What makes people irrational thinkers?

[polymath257]

Next installment of the Hart fiasco:

page 104-105:
"When thinking about the cause of some particular thing’s being—
as opposed to thinking about its physical origin—we must do so
with an eye to the absolutely conditional nature of that thing. If
one considers the terms of one’s own existence, for instance, one
sees that there is no sense in which one is ever self-existent; one
is dependent on an incalculable number of ever greater and ever
smaller finite conditions, some of which are temporal, and some
of which definitely are not, and all of which are themselves de-
pendent on yet further conditions."

Once again, we see that claim of 'absolute contingency', which seems to be very far from being well-defined,
let alone proven. As far as I can see, the 'reason' for something to exist is *precisely* the physical conditions for
its origin. By claiming there is an 'ontological causality' (see earlier in the book) without any definition or actual
proof, it begs the question of whether physical reality *can* be the 'source of existence'.

In other words, once again, Hart assumes his conclusion by excluding from consideration the most reasonable
alternative.

Going back a bit:

"The ultimate source of existence cannot be some item
or event that has long since passed away or concluded, like a ven-
erable ancestor or even the Big Bang itself—either of which is just
another contingent physical entity or occurrence—but must be a
constant wellspring of being, at work even now. The metaphor for
this sort of ontological dependency that all the great religious tra-
ditions seem to share is that of the relation of a candle’s or lamp’s
flame to the light it casts out into a room at night: should the
flame be extinguished, in that very instant the room would fall
dark. More recent philosophers have sometimes used the image of
an electric current that, if shut off at the source, ceases along all
power lines at once. Whatever simile takes one’s fancy, the cause
of being is not some mechanical first instance of physical eventu-
ality that, having discharged its part, may depart the stage; rather,
it is the unconditional reality underlying all conditioned things in
every instant."

there are several basic mistakes here. First, blowing out the candle
does NOT immediately make the room dark. The speed of light is
finite and it takes time for the room to darken as the light moves from
the candle to the walls and gets absorbed (or reflected). Similarly, shutting
off an electrical switch does NOT immediately stop the current throughout
the circuit: it takes time for the effect to propagate.

But this also goes further. The original argument in terms of contingency allowed for
'dependence' in the sense of physical causality, but not, all of a sudden, that isn't
what is being discussed. By shifting the goalposts, Hart manages to undermine his
argument yet again.

So even the notion of an 'ontological cause' seems to be questionable. But, in
addition, it is far from clear why such is required. Hart *claims* it is required, but
does not make any argument to back up that claim. And, given the questionable
existence of that sort of causality, that is a pretty big omission.

---

Too bad my library is packed away otherwise I would have liked to participate more fully on the book discussion. My question for the physicalists is this. Can a rational person not be a phyicalist? In your world are people in general, allowed to be wrong and have a different metaphysics from physicallism without attributing their beliefs to irrationality, delusion, or malice? And the follow-up to that is has that been the case, in particular, with Hart?

To quote from Hart (page 15):

"Just to make clear what my peculiar prejudices are, I
acknowledge up front that I do not regard true philosophical
atheism as an intellectually valid or even cogent position; in fact,
I see it as a fundamentally irrational view of reality, which can be
sustained only by a tragic absence of curiosity or a fervently reso-
lute will to believe the absurd."

To answer the question: I see it as possible for someone to be rational and not be a physicalist.
Hart does not manage to be so. I *don't* see it as possible to be a modern person and hold to
medieval scholasticism and be rational.

For one thing, it is clear that the denial of atomism is irrationally based. But that is essential for
the conclusion that there can only be a single fundamental source of existence. I see it as far
more likely that there are fundamental particles that owe their existence to nothing more fundamental
and yet have a variety of types and properties. And, that these form what we know of as 'physical existence'.

But, to go further, I think that the emphasis on metaphysics as a road to understanding the universe and
its properties is fundamentally mistaken. Metaphysics, like all of philosophy, is best when asking questions
and deriving conclusions from proposed premises. It is worst when attempting to say that things 'must be'
some particular way, usually aligning with the opinions of the author.

[The Grand Nudger]

It seems like people can just be wrong, to me.

