Philosophical zombies

[Amarok]

To be far useful does not mean inaccurate

[The Grand Nudger]

Sure doesn't, but we do observe a relationship between the two in organisms (and machines) that depend upon the utility of their perceptions for survival or function. More accurate perceptions are..very often, the more useful ones. I'm sure we can find the reverse to be true in some scenario, for some species, ofc. Probably even somewhere in ourselves. If the effect of an accurate perception might be crippling...then the utility of self deception immediately presents itself.

[Amarok]

True if our perceptions were always accurate we never would have invented science or philosophy augment them . As what would a perfect mind do with such a thing . Thou i will  also point out that deception in would be hard because the deception would need to be multi situational . This is why idea's like Alvin Plantinga EAAN will always fail .

[bennyboy]

I may actually have BEEN a philosophical zombie. I recently did a gastroscopy, wherein they put a giant fucking scope down your throat. I was told something very creepy: during the procedure, you can respond to commands and even verbalize answers. But when you wake up, you have a "black out" effect. Sure enough, when I woke up, I had a "dream" of something going in and out of my mouth about 4 times but really fast-- like over the course of about 2 seconds.

So "my" experience and "my brain's" experience may or may not be identical. It's quite spooky to think of, actually.

I think it's actually possible that some brain damaged people COULD function fully in this somnambulistic state, and not actually be awake and aware. It may be that people in a blackout state are offline and on autopilot, perhaps for extended periods of time.

[RoadRunner79]

I am completely on the side of Hammy on this one.

The “Looks like a duck” argument that says a physical system that behaves conscious must actually be conscious totally begs the question. Implicit in the argument is an already conscious knowing subject interpreting the behavior of a physical system and assigning it meaning. It’s no different than assigning numerical meaning to abacus beads. When we manipulate the beads manually according to an algorithm they are still just dead wood. They have no meaning in themselves. Likewise, electronic switches and lights have no meaning other than what they get assigned by a knowing subject. And by logical extension, the activity of neurons, firing and not firing, also have no inherent meaning. Yes, they correlate with mental properties. But beads and switches can also correlate with their assigned meanings. As such I see no justification for claiming that the brain, as a physical mechanism, does anything more that produce signs awaiting interpretation by a knowing subject. Signs themselves have no essential properties in common with the things they signify.


I think David Bentely Hart states the issue well...


"Computational models of the mind would make sense if what a computer actually does could be characterized as an elementary version of what the mind does, or at least as something remotely like thinking. In fact, though, there is not even a useful analogy to be drawn here. A computer does not even really compute. We compute, using it as a tool. We can set a program in motion to calculate the square root of pi, but the stream of digits that will appear on the screen will have mathematical content only because of our intentions, and because we—not the computer—are running algorithms. The computer, in itself, as an object or a series of physical events, does not contain or produce any symbols at all; its operations are not determined by any semantic content but only by binary sequences that mean nothing in themselves. The visible figures that appear on the computer’s screen are only the electronic traces of sets of binary correlates, and they serve as symbols only when we represent them as such, and assign them intelligible significances. The computer could just as well be programmed so that it would respond to the request for the square root of pi with the result ‘Rupert Bear’; nor would it be wrong to do so, because an ensemble of merely material components and purely physical events can be neither wrong nor right about anything—in fact, it cannot be about anything at all. Software no more ‘thinks’ than a minute hand knows the time or the printed word ‘pelican’ knows what a pelican is."

– David Bentley Hart

I just made a computer model which says you are wrong....  you can't argue with that!

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edit to add:  I may also have a computer model which says you are right, which could possibly be had for a fair price.

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[Edwardo Piet]

If they have meaningfully different brains then we would likely refer to that meaningful difference as a possible explanation between the two.  If whatever meaningful difference they have produces no discernible effect..such as we cannot otherwise tell between the two which is the control and who is the outlier....then we might suppose that specific disparity between us is functionally inconsequential to consciousness in the first place. 

I think the problem with that view is that it ignores the possibility that the difference is very much to do with the difference in consciousness... and despite the fact you can tell that the difference is the explanation for the difference in consciousness.... the vital point is [i]you still don't know [u]which one is conscious or why that one and not the other. And is that not a possible hard problem?

Not really, because a p-zombie is explicitly proposed to be identical in every physical regard for a very specific reason.  It's meant as a possible demonstration of the weakness of a functional definition of consciousness derived from physical systems.  The reason that the p-zombie has the same brain we do is to -remove- any possibility that a neurological or mechanical difference could distinguish something between the two, or in fact b the reason that one was functionally different from the other even if it could evade a test.  The whole point of the proposition or the hypothetical zombie is to communicate that position.  


What you're talking about is two people who have a physical difference, being somehow different..despite seeming the same.   Well, sure, we're aware of people we might call high functioning in the sets of the impaired or damaged.  They routinely cause us to rethink what is required for a range of mental operation that could pass as average or unremarkable among their unimpaired and un-damaged peers.  It may be that a person could go full on, or at least very nearly full on bio-automaton.  It may even be that we are full on bio-automata that has fundamentally underestimated the capabilities of automatons...ourselves.

Okay so you wouldn't consider such a person a P-Zed because P-Zeds are specifically postulated in an attempt to argue against physicalism. Is that a fair summary of what you just said, for you?

And still, what would you call a person who isn't a P-Zed but has no consciousness and yet behaves exactly the same as we do, despite having a different brain, but not different enough for us to not wrongly dismiss it as normal brain variation?

