Theists: How can predetermined fate and free will coexist?

[Edwardo Piet]

I definitely wouldn't call it "predetermined fate." We believe God exists in a dimension outside of time and so he already knows all the choices we will make with our free will. But yeah, him knowing what choices we will make before we make them, doesn't make them any less our own choices.

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Anyway, hopefully someone else will come in here and also answer in their own words. I hate it when I'm the only one who answers lol.

My bold.

But it does mean you can't choose to do anything besides what God has already pre-determined. So in what sense is it really a 'choice'?

If there are possibilites A and B in theory but God has already fated that it's definitely going to be A and not B.... then you have to do A no matter what and B isn't really an option at all. So how is that a choice or freedom?

[henryp]

There seems to be some confusion regarding my scenario.

I'm addressing the claim put forward by many theists that it is possible for a being to know our future before it happens, while we retain free will.

So I'm making the assumption that it's possible to have knowledge of the future. The future. Different timelines have been mentioned. If God only knows one possible eventuality in advance, then he does not know the future. He only knows one possibility. And that's not difficult. So I'm disallowing mutliple timelines for this thought experiment, because it makes the theistic claim meaningless in the first place. It makes precognition meaningless. (If someone wants to challenge that, feel free.)

So to make it simpler, God shows up in front of you, and tells you that in the next 10 seconds, you're going to walk slowly towards and then through the red door. He has seen it already, and he knows it to be true. Can you ignore him and instead walk towards and through the blue door in the next 10 seconds? Or are you compelled to obey, and to do as he has predicted?

If you're a theist and you don't claim that God can see our future beforehand, then you have nothing to address here. There is no contradiction, and free will is coherent. God cannot truthfully make such a proclamation, and so you can ignore him; at least partially.

Some people still seem to treat the future as if it's constantly changing. Precognition is meaningless if that is the case. God can't know the future if he has to wait and see what happens up until that point before finally knowing what will actually happen. That's simply called observing. Go watch the Minority Report, where the only people who can change the future are the police, for some reason.

There is only one timeline in my example.  A person who can see the future, or a God who exists outside of it, is able to move to different points on the one timeline.  That's why even though something is experienced twice by a precog, it only happens once.  

Here's another example:

What are those little particle things scientists say move objectively randomly?

Anyway, the particle thing (we'll call it P) has a future state that is unpredictable.

However, you can see into the future, and know a future state of P via precognition.  Or God sees everything, and tells you where P is going to be because he can see the entire timeline.  Would that change the properties of P?  

Similarly, after the fact, we know where P has been.  That knowledge doesn't make the arrival at that place non-random.  It is just our perspective after the event that gives us knowledge.  We see it randomly arrive at the state.  So if we send the information back in time, it's still going to randomly arrive in a specific state.

[Edwardo Piet]

I would like to have some theists explain to me how fate and free will can coexist?
[...]

Magic.

Even magic can't make a square circle

God is fucked.

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I definitely wouldn't call it "predetermined fate." We believe God exists in a dimension outside of time and so he already knows all the choices we will make with our free will. But yeah, him knowing what choices we will make before we make them, doesn't make them any less our own choices.

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Anyway, hopefully someone else will come in here and also answer in their own words. I hate it when I'm the only one who answers lol.

I've heard this before about "god existing outside of time"... Not quite sure what that has to do with anything, but let's continue the conversation as if it is relevant.

How do you know god exists outside of time?

If god created me to be the person I am, how do I make any choices? God already knows what I'm going to do. Everything I'm going to do is predetermined, so it's not up to me, it's up to god. Fate is, by definition, predetermined. So if everything I'm going to do is predetermined is it still a choice? Once again this is akin to locking someone in a cell with no food or water, then putting a can of pepsi and a can of Coke in front of them and giving them the "free will" to choose to do what they like.

Outside of time makes as little sense as a time before time or a space outside of space.

It's a non-concept. You can't have outside of time or space. For something to even begin to exist it has to begin.

[henryp]

So; what is the difference if you go through door A and there is no envelope with the prediction?  What does it mean that you do not have freedom in this sense?
I could will to fly like a bird, but I'm not free to do so.

