Trying to simplify my Consciousness hypothesis

[The Grand Nudger]

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It shouldn't be difficult, I'm not asking you to agree that anything -is- a distal cause of qualia, only asking you to identify candidates -as- a distal cause in a material monist framework.  Your view is irrelevant to the question you asked me to answer.

What's the distal cause of the existence of matter?  The Big Bang?  Whatever quantity/principle/process allowed for it?

IOW there is nothing known to exist that you would consider a distal cause.  There is no point at which you would consider this particular question answered. An army of distal causes between the proximate cause and the big bang, but none satisfy -even as candidates-. You aren't, point of fact, asking for a distal cause at all.

Whatever that is, then that is my view of the distal cause of the capacity for material systems to experience: it has been intrinsic to the fabric of the Universe from the very start.

I disagree, what is the distal cause of whatever unknown thing you would call a distal cause, so on and so forth, ad infinitum.  Do you see the problem with the way you've approached the question -and- determined your own answer?  

You're searching for something like an ultimate cause - to everything, not qualia in particular. I don't know what that ultimate cause is, neither do you..but we're not actually questioning qualia, specifically at that point. You have insisted, in this, that you will accept nothing less than an explanation of the entire universe as an explanation of qualia. That's not exactly a rational request, nor is it even remotely a rational objection to any specific explanation of qualia...which is a bit more specific and limited and further up the chain..as it were, than "the universe".

The process you describe led to the capacity for a particular organism to experience things in a particular way.  As I said, we don't "get" what it's like to do echolocation because we're not built like that.  But we get what it's like to be able to know what something is like, and so do bats, worms (I think), and I suspect there's no magical critical mass at all-- that it runs right down the scale spectrum to QM.

Do you think that rocks are able to know what something is like?

[bennyboy]

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What's the distal cause of the existence of matter?  The Big Bang?  Whatever quantity/principle/process allowed for it?

IOW there is nothing known to exist that you would consider a distal cause.  There is no point at which you would consider this particular question answered.  An army of distal causes between the proximate cause and the big bang, but none satisfy.

I can easily be proven wrong. Show what systems do/do not have subjective experience, and that there IS a critical mass of function at which something non-experiencing suddenly allows for experience. 1, 2, 3. . . GO!

I disagree, what is the distal cause of whatever unknown thing you would call a distal cause, so on and so forth, ad infinitum.  Do you see the problem with the way you've approached the question -and- determined your own answer?  Yu have no ore reason to call that unknown thing the distal cause of qualia than anything between it, and objecting in the way hat you have is self defeating.

You're searching for something like an ultimate cause.  I don;t know what that ulimate ause is, neither do you.  Not knowing it won't make any of the intermediate distals any less effective, though.  

The distal cause need not be infinite. If qualia are purely material, I'll be satisfied with you showing the exact physical structure which is minimally necessary for the most basic elements of subjective experience. An actual mechanism would be nice, but I'm not even gonna ask you for that.

Do you think that rocks are able to know what something is like?

Nope. But I believe it's possible that there are subsystems, even in a rock, which do. I'd look first to QM particles, then to energetic interactions in the form of photon absorption or electric exchange.

Now, I don't know this to be the case, but you have some work to do. You do not believe that qualia or consciousness are intrinsic the the Universe or to the matter in it-- you believe that it is under particular circumstances that even the most primitive mind comes into being. So explain what this critical mass is, and provide evidence for it.

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It seems that qualia, as in the case of the bat, is tied to the type of sensory systems that an organism has.  It makes no sense to extend that insight into organisms and systems that have no sensory apparatus.  It is a leap to suggest that you can have qualia without senses.  What evidence are you drawing upon to suggest that qualia can exist without senses?  It makes as much sense to suppose that a bat doesn't have qualia for sonar, the link between senses and qualia is that strong.

Well, what's a sense? At its most basic, it is a system which can take in energy from outside itself, and use this to inform a behavior. An electron can absorb a photon, and its increased energy causes it to vibrate more. Has the atom "sensed" the electron? This might sound silly, but you'll have to determine at what stage of organization something "senses" if you are going to arrive at the "critical mass for qualia" I've been talking about.

I'm not an expert in physics, but it seems to me the observer effect demonstrates that even simple particles are capable of reacting to aspects of their environment.

[The Grand Nudger]

I can easily be proven wrong.  Show what systems do/do not have subjective experience, and that there IS a critical mass of function at which something non-experiencing suddenly allows for experience.  1, 2, 3. . . GO!

There's no need to prove you wrong.........that's really not how this works, and you know that.

The distal cause need not be infinite.  If qualia are purely material, I'll be satisfied with you showing the exact physical structure which is minimally necessary for the most basic elements of subjective experience.  An actual mechanism would be nice, but I'm not even gonna ask you for that.

You've already been given a mechanism.  You call it a proximal cause.

Nope.  But I believe it's possible that there are subsystems, even in a rock, which do.  I'd look first to QM particles, then to energetic interactions in the form of photon absorption or electric exchange.

