Philosophical zombies

[polymath257]

Philosophers like to talk about the 'hard problem of consciousness', but I have to admit I have never grasped the fundamental difficulty.

Just think about it. :-)

Oh, I have. Extensively. I just don't see the problem. If we have physical correlates for all conscious experiences, and can predict from the physical correlates what the conscious experience is, how is that NOT an explanation for consciousness?

The hard problem seems to claim that more is required and I just don't see it.

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The hard problem of consciousness is the fact that philosophical zombies are indeed very possible, and our brain didn't need to produce consciousness in order to produce intelligent and well functioning beings that respond to threats and rewards as if they were conscious. "Why is anyone conscious at all?" is the hard problem of consciousness.

Dennett side steps this by saying that P-Zeds aren't possible. And he is wrong because he never actually addresses consciousness.

I think his multiple drafts theory and the notion that consciousness is fame in the brain makes sense. But to then say that it all makes sense from a third person perspective, and that there is no first person perspective, and that consciousness is an illusion, and philosophical zombies are impossible.... none of that makes any sense.

If consciousness is just the workings of the brain (as I believe they are) then the consciousness we experience from the first person perspective is those workings of the brain from our first person perspective. That qualia is very real, and in fact it's the only thing we know for sure to be real..... we can't know for certain that when we investigate the brain scientifically that investigation isn't as unreal as the rest of reality. But even if reality is an illusion the fact we are experiencing that illusion is NOT an illusion. Phenomena are the only things in the universe that we know for sure are real, it's objective reality that there is a possibility of not existing.  Science itself, after all, studies phenomena. The third person perspective may be an illusion.... but the first person isn't. So he has theories about how the brain works that I agree with.... but then he concludes a complete non-sequitur from it and talks a load of spooky nonsense like "we're all zombies" and "consciousness is an illusion."

Actually, none of us who are conscious are zombies. Because zombies aren't conscious. And consciousness isn't an illusion.... because seeming to seem... is seeming.

Dennett argues that things merely seem to seem and don't really seem. And that... makes no sense whatsoever.

OK, here is a problem: If you ask a zombie if they are conscious, they will say yes. If you ask them if they have experiences and seem to be something, they will say yes. They will wax eloquent about sunrises and the feelings of the ocean, but not actually have those feelings.

Doesn't that just sound contradictory?

If they say they have all these experiences and show every indication of having them, in what sense do they not have them?

[rskovride]

Is his argument about conceivability = possible a popular one?  Are there no examples of things I can conseive that could not possibly exist?

It seemed to be a rather empty argument to me, too. When you're dealing with facts about the state of reality right now, "possible" is irrelevant. Something exists, or is true, if and only if it's possible that it exists / is true. Possible is only relevant with regard to future events.

He just seemed to be saying that if something isn't internally inconsistent then we can't rule it out; or that if something hasn't been shown to be impossible, then... it can't be discounted as possible. That just sounds like a pointless tautology to me. I don't see how we can learn anything through that. A "square circle" is an abstract concept anyway, and one we say is impossible by our definitions. We also haven't learnt anything about reality by noting that. What we're really saying there is that something we identify as a circle, we wouldn't also identify as a square. But even then, that depends on the geometry we're using. In topology, they are the same.

I'm fairly new to philosophy and have only studied basic epistemology but just read a little about this concept and there are issues with it.  Some say that we just don't have knowledge of any contradictions. Similar to the fact that at one point in time we didn't know that all triangles, in fact, do not add up to 180 degrees.  

I think its fair to say there are issues with the conceivability = possible argument.

[polymath257]

So basically we're not zombies but philosophical zombies are not impossible, lol.

The difference is... a philosophical zombie wouldn't actually feel anything or be conscious. But it would seem to everyone else that they would.  The crucial and very real difference is that there would be no seeming to THEM. Daniel Dennett thinks this is impossible. Because he likes to use his own definitions and equivocate a lot. God, Daniel Dennett is annoying. He doesn't even have a first-person version of consciousness. To take the third person perspective of consciousness to such an extent that he denies the first person is as nutty as you can get when it comes to consciousness. Consciousness is as first person as it gets.

But I think Dennett is exactly right here. P-Zombies are just flat-out an incoherent concept. Anything physically identical would have experiences that are exactly the same. The first person is produced because the processing happens in one brain and not another. If they are *identical*, then they would have feelings and experiences.

I don't deny the first person experiences. I just don't see how physicalism is destroyed by such. It happens in my brain, so I am the one with the experiences.

[Edwardo Piet]

I find it rather ironic that the only thing any of us could ever know for sure, that we're having an experience, is the one thing we can never ever demonstrate to anyone else. That makes me suspicious of the whole thing.

The fact we are unable to demonstrate it to anyone else doesn't mean that conscious beings don't have first hand proof that they're conscious though. You have no more reason to be suspicious of your own consciousness than you have reason to be suspicious that a square has 4 sides. The fact other people could, possibly, be zombies... doesn't make you not know that you aren't one.

