What makes people irrational thinkers?

[Belacqua]

Whenever he describes matter as 'inert' or 'lifeless', he shows just how little he really understands about the physicalist position. Matter interacts with other matter. In fact, that is often how material things are *defined*: in terms of their interaction.

From Hart's book:

In Platonic tradition, the soul was not conceived of merely as a pure intellect presiding over the automaton of the body. The soul was seen as the body’s life, spiritual and organic at once, com- prising the appetites and passions no less than rational intellect, while the body was seen as a material reflection of a rational and ideal order. Matter was not simply the inert and opaque matter of mechanistic thought but rather a mirror of eternal splendors and verities, truly (if defectively) predisposed to the light of spirit.

Is Hart here advocating the tradition he describes, or merely describing it? All of the verbs are in past tense. Is it possible that he is describing an important historical tradition which countered a view of matter which he himself no longer holds?

He's describing a view held by "mechanistic thought," but do we know that he believes mechanistic thought is still the view of modern physics?

God is not, in any of the great theistic traditions, merely some rational agent, external to the order of the physical universe, who imposes some kind of design upon an otherwise inert and mindless material order. He is not some discrete being somewhere out there, floating in the great beyond, who fashions nature in accordance with rational laws upon which he is dependent. 

Here he is saying what God is not. He's not saying what matter is. 

Moore cordially detested the modern, essentially deistic picture of reality—derived from the most unfortunate philosophical and religious developments of the previous three centuries—which portrayed God as merely some supreme being presiding over a cosmos that he had constructed from inert elements outside himself.

Here he is describing a position that he also rejects.

Today the sciences are not bound to the mechanical philosophy as far as theoretical and practical methods are concerned; they never were, really, at least not beyond a certain point. Even so, the mechanical philosophy’s great metaphysical master narrative—its governing picture of nature as an aggregate of mechanistic functions and systems, accidentally arranged out of inherently lifeless and purposeless elements—remains the frame within which we now organize our expectations of science and, consequently, of reality.

Are you arguing that elements are alive? Are you arguing that elements have an inherent purpose? 

These are the only relevant results when I do a word search for "inert" and "lifeless." 

Do you really think that these four examples show that Hart rejects modern physics and considers matter to be something that doesn't interact with other matter?

[polymath257]

Whenever he describes matter as 'inert' or 'lifeless', he shows just how little he really understands about the physicalist position. Matter interacts with other matter. In fact, that is often how material things are *defined*: in terms of their interaction.

From Hart's book:

In Platonic tradition, the soul was not conceived of merely as a pure intellect presiding over the automaton of the body. The soul was seen as the body’s life, spiritual and organic at once, com- prising the appetites and passions no less than rational intellect, while the body was seen as a material reflection of a rational and ideal order. Matter was not simply the inert and opaque matter of mechanistic thought but rather a mirror of eternal splendors and verities, truly (if defectively) predisposed to the light of spirit.

Is Hart here advocating the tradition he describes, or merely describing it? All of the verbs are in past tense. Is it possible that he is describing an important historical tradition which countered a view of matter which he himself no longer holds?

He's describing a view held by "mechanistic thought," but do we know that he believes mechanistic thought is still the view of modern physics?

This is very far from the only time that he identifies materialism with exactly this mechanistic thought where matter is inert and lifeless.

In materialism, there is no 'spirit', so matter isn't 'predisposed to the light of the spirit' (whatever that means), but matter is far from being inert. Also, life *comes from* the properties of matter, specifically the way complex collections of chemical reactions interact with each other in certain non-equilibrium situations.

Either Hart fails to understand that or he repeatedly attacks a strawman that fails to represent the materialist position.

Are you arguing that elements are alive? Are you arguing that elements have an inherent purpose? 

These are the only relevant results when I do a word search for "inert" and "lifeless." 

Do you really think that these four examples show that Hart rejects modern physics and considers matter to be something that doesn't interact with other matter? 

Inert: non-interacting.

Purpose is something that humans (or other living things) give to things to organize our lives. it isn't an inherent property of the matter, but rather a property of our interaction with the matter.

I can only rely on what Hart actually writes to determine his views. He repeatedly describes the materialistic view of matter as inert and incapable of doing more than very simple types of activity. Why he believes that or (if he doesn't believe that) why he writes it, I do not know. In any case, his arguments against materialism fail (as far as I can see) on exactly this point.

Well, not completely true. He also assumes there has to be a 'support' for existence (why?) and that matter cannot be such a support (why not?) and that all matter is contingent (that word again, but why must matter be contingent?).

Later, he claims that matter cannot explain the phenomenon of consciousness. In this he has a lot of good company, of course, but it isn't clear to me what sort of explanation is required. If we get to the point (and we are getting closer, but not there yet) where we can 'read minds' from brain scans and can identify brain activities for every thought, emotion, desire, plan, etc, how is that NOT a material explanation of consciousness?

[Mister Agenda]

Am I correct that physicalism postulates that everything is made of energy, matter, space, and time? Are materialism, naturalism, and physicalism all basically the same position?

[polymath257]

Am I correct that physicalism postulates that everything is made of energy, matter, space, and time? Are materialism, naturalism, and physicalism all basically the same position?

This depends, to some extent, on who is talking. Some people make distinctions between these concepts, but there is little consistency in this.

Some see materialism as being focused on a more deterministic, mechanical description. But if physical processes are not 'mechanical' or deterministic, then physicalism and materialism may well be different approaches.

There is also the difficulty of defining what is meant by the term 'physical'. Light, for example, is usually not thought of as being made of matter, so may not be considered (under some interpretations) to be 'material', but it is certainly 'natural' and 'physical'. Gravity is another aspect that is not 'made of' matter, but rather describes how matter interacts and so is 'physical' or 'natural' without being 'matter' or 'material'.