The envelope was an analogy. If what you will do is already known (doesn't matter by who or what) then you have no free will because your will is already determined. That simple. In this case the envelope knows your will, in your case the very God you believe in knows your will. 

Something cannot be known if it isn't determined, in this context.

The part I think you are missing, is that the person who is determining your will is you.  The filler of the envelop merely witnesses you further down the timeline making the choice.  Future you is still you, the order is just wonky because of agents who are able to view time in a non-linear manner.  But they are still viewing you choosing which door.  They aren't picking your door.  The envelop isn't picking the door.  Future you is picking the door.  And then when the time comes, you will become future you, and make the choice..

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It's a non-concept. You can't have outside of time or space. For something to even begin to exist it has to begin.

Are you sure?  I don't think God exists, but some wonky stuff happened back at 'the beginning' if the concept of 'beginning' is even something that applies ,which it may not.  Enough wonky stuff, that I think assumptions such as "everything has to begin" "and everything that exists is in our dimension" are shaky.

[Edwardo Piet]

Say, the Lord has seen me eat ice-cream tomorrow noon at around 12. Do I have the ability to eat a chicken roll instead or will I have to strictly stick with the ice-cream?

What? Not sure if this is a serious question. Obviously you can choose to eat whatever you want. The point is He already knows what you will choose because he's already seen it happen.

Then he doesn't have a choice. He will simply eat an ice cream tomorrow at noon tomorrow and he has no choice to do otherwise.

He won't choose to eat an ice cream. He will have to eat an ice cream.

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For me, the closest approximation to an empirical definition of free will would be if the possessor of free will can uniquely reduce the number of possible outcomes in a particular situation in a way he alone could demonstrably predict, and yet there is no other agent whosoever who could even theoretically Possess the capability to predict how the possessor of the free will would reduce these possible outcomes.

It's not simply that no agent could possibly have that capability but that capability doesn't even cut it at all even if the possessor had it. So what if the posesser could always correctly predict what action he would take? All that would do is beg the question of what caused him to be able to make such a prediction. If it's himself then what caused him to cause himself? And so on. It can't go on forever. Infinite regress problem. He will never get to be causa sui. Was there no cause? Then he wasn't the cause. Either way, no free will.

Contra-causal/incompatabilist free will is a complete non-concept, entirely incoherent. All the ability of being able to always correctly predict your future action would do is beg the question.

The desire for "freedom of will" in the superlative, metaphysical sense, such as still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of the half-educated, the desire to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for one's actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and society therefrom, involves nothing less than to be precisely this causa sui, and, with more than Munchausen daring, to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the slough of nothingness.

And here in video form is a complete knock down argument against free will. Most succinct I've seen. The true logical impossibility of incompatabilist free will:

[SteveII]

The answer to your question is in the order of God's knowledge. If we image trillions of possible worlds branching from every decision ever made where, up unit that point, all circumstances C were fully specified (including God knowing your thoughts). I think you would agree (let me know if you don't) that in considering all these timelines, God is observing libertarian free will. God surveyed all those worlds in #2--prior to creation.

He chose to actualize one of them. 

God's Free Knowledge (#3) or foreknowledge stemming from #2 of what will happen does not change the fact that we are still making choices for internal reasons not causally determined from outside ourselves--therefore libertarian free will.

I think the point of Jormungandr's objection lies in God's ultimate choice to actualize one, and just one of the possible worlds. No other possible world will take place, and in that sense, god has determined exactly one set of Judas's life choices in which he betrays Jesus exactly as he does in reality. Libertarian free will holds that the human will is the single formal cause of its own choice (i.e. nothing at all but the will itself determines the will's choice). If god determines which set of Judas's choices among an infinity of various circumstances, then god has, in some sense, determined which choices the will makes. This can't line up with libertarian free will. Molinist free will is not the same as libertarian free will, even if they are very similar. At least that is my understanding, and I've been wrong before.

For reference:

1. God's natural knowledge of necessary truths.
2. God's middle knowledge, (including counterfactuals).
---Creation of the World---
3. God's free knowledge (the actual ontology of the world).

