Do you control what you believe?

[Whateverist]

I hope I've made myself at least partly clearer.

Figuring out exactly what you mean when you deny libertarian free will is probably the more productive thing to do at this point. Apparently it comes down to what choices are on the menu we are conscious of, not our ability to decide between options on that menu. It is how our experiences in our unchosen environments up to the point of decision (perhaps with some equally unchosen innate dispositions) which determine the range of choice. In that sense we are not consciously free to generate new choices which reflect desires we don't actually possess.

Even if we (somehow) randomly generate a list of choices, at the point at which we decide between the choices we will be sorting by virtue of the desires we have not chosen. What else can we do? To take the restaurant metaphor a little further, if our dining companion encourages us to try something new we may find we like it. It may even insinuate itself among our pantheon of desires, thus influencing future motivation.

If that is all, I have no trouble conceding it. Not much really seems to be at stake. Perhaps you could elaborate if you think I'm missing anything important.

Of course, where questions of free will often come up is in connection with accountability and the application of state sanctioned justice. (Well, of course some would point to accountability to God and the question of sin but I suspect we can agree that is made moot if gods don't figure among the things one fears or desire.) Personally I have no problem with enforcing societal standards of behavior regardless of whether a person has been properly brought up to respect others. If some individuals don't have pro-social desires then we can at least hope that fear of consequences will have the desired effect.

[Edwardo Piet]

Figuring out exactly what you mean when you deny libertarian free will is probably the more productive thing to do at this point.

I thought I made it clear what it is that I'm denying. I tried several times, but I'll try again. I'm denying the idea that we can somehow consciously ultimately determine our own conscious motivation. My point is that for that to be true, conscious motivation would require more conscious motivation, and that would have to go on forever (which clearly doesn't happen, there are times in the past when we're not conscious of our motivation(s), before we were born being the obvious example!) leading to an infinite regress of conscious motivation requiring more conscious motivation - and that wouldn't do it either because you'd always need more conscious motivation, so you'd never get there, it would never work. Now to any rational and logical person, when thought through, this entire concept seems totally insane and obviously false, but there are a lot of people who behave as if it's true, as if they really do believe it. I think they are confused, and/or they haven't given the matter much thought - and I also think that lots of people who do deny it often equivocate it with other kinds of "free will" that actually are possible, and so they end up believing in it too anyway. In other words, they commit the equivocation fallacy.

Apparently it comes down to what choices are on the menu we are conscious of, not our ability to decide between options on that menu.

No, it's not a matter of what choices are on the menu, it's a matter of whether or not those choices are "free" in the libertarian sense I've described several times. They are not free in the sense that they're ultimately entirely determined by unconscious motivation. If our choices were not ultimately entirely determined by unconscious motivation, nor were they ultimately entirely undetermined, then we'd - somehow - have libertarian "free will". I don't see how this is possible because either conscious motivation is ultimately entirely determined by unconscious motivation, or it's ultimately entirely not determined by anything, including conscious motivation, and so, ultimately, we can't determine things at all.

It is how our experiences in our unchosen environments up to the point of decision (perhaps with some equally unchosen innate dispositions) which determine the range of choice.

Yes, and our experiences in our unchosen enviroments and innate dispositions are ultimately entirely determined by other things that are part of the universe, as everything is part of the universe. Any possible decision is a possible part of the universe therefore, because everything is part of the universe. Our possible decisions in any possible universe may be determined by other decisions but they are all ultimately entirely determined by unconscious sources that are also part of the universe. We are all ultimately entirely unconsciously determined, or ultimately entirely undetermined.

Not much really seems to be at stake.

Well what's "at stake" is surely a question of what matters, and therefore a moral question, which is off-topic. My point is that we ultimately entirely don't have conscious motivation, that is the "free will" that I'm denying. To digress for just a second on the moral note, I think there is a lot at stake, revenge and supposedly "deserved" retribution as opposed to merely justified punishment is often based upon the idea that people are ultimately responsible, for example - and such as idea is dependent upon the notion of our conscious motivation not being ultimately entirely determined by unconsciousness. The notion of arrogance is also often based upon the fact that people often feel that they are superior to others because they believe that they are ultimately responsible for their good qualities, which once again is dependent upon the notion of conscious motivation not being ultimately entirely determined by unconsciousness. And the same of course applies to people with excessively low self-esteem/excessively high shame - as opposed to just guilt or regret which is based on recognized wrong action and helps correct bad behavior - for the same reasons. I think that revenge, arrogance and excessively low/self-esteem/excessively high shame all do a lot of harm in the world and, since I believe that belief in the libertarian sense of free will often influences this, for reasons given - this is why I think it's morally relevant.

Perhaps you could elaborate if you think I'm missing anything important.

I think denying libertarian free will is clearly logical. That is my fundamental point, and that is the only definition of "free will" that I've made clear that I do deny. I also think that it is the kind of "free will" most worth paying attention to, for the off-topic moral reasons described above.

[...]Personally I have no problem with enforcing societal standards of behavior regardless of whether a person has been properly brought up to respect others. If some individuals don't have pro-social desires then we can at least hope that fear of consequences will have the desired effect.