The fact of a conscious being's first hand evidence of its consciousness is stronger than the evidence for evolution or anything else from science. In fact, like I say, it's absolutely proven. The fact that someone is aware of themselves asking the question means they already know the answer.

If we seem to ourselves to be conscious, we are conscious.

And don't forget that the entirety of science studies each of our conscious experience of reality, and not reality itself. We know that we have evidence of the world we experience, and we don't know that we have evidence and facts about the world that we don't experience. We don't even know that there is a world that we don't experience. Although the idea of there being no existence outside of our own consciousness is indeed absurd.... just like the idea that we ourselves are conscious but everyone else is zombies is absurd.

[polymath257]

Philosophical zombies are possible because it's possible that a being could behave conscious without being conscious.

There could be alien species out there that are as advanced or even more advanced than us.... but who aren't conscious. We are simultaneously lucky and unlucky that our brain feels pain and pleasure and doesn't just react as if we feel it... but there's no reason to believe that evolution had to take the path of consciousness.

It's not just that philosophical zombies are possible... it's that we're not zombies, but we easily could have been. They are VERY possible.

The "either we're all zombies or zombies are impossible" thing is just completely backwards and couldn't be more wrong. Us all being zombies isn't no different to none of us being zombies, it is a huge difference. It's the difference between the lights being off and on.

The truth is we're not zombies, but we could have been, and there could be lifeforms out there that are indeed zombies, and yet have all the intelligence that we do.

OK, I disagree that they are even possible, at least given the laws of physics as we know them (what could happen in a world where water is XYZ is another story).

As I see it, consciousness is a phenomenon that automatically happens at a certain level of information processing complexity. Once you get to a certain stage, consciousness arises because you are processing information.

So, no, I don't think unconscious space aliens are possible either. If they have enough ability to process the information, they simply will be conscious.

OK, so how do I determine if I am a zombie? How do I know that what I *think* is feeling and experiencing is actually NOT what everyone else means by the terms? maybe I don't *really* feel and experience, but have instead some sort of vague shadow that is actually not conscious.

How would I know?

[Edwardo Piet]

I had a weird idea before that consciousness is reality experiencing itself, somehow. The experience is everywhere and simultaneous, but it feels individual to any particular point of reference. It's compartmentalised, somehow. That's just nuts, I know. But it makes as much sense as anything else at this point.

Galen's bizarre argument on this is surprisingly strong too. It's one of those "That seems absurd and I must surely be missing something... but I find it hard to find the flaw in the actual logical argument", type of things.

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OK, I disagree that they are even possible, at least given the laws of physics as we know them (what could happen in a world where water is XYZ is another story).

What does physics have to do with it? And what's your logical argument against their possibility?

As I see it, consciousness is a phenomenon that automatically happens at a certain level of information processing complexity. Once you get to a certain stage, consciousness arises because you are processing information.

I've heard this but I don't see what information processing has got to do with it. I see it as things being arranged in a certain way, or some other detail we're unsure of. I see no reason to believe that a computer that had enough information processing would become conscious.

I think we don't know precisely what it is about intelligent brains in our case that happen to be conscious, and I think we should stop pretending to know. And I think there may indeed be beings out there that are more intelligent than us that didn't happen to evolve consciousness. Consciousness is utterly useless after all, it's just an epiphenomenon.

So, no, I don't think unconscious space aliens are possible either. If they have enough ability to process the information, they simply will be conscious.

I don't think information processing is relevant at all. You could have a rather unintelligent being that was conscious at some low level, and you could have a highly intelligent being that behaved conscious but wasn't conscious at all.

OK, so how do I determine if I am a zombie?

If you're conscious you know you're not one.

How do I know that what I *think* is feeling and experiencing is actually NOT what everyone else means by the terms?

Consciousness is just the fact that something can seem to be anything to you.

maybe I don't *really* feel and experience, but have instead some sort of vague shadow that is actually not conscious.

See this just makes no sense and demonstrates that you are confused. If you seem to experience something, then the seeming of that experience is an experience that seems a particular way to you.

The very notion of "It doesn't seem like I experience anything it just seems like I seem to experience something" is logically incoherent. Seeming to seem implies seeming.

How would I know?

Because that you are aware of yourself seeming to ask the question is absolute self-evidence to you that it seems that you are aware that you are asking that question.

[The Grand Nudger]

"The sort of consciousness Dennett describes".... isn't consciousness. That's the problem.

It's not what we've traditionally described it as...but that would only be a problem if our traditional description were the accurate one.   

Now I'm not saying that consciousness isn't multiple drafts or isn't the fame in the brain. I think it is. I think that's the part where he actually makes sense.

His own position on consciousness is based upon his hypothesis.  If you agree with that..you're likely misunderstanding some quote mine by a detractor.  