If God's knowledge in #2 is of free choices, then when God actualized a real world, I cannot see how that would change the nature of the Judas' choices. In #3, God's knowledge of what you will decided to do is logically equivalent to what you will decide to do. 

My understanding of libertarian free will is that a person's ability to genuinely choose between options comes from within themselves. If it was present in #2, it is still present when actualized.

[robvalue]

I'm going to have to have a rethink, to see if I can make my point any more clearly. Thanks for the replies everyone, especially Ignorant

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Wallym: Why does precognition make time not linear?

[Neo-Scholastic]

The answer to your question is in the order of God's knowledge. If we image trillions of possible worlds branching from every decision ever made where, up unit that point, all circumstances C were fully specified (including God knowing your thoughts). I think you would agree (let me know if you don't) that in considering all these timelines, God is observing libertarian free will. God surveyed all those worlds in #2--prior to creation.

He chose to actualize one of them. 

God's Free Knowledge (#3) or foreknowledge stemming from #2 of what will happen does not change the fact that we are still making choices for internal reasons not causally determined from outside ourselves--therefore libertarian free will.

I think the point of Jormungandr's objection lies in God's ultimate choice to actualize one, and just one of the possible worlds. No other possible world will take place, and in that sense, god has determined exactly one set of Judas's life choices in which he betrays Jesus exactly as he does in reality. Libertarian free will holds that the human will is the single formal cause of its own choice (i.e. nothing at all but the will itself determines the will's choice). If god determines which set of Judas's choices among an infinity of various circumstances, then god has, in some sense, determined which choices the will makes. This can't line up with libertarian free will. Molinist free will is not the same as libertarian free will, even if they are very similar. At least that is my understanding, and I've been wrong before.

Why must the nature of choice always be one to the utter exclusion of the other? Could it not also be that God makes some things inevitable and others elective?

[Ignorant]

For reference:

1. God's natural knowledge of necessary truths.
2. God's middle knowledge, (including counterfactuals).
---Creation of the World---
3. God's free knowledge (the actual ontology of the world).

If God's knowledge in #2 is of free choices, then when God actualized a real world, I cannot see how that would change the nature of the Judas' choices. In #3, God's knowledge of what you will decided to do is logically equivalent to what you will decide to do. 

My understanding of libertarian free will is that a person's ability to genuinely choose between options comes from within themselves. [1] If it was present in #2, it is still present when actualized. [2]

Right. I understand Molinism. Molina didn't subscribe to libertarian free will (which doesn't care about divine agency/providence). If he did subscribe to libertarian free-will, he wouldn't have bothered with middle knowledge. He did bother, however, with middle knowledge, because if man's will is not acted upon by god in ANY sense, then god's providential agency is hard to reconcile with such freedom. His solution? Middle knowledge. His position was a stepping stone in the direction of libertarian free-will, but it hadn't gotten there yet. God's agency still plays a part in determining the free agency of human beings according to Molina. Because that is the case, it can't be libertarian free will.

1) This is the basic position of anyone who holds a view of "will" in general (free or otherwise), not merely libertarian free will. 

2) Yes, but since god's determination of a single actual reality is in some sense related to the determination of your will within that reality, it cannot be said to be libertarian. Classical libertarian freedom is incompatible with any sort of determinism that isn't human. Molina was trying to make them compatible, and so his understanding of freedom is different than classical libertarianism.

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I think the point of Jormungandr's objection lies in God's ultimate choice to actualize one, and just one of the possible worlds. No other possible world will take place, and in that sense, god has determined exactly one set of Judas's life choices in which he betrays Jesus exactly as he does in reality. Libertarian free will holds that the human will is the single formal cause of its own choice (i.e. nothing at all but the will itself determines the will's choice). If god determines which set of Judas's choices among an infinity of various circumstances, then god has, in some sense, determined which choices the will makes. This can't line up with libertarian free will. Molinist free will is not the same as libertarian free will, even if they are very similar. At least that is my understanding, and I've been wrong before.

Why must the nature of choice always be one to the utter exclusion of the other? Could it not also be that God makes some things inevitable and others elective?

Not if you're a Thomist! =) Seriously though, that may be the case. But it is certainly not the case if you're a Molinist. For the record, I hold to Thomism here.