Is it rational to believe in some wrong thing? Probably, though rationality has a clear expiration date in that event.

One that every bullshitting apologist we meet on these boards has long since passed before we ever had the misfortune of them darkening our shores…..if I had to guess.

[emjay]

Too bad my library is packed away otherwise I would have liked to participate more fully on the book discussion. My question for the physicalists is this. Can a rational person not be a phyicalist? In your world are people in general, allowed to be wrong and have a different metaphysics from physicallism without attributing their beliefs to irrationality, delusion, or malice? And the follow-up to that is has that been the case, in particular, with Hart?

If rational just means 'reasoned' then people can reason themselves into all sorts of positions, using all sorts of different 'frameworks' of understanding to get there. So no, I don't think you're irrational... or any more irrational than anyone else, myself included... you just use a different framework of understanding than many people, ie Aristotle etc, to arrive at your conclusions. And can a rational person not be a physicalist? Again I don't see why not, if all we mean is 'reasoned' then you only need to look at all the different theories on consciousness for example, and/or solipsism etc, to see the diverse places reason can take people. It's always been kind of ironic to me how we can all claim to be using logic, but yet never agree on anything, and this is the main reason why I think... just different frameworks of understanding. Anyway, as to the book/Hart, I'm not reading it, just following the discussion here, so no comment from me on that.

[polymath257]

Too bad my library is packed away otherwise I would have liked to participate more fully on the book discussion. My question for the physicalists is this. Can a rational person not be a phyicalist? In your world are people in general, allowed to be wrong and have a different metaphysics from physicallism without attributing their beliefs to irrationality, delusion, or malice? And the follow-up to that is has that been the case, in particular, with Hart?

If rational just means 'reasoned' then people can reason themselves into all sorts of positions, using all sorts of different 'frameworks' of understanding to get there. So no, I don't think you're irrational... or any more irrational than anyone else, myself included... you just use a different framework of understanding than many people, ie Aristotle etc, to arrive at your conclusions. And can a rational person not be a physicalist? Again I don't see why not, if all we mean is 'reasoned' then you only need to look at all the different theories on consciousness for example, and/or solipsism etc, to see the diverse places reason can take people. It's always been kind of ironic to me how we can all claim to be using logic, but yet never agree on anything, and this is the main reason why I think... just different frameworks of understanding. Anyway, as to the book/Hart, I'm not reading it, just following the discussion here, so no comment from me on that.

Exactly. Logic *alone* is a very, very weak filter for ideas. At best, it determines if they are internally consistent. It cannot determine if they are actually true.

This is also true of math, by the way.

At some point, it is crucial to have actual observations as an additional filter. Logic and math alone simply are not enough.

Now, the question is whether the *completely logically defensible* position of solipsism is 'rational'. I would say not, but that is because of my metaphysical biases, I guess.

[emjay]

If rational just means 'reasoned' then people can reason themselves into all sorts of positions, using all sorts of different 'frameworks' of understanding to get there. So no, I don't think you're irrational... or any more irrational than anyone else, myself included... you just use a different framework of understanding than many people, ie Aristotle etc, to arrive at your conclusions. And can a rational person not be a physicalist? Again I don't see why not, if all we mean is 'reasoned' then you only need to look at all the different theories on consciousness for example, and/or solipsism etc, to see the diverse places reason can take people. It's always been kind of ironic to me how we can all claim to be using logic, but yet never agree on anything, and this is the main reason why I think... just different frameworks of understanding. Anyway, as to the book/Hart, I'm not reading it, just following the discussion here, so no comment from me on that.

Exactly. Logic *alone* is a very, very weak filter for ideas. At best, it determines if they are internally consistent. It cannot determine if they are actually true.

This is also true of math, by the way.

At some point, it is crucial to have actual observations as an additional filter. Logic and math alone simply are not enough.

Is what you're saying basically the difference between inductive and deductive reasoning? Ie the latter has the conclusion fully contained in the premises, and in a sense through it you're learning nothing new on account of that, but the former makes testable hypotheses/generalisations from observations. Top down vs bottom up logic, where the latter is where it actually gets tied to reality, through those testable hypotheses?