I'm a consequentialist and I believe that rehabilitation and detainment are not the only necessary methods of justice. I also, for example, think full-on punishment can be justified. But justified punishment is of course not the same as retribution based on whether people "deserve" it. In the sense that it's not about ultimate responsibility, it's about ultimate consequences and relative responsibility often plays a big part in that, since the deliberate intentions of people often affect the consequences. People with bad intentions don't always do bad things, but they are more likely to. People with good intentions don't always do good things, but they are more likely to. People with bad intentions can often do good things, but they're not as likely to as people with good intentions. People with good intentions can often do bad things, but they're not as likely to as people with bad intentions. Ultimately it's about consequences and not intentions, indeed, but the point is that intentions often play a big part in the consequences, despite the fact that they're ultimately not consciously determined at all, and so not ultimately responsible, at all.

[Whateverist]

Figuring out exactly what you mean when you deny libertarian free will is probably the more productive thing to do at this point.

I thought I made it clear what it is that I'm denying. I tried several times, but I'll try again.

I meant the most important thing for me to do. But your response gives me lots of feedback on my initial (very incomplete as it turns out) attempt to state your position. Thanks for the time and effort you've given me here. I'll need some time to take it in and there is a lot on my plate to do first today. But I look forward to getting back to this.

[Mystic]

Praise and pride only make sense if context of free-will. To be honest, I don't know how to function without assuming to believe in free-will.

If takes an assumption of a soul for free-will to be possible, I would put hope in free-will existing, and hope there is soul, and act as if that's the case.

One reason is you don't want to act as if you have no control, while it's possible you do.

But there is no harm in the case of not having free-will, in acting as if you have free-will.

[The Grand Nudger]

That's probably not entirely accurate Mystic, as I have confidence that your heart will beat whether or not you believe in free will. Nevertheless I understand what you mean and feel largely the same way. I do, however, acknowledge that my "inability to function" as if there were no such thing as free will has more to say about the limitations of my cognitive faculties than it does about the existence of any free will. What you've offered after this comment can be summed up as an extended appeal to consequences, with a classic wager bit at the end. Very cute.

[Edwardo Piet]

[...]To be honest, I don't know how to function without assuming to believe in free-will.

Then you are confusing determinism with fatalism.

If takes an assumption of a soul for free-will to be possible

I can't conceive of how that would make the libertarian sense of free will possible.

One reason is you don't want to act as if you have no control, while it's possible you do.

We do have control in the sense that we have conscious motivations that come from other conscious motivations that we have. It's just that ultimately that is determined by unconsciousness. We have control, but that's not the same as free control.

But there is no harm in the case of not having free-will, in acting as if you have free-will.

I think there is, for reasons stated above, but it was an off-topic digression. Whether it does any harm is a moral question and not addressing the OP.

[IATIA]

If one has no free will, then one cannot 'choose' what to believe. The problem is that within the 'system', we have no way to prove free will exists. (Though there is substantial empirical data that suggests it does not.)

If one has free will and 'chooses' to believe or not, there would be no discernible difference if there were no free will for the mind would 'convince' us that we had made the 'choice' of our own 'free will'.

With that said, it would seem prudent to accept free will as a fact and accept the responsibilities/consequences involved in making a choice. If we do not have free will, then all is moot anyway.

Elaborating on the original question, we do not have full control of everything in our life that will ultimately lead to our decision whether or not to believe. Therefore, to answer the original question yes requires the qualified, "yes, but not full control".

[Edwardo Piet]

If one has no free will, then one cannot 'choose' what to believe.

If 'choice' is defined as 'free choice' then yes, but if 'choice' is merely defined as 'decision' then, no, because decisions aren't necessarily free, are they? If you say that they are then, assuming that decision-making exists, that would imply that all decisions are free. But in that case you're already saying that we have free-will, so then what is reasonable is motion towards "free" needing a definition.

The problem is that within the 'system', we have no way to prove free will exists. (Though there is substantial empirical data that suggests it does not.)

Well, I'm sure that there is enough scientific evidence that the typical compatibilistic sense of "free will" exists. Our decisions are free enough to affect other decisions that we have. Our will is partly free.

But I also believe that our will is ultimately entirely not free. If we don't look to the present but instead we look to the past, and we trace our will causally back to the beginning of the universe, our will is ultimately entirely not free.

If one has free will and 'chooses' to believe or not, there would be no discernible difference if there were no free will for the mind would 'convince' us that we had made the 'choice' of our own 'free will'.

Whether the difference is subjectively discernible or not, there's still a difference. Well, sort of. If libertarian free will was a coherent concept there would be an existent difference if it were then true. The only real difference between no free will and the libertarian sense of free will is that libertarian free will is false because it's not even logically coherent.

With that said, it would seem prudent to accept free will as a fact and accept the responsibilities/consequences involved in making a choice. If we do not have free will, then all is moot anyway.

Free will of the typically compatabilistic sense is not an illusion but is trivially true and I think barely worth pondering over. Fatalism is almost certainly false (and it's not the same as determinism). So we obviously accept that. Free will in the libertarian sense is logically incoherent so I don't know why we'd want to accept that unless we wrongfully confuse the implications of the absence of its meaning with fatalism.

[IATIA]

I will elaborate further later. I am at work now.

"Free will" is the ability to make a choice undetermined by the biochemical/bioelectrical physiology of the body. Note, I said "undetermined", not unaffected.

[Edwardo Piet]

As I said, are you defining "choice" as "free choice"?

If not, if you simply mean "decision": if a decision is made by someone and that decision is undetermined by their biochemical/bioelectrical physiology of the body, you'd call that free will? Well, what determines the part of them that actually does do the determining then? It can't just keep being more and more and more parts of them because that would lead to an infinite regress. Either at some point they have to be ultimately entirely determined by something outside of themselves or they are ultimately entirely not determined at all.