[Ignorant]

That's a bit convoluted for me.  I can't understand how a God who can always act unilaterally puts us in positions to suffer or rejoice instead of creating a scenario where we did not suffer.  I cannot accept that anyone but God is to blame for what happens when things go wrong in a world, universe, and reality that he created. [1]

We can go with the standard dictionary definitions. [2]

I get what you're saying.  Although it should have been an expectation, given the prophecies that were written and his own prediction to his followers, those who were watching from afar (so to speak) would have simply seen a roving preacher who antagonized the wrong guys.  But from the perspective of someone reading the Bible much later, he triumphed.  However, the reason that he suffered was because his perfect human form was in a world that went off the rails... a fate he did not prevent. [3]

If I thought it was real, I would be confused by this.  Why would he choose to suffer?  Indeed, why go through any of it?  So much of this could have been avoided if God had uttered three words: "I forgive you." [4] Imagine the level of mercy that this would reveal, suspending judgment and giving us a chance to do things right without the unfair shackles of imperfection! [5]

Now imagine how magnanimous he would be if he forgave them unconditionally? [6]

That's even scarier to me.  God creates the world and two humans and then creates the conditions under which they can fail, with the stipulation that their failure will resonate through all of humanity for thousands of years to come.  And there is nothing we can do to fix that because we are unable to avoid sinning even if we wished that it were not so. [7] And God is under no obligation to change this scenario.  He could send us all packing to hell if he so wished. [8]

This is where I would be most concerned about knowing for sure that God was truly compassionate and merciful.  Because that would be the only hope I had.  It would not matter that he was right or wrong, that he was at fault or blameless.  All that matters is what he decides to do, because no one can prevent him from acting.  Under those circumstances, anything short of clear and direct action should make us very, very nervous.  The long and convoluted plan to offer us salvation under certain conditions should frighten us because we know that this means that God does not want everyone to be saved, or he would simply save everyone. [9]

If he wrote the rules and put all of the pieces on the board, those are really the same thing, aren't they?  And I cannot accept blame for cursing myself.  If two people conspired to turn against God six thousand years ago, I didn't have anything to do with that.  But their curse lives on in me and I am expected to accept this because the guy who made the rules holds all of the cards and this is what he decided to go with.  My options are to blame myself and beg for mercy or face an eternity of suffering.  That's not mercy, that's extortion. [10]

My goal in any discussion here is to learn what people believe and why they believe it.  The discussion is the reward (or the agony, if I'm engaging Little Rik).  I'm glad for anyone like you who prefers to express his beliefs plainly and openly.  It's not always easy in a forum like this and some folks get discouraged but, in the end, it's just a discussion.  Thanks. [11]

1) Fair enough. No need for us to just keep repeating ourselves.

2) Compassion: feeling sorrow for another's misfortune. Mercy: compassionate action toward another unfortunate person.

3) Fair enough.

4) That is exactly what the whole thing means! =)

5) This is almost exactly what the sacrament of confession does. His judgment is suspended, your failures are forgiven, you are given divine power to act (i.e. grace) and you get another chance to do things right. No matter how many times you mess up, he will forgive it and give you a chance to try again.

6) He does forgive it unconditionally. Your asking for forgiveness is already the fruit of his mercy. You can't even ask for forgiveness unless he restores you to that action.

7) Who says we can't avoid sinning?

8) If he wanted, god could have indeed condemned us all to hell. But god doesn't want that. He's never wanted that because it doesn't accord with how he's determined to be toward his creation (i.e. merciful).

9) Salvation is not given under certain conditions. He just saves you, and you get to participate in your own salvation. It is not, "If you do x, y, and z, then god will save you." That is what Paul fought so hard against. Rather, it is "God has come to save you, throw a party, live in reality of that new relationship, and let's try and make this the biggest party ever. Invite everyone you can. Jesus will bring the drinks".

10) Who says you have to beg for mercy? God's throwing that stuff around like its Mardi Gras. He knows you need it. Your sins don't bother him. All he wants is you, and he wants to restore you, and he wants you to participate in your own restoration.

11) I understand, and I appreciate the kind words!