Now, the question is whether the *completely logically defensible* position of solipsism is 'rational'. I would say not, but that is because of my metaphysical biases, I guess.

I was mainly thinking about people like @bennyboy... I don't know if he's still around... I haven't seen him in a long time. We used to have some interesting conversations about consciousness, but our perspectives couldn't be much more radically opposed. His was along the lines of solipsism I think, or had elements of it, but I wouldn't say for a second that he wasn't rational or that his theories weren't arrived at rationally... just from a different, and more inward focused, perspective.

[The Grand Nudger]

Are we accounting for the difference between a mechanically valid statement and a rational argument?

When we say, for example, that we require some observation, we’re talking about whether a premise is sound. That’s not other than, it’s already included.

[The Architect Of Fate]

I want to point out one other thing Hart says close to the beginning of his diatribe (page 17-18):

"If, moreover, naturalism is correct (how-
ever implausible that is), and if consciousness is then an essentially
material phenomenon, then there is no reason to believe that our
minds, having evolved purely through natural selection, could pos-
sibly be capable of knowing what is or is not true about reality as
a whole. Our brains may necessarily have equipped us to recog-
nize certain sorts of physical objects around us and enabled us to
react to them; but, beyond that, we can assume only that nature
will have selected just those behaviors in us most conducive to
our survival, along with whatever structures of thought and belief
might be essentially or accidentally associated with them, and there
is no reason to suppose that such structures—even those that pro-
vide us with our notions of what constitutes a sound rational ar-
gument—have access to any abstract “truth” about the totality of
things. This yields the delightful paradox that, if naturalism is true
as a picture of reality, it is necessarily false as a philosophical pre-
cept; for no one’s belief in the truth of naturalism could corre-
spond to reality except through a shocking coincidence (or, better,
a miracle)."

Well, he is quite correct that evolution has not built our brains to find the truth of the world. It has built our brains for survival.
This, of course, ties into the whole thread: what makes people irrational? The answer is that we have not evolved to be rational,
we have evolved to survive.

And the history of our species shows that we *don't* easily see how the world around us actually is.

It has taken a LOT of hard work, a LOT of skepticism about 'obviously true' concepts, and a LOT of testing to be sure we are
not fooling ourselves. We do NOT naturally see or experience a great deal about the world: we do not see radio waves,infrared,
ultraviolet. We do not hear ultrasound or infrasound. We do not detect radioactivity. We cannot see things that are too small.
We don't see with much precision or accuracy. We are subject to many types of illusions, from optical, to auditory, to tactile,
all of which distort our perception of reality.

And, most importantly for this discourse, we tend to see intention where there is none. From seeing faces in toast, to claiming
our computers are 'acting up', to naming our cars, we have a strong evolutionary tendency to misinterpret our environment
in ways that promoted survival at one time, but do not serve any good purpose now.

Furthermore, even our patterns of thought don't necessarily correspond to reality. Simple things like basic logic are hard for
most people, even those who are highly educated and trained. There is a perception that the rules of thought were elucidated
by Aristotle and have been fixed since then. of course, that is very far from the truth. There have been HUGE advances in logic
over the last couple of centuries with the rise of formal logic. The deficiencies of our 'ways of thought' have been revealed and
analyzed in ways that the ancient Greeks could not have imagined.

So, yes, it would be a miracle if our first attempts to understand the world around us actually were correct. And, of course, they
were not. From bad metaphysics to not testing our ideas, to making assumptions that were wrong, we have made many mistakes
along the road to even our present level of understanding.

And we do NOT expect that we have the actual truth even now. We get better and better *approximations* that serve to explain
and organize our perceptions. But new information and new techniques usually open up new aspects to investigate. This is why
ALL hypotheses are held tentatively and *tested* in as many different ways as possible, attempting to show when and how they
are *wrong*.

TL;DR: Hart completely misunderstands physicalism and the way we go about learning about the world around us.

---

Another aspect that goes right to Hart's basic search: the question of whether 'existence' can be 'explained' at all.

So, what does it mean for one collection of concepts to 'explain' another?