[WinterHold]

I would look at the results of their logic. The question for me is "in which context" should I judge that the result is complete or not?
Is death the end, or is the continues advent of generations is the context; i.e a never ending context?

Are we living a result inflicted by the past generations? That means that the conditions are not so alien to the results.
But to answer you; a zombie is that person producing the wrong results. I need to observe the results of their actions first, then decide.

Can you give any examples here of what two people do/say under your supervision, and how you come to your conclusion? I have no idea what you mean by "wrong results". People get things wrong all the time, and are illogical all the time. What do you mean, "is death the end"? Are you saying you'd ask people that question? Am I a zombie because I think it is indeed the end?

An example can be of two siblings, one chooses to follow the family code while the other rebels and find their own way.
The first sibling will follow the stereotype because it's easier and requires less thinking, to reach the result: that is happiness and prospering.
The second sibling will follow their own norm, because their logic saw something else, to reach the result: that is happiness and prospering.
Both have the same equipment from the get go (a brain-a body).  Death is the end of their attempt to be happy and to prosper.
For an observer from the outside; it's not wise to keep the sight focused at the two siblings. were their choices affected by external conditions? here; the condition pop in as a second possible cause of the zombie state.
Wrong results are when the choice leads to something negative, something totally unintended.
Zombies -on the top of not having the right logic to pick the right path-, tend to repeat the historical disasters and mistakes of others just to escape the thinking process that they're not capable of.
Not learning from "wrong results" is a first indication that suggests to me, that someone is brain dead.

Let's say my physical body is replicated exactly. The resultant brain has all my knowledge and works exactly the same as my brain. It's not an imposter as such, it is just me, minus whatever "consciousness" is supposed to be. It will produce the same results as me under examination, unless you can somehow find a way to measure "how conscious" each one is. How do you tell the difference?

Here comes the "conditions". Every action we do is interacting with the physical world we live in. Our bodies are also a part of that physical world. The conditions will affect the results greatly.

You in a warzone, will act so differently than you floating in a space ship. In one scenario your body is angry, in the other it's overjoyed.

I will judge the results depending on the condition: if it's a warzone, and somebody freaks out, I'll call them a coward.
                                                                         if it's a flight in space and somebody freaks out, I'll call them "He's/She's just new to this"

Both are results, both were produced by the same brain, but the judgement varied greatly between the two.

My answer is that this doesn't make sense. If it's a copy of me, it's as conscious as I am. Consciousness is a direct result of my physical brain: that is what all evidence points to. Otherwise, my consciousness/essence is some other entity, which exists on some other plane which we can't ever access. But if we can't access it, how can we conclude it exists at all?

For all I know, everyone else could be zombies, or some of them, or none of them. I can't think of any way I can tell the difference.

Evidence points to nowhere actually in terms of consciousness; science doesn't have a clue why we're "awake".
https://www.sciencealert.com/harvard-sci...sciousness

Harvard "thinks" it pinpinted a neurological network that is crucial to it; but this is not the generator of consciousness or where it springs from. It's just "thought to be important for it".

If we couldn't decide which path is wrong and which is right; atheism would work better than religious thought. My belief in Islam is pointing me that God is the controller of the conditions.

[Edwardo Piet]

What you're talking about is two people who have a physical difference, being somehow different..despite seeming the same.   Well, sure, we're aware of people we might call high functioning in the sets of the impaired or damaged.  They routinely cause us to rethink what is required for a range of mental operation that could pass as average or unremarkable among their unimpaired and un-damaged peers.  It may be that a person could go full on, or at least very nearly full on bio-automaton.  It may even be that we are full on bio-automata that has fundamentally underestimated the capabilities of automatons...ourselves.

And the point is the physical difference is that the person isn't conscious.... but we are unable to tell they're not. So they're not a P-zombie, but what are they?

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The “Looks like a duck” argument that says a physical system that behaves conscious must actually be conscious totally begs the question. Implicit in the argument is an already conscious knowing subject interpreting the behavior of a physical system and assigning it meaning. It’s no different than assigning numerical meaning to abacus beads. When we manipulate the beads manually according to an algorithm they are still just dead wood. They have no meaning in themselves. Likewise, electronic switches and lights have no meaning other than what they get assigned by a knowing subject. And by logical extension, the activity of neurons, firing and not firing, also have no inherent meaning. Yes, they correlate with mental properties. But beads and switches can also correlate with their assigned meanings.

I agree 100% with all of this.

I see no justification for claiming that the brain, as a physical mechanism, does anything more that produce signs awaiting interpretation by a knowing subject. Signs themselves have no essential properties in common with the things they signify.

I don't agree with this though. My position is that the physical brain does explain consciousness (which is exactly why if you get hit hard in the head you lose consciousness... to give the most simplistic example).... but the problem is that whatever it is that lies within the brain that does explain consciousness is untestable by science precisely due to the fact that consciousness on the one hand is known from the first-person and personally only to each particular subject ("subject" as in conscious entity and not as in "topic") whereas science deals with things known from the third-person overall (by scientific consensus and evidential corroboration) and not to any subject in particular.

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If it is impossible to tell the difference through observation (i.e, science), then I would say both are sentient.

...and you would say that even when one is and the other isn't?

[polymath257]

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If it is impossible to tell the difference through observation (i.e, science), then I would say both are sentient.

...and you would say that even when one is and the other isn't?

The definition I would use to determine sentience would say that isn't possible.

[Neo-Scholastic]

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...and you would say that even when one is and the other isn't?

The definition I would use to determine sentience would say that isn't possible.

The problem is that you are elevating an epistemological stance to an ontological certainty.