I often find that arguments against 'materialism' are arguments against 'everything being made of matter' and so don't really represent the materialist/physicalist/naturalist viewpoint accurately. This is why I prefer the term 'physicalism'.

Also, the phrase 'made of' need not apply directly. Instead, I would use the language of supervenience. I see physicalism as being essentially: If we have information about *everything* physical, we could *deduce* what is happening for everything meaningful.

So, an idea may not be 'made of' anything physical if it is a physical *process* (or collection of physical processes). But, if you knew the complete physical description of the brain over time, then all ideas thought by that brain would be determined. In that sense, ideas supervene on the physical. If we could know all there is about the brain and how it functions, we would also know what the 'mental states' are that it is experiencing, and so would have an 'explanation' of consciousness.

[The Grand Nudger]

We couch this as an if, as though there weren't an entire industry that revolved around knowing what we would think before we do.

[Neo-Scholastic]

If we could know all there is about the brain and how it functions, we would also know what the 'mental states' are that it is experiencing, and so would have an 'explanation' of consciousness.

IMO Frank Jackson's thought problem "Mary's room" serves as a sufficient defeater for that position.

[The Grand Nudger]

Marys room is self defeating on it's own premises, unfortunately. It asks us whether a scientist who knows everything there is to know about color will gain new knowledge when they step out of their black and white world and into the world of color. The answer is no, as per the premise. They already know everything about color, and everything about color, includes the phenomena of color experience. Now we know that's not true of people, but it is true of hypothetical characters in a thought experiment. Hence the disconnect.

Another good example of why people are irrational thinkers. We need only the barest of pretense to declare the irrational otherwise. It's a gap-by-proxy argument couched in sloppy phrasing and hidden assertions. May as well simply, more clearly, and more accurately ask - if someone who doesn't know everything experiences a new thing will they have additional knowledge, and the answer is a no-shit yes.

More perplexingly, it's not clear how the addition of any new information where there is new information is taken by default to be a or non-physical. May as well say that if I learn any new thing tomorrow, say the exact weight of a stone I'd never before seen....that proves the existence of the immaterial.

[The Architect Of Fate]

People Trotting out Mary's Room as a valid argument 

[Belacqua]

He repeatedly describes the materialistic view of matter as inert and incapable of doing more than very simple types of activity. Why he believes that or (if he doesn't believe that) why he writes it, I do not know. In any case, his arguments against materialism fail (as far as I can see) on exactly this point.

Suppose that matter is capable of more types of activity than Hart understands.

How does this show that his arguments about God are incorrect?

I'm wondering if you can construct an argument, based on what Hart says, that if matter is more active than he says it is, his arguments for God fail. But you'd have to do this without begging the question -- that is, it wouldn't be sufficient to argue that of course pretty soon physicalist investigations will be able to answer all the questions they have so far been unable to answer, including why there is something rather than nothing.

To form an argument that's convincing to people who don't already assume he's wrong, you'd have to engage with what he says and show (rather than just assert) that his (allegedly) over-simple view of matter is fatal to his argument.

[polymath257]

If we could know all there is about the brain and how it functions, we would also know what the 'mental states' are that it is experiencing, and so would have an 'explanation' of consciousness.

IMO Frank Jackson's thought problem "Mary's room" serves as a sufficient defeater for that position.

I disagree. If Mary knows *everything* about the physical process of seeing colors, she would also know what the internal state would feel like (since it is a physical process). The most she would learn is that she has finally 'seen red'.

The problem is the assumption that Mary knows *everything* there is to know about the physical aspects of 'seeing red'. That is an incredibly tall order, but if achieved would carry along with it an understanding of how *she* would react to seeing red.

---

He repeatedly describes the materialistic view of matter as inert and incapable of doing more than very simple types of activity. Why he believes that or (if he doesn't believe that) why he writes it, I do not know. In any case, his arguments against materialism fail (as far as I can see) on exactly this point.

Suppose that matter is capable of more types of activity than Hart understands.

How does this show that his arguments about God are incorrect?

It shows that there are gaps in his argument. if matter is capable of 'supporting existence', for example, his use of the requirement for such a support does not prove the existence of a God.

If matter can, in fact, support consciousness, it shows that his argument from consciousness has a gap and does not manage to demonstrate his conclusion.

So, while it does not prove his conclusion is wrong, it does show that it isn't proven to be correct.

I'm wondering if you can construct an argument, based on what Hart says, that if matter is more active than he says it is, his arguments for God fail. But you'd have to do this without begging the question -- that is, it wouldn't be sufficient to argue that of course pretty soon physicalist investigations will be able to answer all the questions they have so far been unable to answer, including why there is something rather than nothing.

To form an argument that's convincing to people who don't already assume he's wrong, you'd have to engage with what he says and show (rather than just assert) that his (allegedly) over-simple view of matter is fatal to his argument.

He gets to make assertions without evidence and nobody else does?

He has to prove that his assumptions are true in order for his argument to be sound.

As for whether physicalist investigations can resolve all of the issues, all I can say is that we need to continue to do the investigations. Given the successes over the last 400 years in showing that nothing beyond the physical is required in places where it was previous thought to be necessary, I am willing to wait and see.

One of the requirements for doing science is patience. We have made far more progress in understanding the brain and how it produces our experiences than most people imagine. We can produce, for example, illusions of being 'out of body' or even the illusion of being in another body. These are *illusions* caused by playing with how the brain processes information.

As for his overly simple view being fatal to his argument, if the physical is a sufficient 'support for existence' his whole argument for God falls apart. he never justifies that cannot be the case.