But when he talks of consciousness being an illusion and us being zombies... that makes no sense whatosever. Zombies aren't conscious, we are conscious. Consciousness is first person, not third person. Consciousness can't be an illusion because seeming to seem is seeming.... and he pretends like there isn't really any seeming to us it just seems like there is. Which makes absolute zero sense. For something to seem to seem to us seeming has to exist!

......see above.  

And the irony of it all is that the entirety of science is dependent on the reality of consciousness and science ultimately only ever studies the conscious experience of reality and not reality itself. And yet he calls the very experience that scientists have when they study the reality he gets all his evidence from 'an illusion'. If consciousness is an illusion then reality as we know it is an illusion. They key part being as we know it.

In fairness, he doesn't just call it that..he shows how often it is.  Nevertheless, he thinks that some mechanism is presenting itself in this way and that thing is as real as you need anything to be, right?  His comments regarding illusion are part of a response to a question from two very different camps and the product of his trying to be ecumenical to the counterpoints.  He criticises the cartesian theatre...the actual first person perspective...because there's just no little man in there doing that...that's not how the effect is produced.  Illusion fits, there, right - in the same way that seeing a rabbit get pulled out of a hat is still seeing a rabbit get pulled out of a hat despite it;s being an illusion?  OTOH, If a person thinks that...without some cartesian element to consciousness pulling the strings and whatnot, we're discussing a p-zombie..well, then fine we're all p zombies.

This particular bit has been the source of so much misconception that it's a footnote in his book.......

He redefines free will and he redefines consciousness. He very much engages what Kant correctly called a "wretched subterfuge". He's good at talking about facts.... now he just needs to use those facts to actually address what he's supposed to be talking about... and draw correct conclusions rather than non-sequiturs. And if he can't do that, he needs to stop pretending he can.

He's an eliminativist, and that means that he -has- to provide a better description of consciousness than what he considers to be folklore.  He's not looking to explain that thing that people traditionally thought was happening, but what actually is. He thinks that consciousness is a real thing...that really isn't what we thought it was. Does that help?

[Minimalist]

A philosophical zombie is something that is physically identical to a human in every way, yet has no conscious experience.

I call them "republicunts."

[Neo-Scholastic]

Idle speculation here but...wouldn't it be interesting to somehow find out that anyone who denies the existence of consciousness and/or doesn't understand the notion of P-zombies are in fact P-zombies!

[Edwardo Piet]

It's not what we've traditionally described it as...but that would only be a problem if our traditional description were the accurate one.   

But we know that we're conscious in the traditional sense. And the fact science can't touch it doesn't mean by redefining it we're not still conscious in the tradtional sense.

It's one thing for him to create a new definition and say that definition is better.... but he can't use his own definition to argue against the traditional one. That makes no sense.

Qualia is still very real in the traditional sense, things really do seem to us, we really aren't zombies. And everything science studies is the experience of reality in the traditional sense. The one thing in the universe we know for sure exists is consciousness in the traditional sense, and if it were a battle between traditional consciousness and science, traditional consciousness would win every time. Because science studies nothing but it.

His own position on consciousness is based upon his hypothesis.  If you agree with that..you're likely misunderstanding some quote mine by a detractor.  

No we've been through all this before. The fact that you think that he is making any sense when he concludes that consciousness is an illusion or qualia don't exist just shows that you don't understand that he is making non-sequiturs.

His position on the workings of the brain do make sense. Consciousness is the fame in the brain, consciousness is competitive. But no it can't be illusory and no we can't be zombies that makes no sense. What he calls an "illusion" is not an illusion. You can't apply illusoriness or unreality to consciousness because consciousness is the one thing in the universe that we know really exists. Everything else could be an illusion but not consciousness.

In fairness, he doesn't just call it that..he shows how often it is. 

Dennett goes on a huge digression. He shows that the brain works like a bunch of tricks and that we are often tricking ourselves... and he thinks that means that the tricks aren't real. He's really terrible at logic sometimes. It's like yes Dennett that makes sense. Yes Dennett that makes sense. Yes Dennett that makes sense. No, Dennett, that is a non-sequitur.

He's an eliminativist, and that means that he -has- to provide a better description of consciousness than what he considers to be folklore.  He's not looking to explain that thing that people traditionally thought was happening, but what actually is.

He can create his own definitions but he can't redefine the old ones when the old ones describe something that we know is absolutely real more than we know anything scientific is absolutely real.

He can address the brain, he can talk about the workings of the brain that probably lead to consciousness, he can even label that consciousness. But he can't call consciousness an illusion if he hasn't addressed consciousness.

It would be fair enough if he said "Of course remember I'm not talking about actual consciousness I'm talking about something else and calling it consciousness." but he doesn't say it like that.

To call it consciousness when it isn't consciousness is utterly pointless and futile.

He may as well call the universe "God" if he's going to call the absence of free will "free will" or something other than consciousness "consciousness".