An interesting proposal.

Now, I don't know this to be the case, but you have some work to do.  You do not believe that qualia or consciousness are intrinsic the the Universe or to the matter in it-- you believe that it is under particular circumstances that even the most primitive mind comes into being.  So explain what this critical mass is, and provide evidence for it.

I don't have -any- work to do with regards to your notions of qualia. Nor is there any sense in repeating myself.

[bennyboy]

I can easily be proven wrong.  Show what systems do/do not have subjective experience, and that there IS a critical mass of function at which something non-experiencing suddenly allows for experience.  1, 2, 3. . . GO!

You do have to prove me wrong, because your ideas and mine are diametrically opposed, and you are making assertions about the nature of qualia. So long as I'm not proven wrong, you aren't proven right. Not only that, my view is simpler-- that consciousness is a brute fact, something intrinsic to the makeup of the Universe. I've provided evidence-- the interactions of QM particles, which are the most basic material elements that we know of. Your evidence, I think, is more based on assumptions, and less on material observations, than mine is.

[The Grand Nudger]

Benny, lol, I really don't.  If I wanted to prove anything, I'd do so in the only manner it could -be- done, by a positive case for my own position, not some negative nonsense about yours.  No amount of me proving you wrong would prove me right, in any case.  That's how batshit christers argue, lol.  

I'm answering questions you've put to me about explanations of qualia in a material monist framework.  Trying to help you see when your objections are not objections, and when your objections defeat your own position. QM, for example, is a materialist explanation. It is, case in point, one of any number of distal causes to which a materialist can point to in a material monist explanation of qualia. If you want to propose something other than a materialistic explanation of qualia, you will have to look somewhere other than QM.

[Angrboda]

It seems that qualia, as in the case of the bat, is tied to the type of sensory systems that an organism has.  It makes no sense to extend that insight into organisms and systems that have no sensory apparatus.  It is a leap to suggest that you can have qualia without senses.  What evidence are you drawing upon to suggest that qualia can exist without senses?  It makes as much sense to suppose that a bat doesn't have qualia for sonar, the link between senses and qualia is that strong.

Well, what's a sense?  At its most basic, it is a system which can take in energy from outside itself, and use this to inform a behavior.  An electron can absorb a photon, and its increased energy causes it to vibrate more.  Has the atom "sensed" the electron?  This might sound silly, but you'll have to determine at what stage of organization something "senses" if you are going to arrive at the "critical mass for qualia" I've been talking about.

I'm not an expert in physics, but it seems to me the observer effect demonstrates that even simple particles are capable of reacting to aspects of their environment.

You yourself give the answer. It is a 'system'. Given the differences in behavior between animals and plants (and other living things without nervous systems), it's reasonable to conclude that by sensory apparatus we are implying a representational system by which coherent bundles of information can be managed. This is more than a simple change in state. Plants change state, but they don't represent the environment to themselves as coherent, ordered bundles of information. Plants, etc. lack the systems necessary for making and managing environmental information in this way. You're attempting to extend the term 'sensory' to electrons and photons by way of an analogy, but the way animals manage representational information is not merely a metaphor, it's a real difference between them and an electron. An electron doesn't 'store' the location of a photon, it simply reacts to the photon. So, no, in my view an electron hasn't 'sensed' the photon. Do you see any behavioral evidence for qualia and representational systems in plants or anything else without a nervous system?

[Won2blv]

@bennyboy

I haven't had time to check in here the last couple of days and I am writing this without reading all the posts, So please forgive me if I am saying something redundant to the thread...

Think about this, humans have a fear of advancing AI to a point where the AI becomes self aware and then kills us humans right? Do you see the evolutionary advantage of being self-aware? When our minds progressed in evolution, they also progressed in being self aware. Instead of just seeing a rock, the mind saw a rock that could be useful to it. The more it evolved to learn from its surrounding the more it used it surroundings to better itself.

I suggest you read this article https://www.theatlantic.com/science/arch...ed/485558/

Let me know what you think, its a good read

[bennyboy]

Do you see any behavioral evidence for qualia and representational systems in plants or anything else without a nervous system?

I'd argue that QM interference patterns ARE a representational system-- they represent the state of a photon's interactions in its journey from emission to reception. Actually, I'd say a QM a photon's resolution is both a representation of state and a behavior, depending on which time during its passage you are considering.

[DLJ]

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I suggest you read this article https://www.theatlantic.com/science/arch...ed/485558/

Let me know what you think, it's a good read

It is a good read.

Add predictive modelling (simulation of future scenarios) to the mix of self-model and other-model and we're pretty much there. From 'attention' to 'intention'... job done.

I recommend ignoring Qualia. It's a red herring.

btw, I spent christmas and both of the major New Years working on my own version of Life, The Universe and Everything and have drawn similar conclusions to you. Except my focus is The Evolution of Morality.

Looking forward to comparing notes.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Representational theories project irreducible semantic content onto physical systems. They seem to beg the question.