is the functioning of the brain. However, I'd like to see any method for establishing whether any physical system does or does not experience qualia. Does a robot, for example, know "what it's like" to encounter an orange cone? What, EXACTLY, is it about the brain that makes it capable of experiencing qualia? Other than the assumption that things basically are what they seem (which is obviously busted thanks to Science), what reason do I have to think that ANY physical system, including people's brains, experience qualia?

And if I can't even establish that others even HAVE minds, then what, exactly, is all the evidence about? Nothing real-- just philosophical assumptions.

Can you talk more about how science has shown that evidence is not an accurate reflection of reality? I'm just interested. [emoji846]

[bennyboy]

Too special to be material, and too special to be anything other than unique to gear you possess if it happens to be material.  I agree here, sort of...it's far too special.

No, not necessarily too special to be material. The brain has many layers of function, from the most elemental (the passage of photons an electrons among atoms for example), to the chemical cascades in neurons, to nerve bundles, to the coordination of brain parts involving sound and sight, complex processing, accessing of memories, etc.

Now, you can say that mind is brain function-- but unless you know exactly what it is about the brain that allows us to experience the "what it's like," there are some serious philosophical questions-- and that's EVEN IF I accept a physical monist position.

For example, does an atom have a primitive awareness of "what it's like" to receive a photon? Does a single nerve have an awareness of "what it's like" to be triggered by activity at the dendrites? Or is there a critical mass of complexity where there's any "what it's like" at all-- say, at least an input, a processor, and an output? In the first case, there is literally mind everywhere in the universe, and it is no less intrinsic to material than any other physical property. In the latter, it may be that you need something VERY similar to the human brain to have any awareness at all.

So waving at the brain and saying "It's clearly in there somewhere" won't really resolve the question of mind/matter, at least not in a very useful way. It's more an ontology than a conclusion.

[bennyboy]

Can you talk more about how science has shown that evidence is not an accurate reflection of reality?  I'm just interested.  [emoji846]

Let's say you look at a table. To what degree does your observation demonstrate that there is actually a flat surface there? The reality of it is that the table is 99.9999999% empty space, and that 0.000000001% consists of a nature that is almost impossible for the humand mind to comprehend. In one sense, there is no flatness-- it's an idea that we derive.

So there are at least two levels we can look at reality: that of the Universe as a cloud of varying densities of wave functions, and another as that of solid objects and their physical properties-- like bouncing billiard balls.

Now, I'm sure this view will be controversial, and I can feel Rhythm breathing down my neck already. But I'd say that science has shown that, whatever we think the universe is, it isn't that. Or, at least, that there's a paradoxical dualism: if you view a cell through a microscope (i.e. collect evidence) what are you really seeing? Is the answer a cloud of wave functions, or a "thing"? Is a photon a wave or a particle?

[Neo-Scholastic]

I read Mr. Lycan’s paper some time ago. First he says that the arguments against dualism have been grossly overrated (which they have). Secondly he reflects on his own materialist conviction and concludes that it doesn’t fare much better. He seems to believe that the primary justification for materialism is parsimony, which isn’t really an argument at all; but rather, an epistemological preference to interpret data in a certain way. What I find interesting is that Lycan and the people he references keep contrasting dualism with materialism. The more appropriate contrasts would be between dualism/monism and materialism/idealism.

I don’t exactly understand the relevance of objections that say something like: mind/brain identity is true because minds cannot exist in a disembodied state. In point of fact the two concepts are unrelated. The question is not whether the mind and body have independent existence (I don’t believe they do); but rather, whether they can be recognized as distinct one from the other (and I believe they can). What we are basically looking at is the Problem of Universals. Solve that and you solve the mind-body problem.

[little_monkey]

Nice to see you again!  I remember you very well, and will not say what name you went by there, but I know exactly who you are (at least in the context of that other forum).

The problem is that you are making an important assumption: that a person you are studying is not a philosophical zombie.  You do not actually know whether the smiling, breathing physical structure in front of you is experiencing "what it's like" to be mindful-- you accept them at their word when they say they are, but cannot know it.  It is because people SEEM to you to be mindful that you accept them as so, not because of any particular observation or measurement you are capable of making.  I'd argue as well that the objective world by which you are studying a person's brain SEEMS to be as you experience it, but in the end, the decision to believe that is also a philosophical assumption rather than a fact which can be made on observations.  In fact, I'd say that we've learned enough through science to know that the universe cannot be as it seems.

Some clarifications:

(1) There are things that are visible to the scientists carrying those experiment: for instance smiling since you brought it up. There are things taking place on your face when you smile in terms of muscles being pulled, and all sorts of chemical reactions taking place, etc - all of these can be observed and measured.

(2) Scientists observe thousands of patients, so if you claim this smiling is a fake, for instance, then you need to believe in a conspiracy theory that all those thousands of  patients are faking it and why they would want to fake a smile???

So, we can definitely map the brain in terms of the activities we all do, whether it's about smiling or anything that involves thinking, feeling, mobility, etc. Now if you can show scientifically you can do some of these activities without the brain , that is, the brain being not involved in any possible way , then you have something to argue from. But so far, the science is not on your side.

Benny, I'm waiting for your response...

[The Grand Nudger]

Too special to be material, and too special to be anything other than unique to gear you possess if it happens to be material.  I agree here, sort of...it's far too special.

No, not necessarily too special to be material.  The brain has many layers of function, from the most elemental (the passage of photons an electrons among atoms for example), to the chemical cascades in neurons, to nerve bundles, to the coordination of brain parts involving sound and sight, complex processing, accessing of memories, etc.

Now, you can say that mind is brain function-- but unless you know exactly what it is about the brain that allows us to experience the "what it's like," there are some serious philosophical questions-- and that's EVEN IF I accept a physical monist position.

For example, does an atom have a primitive awareness of "what it's like" to receive a photon?  Does a single nerve have an awareness of "what it's like" to be triggered by activity at the dendrites?  Or is there a critical mass of complexity where there's any "what it's like" at all-- say, at least an input, a processor, and an output?  In the first case, there is literally mind everywhere in the universe, and it is no less intrinsic to material than any other physical property.  In the latter, it may be that you need something VERY similar to the human brain to have any awareness at all.

So waving at the brain and saying "It's clearly in there somewhere" won't really resolve the question of mind/matter, at least not in a very useful way.  It's more an ontology than a conclusion.

There are those layers of rationalization I mentioned, surrounding your need for mind to be special.

Single atoms are not expected to have an awareness in a materialist explanation, and they do not present any evidence of awareness.  Things -may- need to be  similar to our own brain to have an awareness, in a materialist explanation...that -is- expected.  That doesn't mean they need to be human, brains, or even biological.  

Speaking of similarities....since -no- material monist explanation says "it's in there, somewhere"....this one is just like your "can't account for or discuss" nonsense, and you know better.