Clearly, it means that we can deduce the main properties of the things 'explained' from the properties of the 'explainers'. The explanation is the deduction itself.

So, what could *possibly* constitute an 'explanation for existence'?

it would have to be a collection of things from which we can deduce the properties of all of existence.

But those 'explainers' either exist, in which case they don't explain their own existence, and thereby fail to explain existence.

OR, those 'explainers' do not exist and thereby cannot be an explanation for *anything*.

Ultimately, what that means is that 'existence' cannot be explained: it is a raw fact that cannot be deduced from more basic facts.

And, I want to point out that Hart *never* actually explains existence. He claims that there is a simple entity that 'necessarily exists'
Ultimately, all this means is that its existence is not explained.

In other words, Hart fails in his basic quest. Furthermore, he *must* fail in that quest.

At that point, we realize that there *must* be things that exist that have no deeper explanations: raw facts that cannot be deduced from
more basic principles OR there are 'explanatory loops' OR there is an infinite regress of explanations. Usually, we discount the last two possibilities as not giving 'actual explanations' (although we might want to reconsider these options).

And, at no point does Hart show why 'the physical world' cannot be that basic unexplained explainer.

So he claims, but fails to prove that physicalism cannot do the utmost of what is possible toward his goal.

It is because we know our minds are not good at determining reality we need disciplines like science. If our minds were excellent at intuitively finding truth science would be worthless.

[vulcanlogician]

I don't think anyone wants to say that what is logical is necessarily correct. Solipsism is rational. But who can say if it's correct? Nobody.

I tend to think solipsism is false. But a reasonable person could be a solipsist. Why not? Nothing disproves it. "Solipsism is false," isn't a logical conclusion. It's an axiom. A very, very, very good axiom.

***

Logic doesn't get us to the correct answer, it gets us to the logical answer. It must be properly done, of course, like math. But the cool thing is (when we use logic correctly) if our premises are true, our conclusion is true. Logic can give useful information in this way. But, as Poly said earlier, --in a vacuum- it can't help us determine what is true. It can only say "If A is true, then B is true."

But that can be pretty useful.

[LadyForCamus]

There was a time when it was a completely rationally justified and evidentially supported belief that the earth was the center of the solar system and that all other celestial bodies orbit it, until we learned we were wrong. No tool is perfect, and certainty only speaks to the strength of a particular belief, not to its accuracy.

[Belacqua]

this bit stood out to me:


"Physical reality cannot account for its own existence for the simple reason that nature—the physical—is that which by definition already exists; existence, even taken as a simple brute fact to which no metaphysical theory is attached, lies logically beyond the system of causes that nature comprises”. 

I think that by "account for its own existence" he means that there is nothing within nature which explains why it exists to begin with. Science describes the causes and effects within nature, but not the cause of nature itself.

To say that nature causes itself, you'd need a strange argument: 

 ~ First no part of nature existed.
 ~ Then a part of nature caused nature to exist. 

Obviously if no part of nature existed, then there is no part of nature which can cause nature to exist. So if someone thinks that nature has a cause, then it needs to be a cause which isn't part of nature. 

So the quote from Hart above seems true to me, although it doesn't go all that far. It just means that the system of causes within nature aren't sufficient to explain why nature is here. 

1. Hart hasn’t shown here that physical reality can’t be causeless and necessary. 

He certainly hasn't in the quote above. Does he address the issue elsewhere in the book? 

2. If nature cannot account for itself by the fact of its very existence, then this seems to also be a problem for God’s existence accounting for itself.

This, too, isn't addressed in the brief quote you give, but is something for which there are other arguments. Very roughly, the idea is that things which can't be self-caused are contingent, and therefore must rely on something necessary. 

If God were seen as a Demiurge or craftsman -- some other contingent, active thingy which puts together nature -- then you're right the same question would be appropriate. What made the Demiurge? Hart's argument is that God is unique in that it is non-contingent and unchanging. It is unlike the material created world in that its essence is identical with its existence. And there are elaborate arguments as to why such a thing is necessary for contingent existence to continue.

So you're certainly right that none of this is addressed in the quote you give, and that reading just the quote we are left with lots of questions. There's a lot more to the book, though.