Atheism and Ethics

[Disagreeable]

I'm a moral realist because there are facts about which actions are most and least harmful.

I am still not because I can’t see an obvious link between harm and some mind-independent non-institutional categorical imperative existing as a property of the universe.

Do you think that there are only moral facts if they are mind-independent categorical imperatives? If so, why? Maybe there are facts about wrongness and maybe wrongness is about harm because that makes sense of moral language. Which is the metaethical point.

For me, the fact that there are facts about harmful actions is enough. Because wrongness is about harm.

[Lucian]

I am still not because I can’t see an obvious link between harm and some mind-independent non-institutional categorical imperative existing as a property of the universe.

Do you think that there are only moral facts if they are mind-independent categorical imperatives? If so, why? Maybe there are facts about wrongness and maybe wrongness is about harm because  that makes sense of moral language. Which is the metaethical point.

For me, the fact that there are facts about harmful actions is enough. Because wrongness is about harm.

So I guess there can be moral facts if we define morality as being about wrongness and wrongness as being about harm. But it seems tautological and just an arbitrary definition. Why should I care about harm (I do, but by what standard should I). Perhaps that is not a mind independent (non-institutional) categorical imperative, and if so fine I get on board with it and fail as much as the next man and succeed hopefully at least as well. But to be moral realist to me is to say that this isn’t just a matter of definition, it is a matter of a property (of the universe?) that exists, that our actions can live up to or fall short from. We don’t think that there are objective standards about tickling (apart from the way my brother bullied me with it as a child and might explain a lot), so why think there are standards about harm

[Angrboda]

Harm seems to reduce to instrumental utility, in which case, why isn't instrumental utility a measure of moral right and wrong. If it's not, it's hard to see what harm offers that utility doesn't.

[Lucian]

Harm seems to reduce to instrumental utility, in which case, why isn't instrumental utility a measure of moral right and wrong.  If it's not, it's hard to see what harm offers that utility doesn't.

Hey Angrboda. Sorry, being a dumb-dumb, what is instrumental utility. Not a concept I have come across before so figured I would ask what you mean rather than look it up and maybe misunderstand you


Also, general comment - why do we keep focussing on immorality in the definitions… why no focus on what being morally good is, or is it just the absence of the bad? in many instances there is no harm to minimise when we do acts of good. Or am I misunderstanding

[Lucian]

Harm seems to reduce to instrumental utility, in which case, why isn't instrumental utility a measure of moral right and wrong.  If it's not, it's hard to see what harm offers that utility doesn't.

Hey Angrboda. Sorry, being a dumb-dumb, what is instrumental utility. Not a concept I have come across before so figured I would ask what you mean rather than look it up and maybe misunderstand you


Also, general comment, not aimed at you - why do we keep focussing on immorality in the definitions… why no focus on what being morally good is, or is it just the absence of the bad? in many instances there is no harm to minimise when we do acts of good. Or am I misunderstanding

[Angrboda]

Harm seems to reduce to instrumental utility, in which case, why isn't instrumental utility a measure of moral right and wrong.  If it's not, it's hard to see what harm offers that utility doesn't.

Hey Angrboda. Sorry, being a dumb-dumb, what is instrumental utility. Not a concept I have come across before so figured I would ask what you mean rather than look it up and maybe misunderstand you

In moral philosophy, instrumental and intrinsic value are the distinction between what is a means to an end and what is as an end in itself. Things are deemed to have instrumental value (or extrinsic value) if they help one achieve a particular end; intrinsic values, by contrast, are understood to be desirable in and of themselves. A tool or appliance, such as a hammer or washing machine, has instrumental value because it helps one pound in a nail or clean clothes, respectively. Happiness and pleasure are typically considered to have intrinsic value insofar as asking why someone would want them makes little sense: they are desirable for their own sake irrespective of their possible instrumental value. The classic names instrumental and intrinsic were coined by sociologist Max Weber, who spent years studying good meanings people assigned to their actions and beliefs.

Wikipedia.

[The Grand Nudger]

So I guess there can be moral facts if we define morality as being about wrongness and wrongness as being about harm. But it seems tautological and just an arbitrary definition. Why should I care about harm (I do, but by what standard should I).Perhaps that is not a mind independent (non-institutional) categorical imperative, and if so fine I get on board with it and fail as much as the next man and succeed hopefully at least as well. But to be moral realist to me is to say that this isn’t just a matter of definition, it is a matter of a property (of the universe?) that exists, that our actions can live up to or fall short from. We don’t think that there are objective standards about tickling (apart from the way my brother bullied me with it as a child and might explain a lot), so why think there are standards about harm

A person might not give a shit regardless of whether or not there are shoulds.  Similarly, we could assert that rape was not harmful, or even declare it a societal imperative - but that won't change anything about rape that lead me to call it harmful or deem it immoral.  If there are no objective standards for tickling™, what is the difference between tickling and rape? As for mind independence, I'd suggest that the way you've employed the term literally everything in the universe is mind dependent. It means more than just existing as or accurate as an opinion in a mind in metaethical theory. It means existing nowhere else and being accurate of nothing else but.

I think you're coming at this backwards. Moral realism is not the answer to any or every question - moral realism doesn't even propose a -single- answer to -any- question. If you ask me how much good is enough good, for example..moral realism can't answer that for you. Metaethics, value, motivation, and deontology are not interchangeable.

-as an answer to your q, of why we talk so much about immorality...well..probably because of the harm lol. It's nice to do good things, sure. If you didn't do any good things you'll have harmed no one. Now do one bad thing....

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

As an atheist, I make a concerted effort to have some ethics. Seems to be working, mostly.

Boru

[The Grand Nudger]

Harm seems to reduce to instrumental utility, in which case, why isn't instrumental utility a measure of moral right and wrong.  If it's not, it's hard to see what harm offers that utility doesn't.

Accuracy.

[Lucian]

As for mind independence, I'd suggest that the way you've employed the term literally everything in the universe is mind dependent.  It means more than just existing as or accurate as an opinion in a mind in metaethical theory.  It means existing nowhere else and being accurate of nothing else but.

So this mind independent thing is a sticking point for me and I seem to be misunderstanding something. If something is mind independent it exists even if no one is aware of it, it doesn’t require a mind for it to be real, such as the colour red does. So the way I have employed it almost everything in the universe is mind-independent. I am however denying that there is anything that can be called a moral standard that is such as that. A belief in such a thing does seem to run through most moral realist stuff I have seen so far, eg. It doesn’t matter whether anyone things torture for the shits and giggles is wrong;it just is regardless of what people believe. 

Also, I totally get that metaethics isn’t giving an answer to any one question, and I don’t think I am trying to make it do that. Whether it can be grounded in some natural phenomenon, such as harm, is relevant to a discussion of metaethics as not all positions argue for that, and the issues and argument differ depending on whether that is being argued for

Re the immorality point. I was trying to get at the fact that an explanation of moral actions that do not function as a reduction of harm do need discussion. If everything resolves down to a question of harm grounding morality then it seems something important has been missed off.