Rosenberg's Argument Against Beliefs

[Neo-Scholastic]

Alex Rosenberg is an atheist and philosopher of science who maintains that if naturalism is true, then beliefs cannot exist. (How he can believe this is a mystery to me.) He is also the author of "The Atheist's Guide to Reality."Anyway, here is his argument:

1: If naturalism is true, then beliefs are brain states.
2: Brain states are physical configurations of matter.
3: Therefore, if naturalism is true, beliefs are physical configurations of matter.
4: In order to qualify as beliefs proper, they need to have the property of intentionality (i.e. to refer to or be "about" something)
5: Physical configurations of matter cannot, in virtue just of its physical structure, composition, location, or causal relation, be “about” another configuration of matter in the way original intentionality requires.
6: Therefore, if naturalism is true, beliefs cannot be "about" anything.
7: Therefore, if naturalism is true, there are not beliefs.
8: Naturalism is true.
9: Therefore, there are not beliefs.

and

10: If there are not beliefs, then there are not true or false beliefs either.

[Joel]

Alex Rosenberg is an atheist and philosopher of science who maintains that if naturalism is true, then beliefs cannot exist. (How he can believe this is a mystery to me.) He is also the author of "The Atheist's Guide to Reality."Anyway, here is his argument:

1: If naturalism is true, then beliefs are brain states.
2: Brain states are physical configurations of matter.
3: Therefore, if naturalism is true, beliefs are physical configurations of matter.
4: In order to qualify as beliefs proper, they need to have the property of intentionality (i.e. to refer to or be "about" something)
5: Physical configurations of matter cannot, in virtue just of its physical structure, composition, location, or causal relation, be “about” another configuration of matter in the way original intentionality requires.
6: Therefore, if naturalism is true, beliefs cannot be "about" anything.
7: Therefore, if naturalism is true, there are not beliefs.
8: Naturalism is true.
9: Therefore, there are not beliefs.

and

10: If there are not beliefs, then there are not true or false beliefs either.

Great. All religions are redundant, then.

[Lord Privy Seal]

I don't buy premise #5.

5: Physical configurations of matter cannot, in virtue just of its physical structure, composition, location, or causal relation, be “about” another configuration of matter in the way original intentionality requires.

Why not? If naturalism is true, configurations of matter can compose symphonies.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Great. All religions are redundant, then.

Not just that. All beliefs are redundant, even the belief that the earth is round. If physicalism is true then there can be no knowledge.

---

Why not? If naturalism is true, configurations of matter can compose symphonies.

Then you do not understand premise 5. Physical things have no meaning in themselves. As a physical object a painting is an ordered collection of pigment and oil on rough cloth. It isn't about anything. But as an object of contemplation at a painting is about something. It has a subject matter to which it refers. The properties of physical things do not point to anything beyond themselves. This is in stark contrast to mental properties. Beliefs, fears, and thoughts are all about something. You can believe the earth is round. You can fear spiders. You can remember the Mount Rushmore. These mental properties are about the earth, spiders and Mount Rushmore. But the earth, spiders, and Mount Rushmore as physical things are not about anything.

The cornerstone of naturalism is physical reduction. Yet intentionality cannot fit into naturalism. Alex Rosenberg is fully aware of this. And yet he does not let this shake his conviction that everything is physical. Instead his intellectual commitment to atheistic naturalism forces him to admit the inherent nihilism of that position.

[Whateverist]

1: If naturalism is true, then beliefs are brain states.
2: Brain states are physical configurations of matter.
3: Therefore, if naturalism is true, beliefs are physical configurations of matter.
4: In order to qualify as beliefs proper, they need to have the property of intentionality (i.e. to refer to or be "about" something)
5: Physical configurations of matter cannot, in virtue just of its physical structure, composition, location, or causal relation, be “about” another configuration of matter in the way original intentionality requires.
6: Therefore, if naturalism is true, beliefs cannot be "about" anything.

Notice how incomplete step one is as written. Brains states which underpin beliefs aside from being configurations of matter are already about something. Similarly if I write out a "Spare any change?" sign on a scrap of paper, the piece of paper is just a piece of inert material, compositionally. But now it also conveys my belief that someone is going to throw me some coin, which is my intention. If a scrap of paper can convey my intention, then it would seem that, whatever material my brain may be composed of, can not prevent it from doing the same.

[Excellent example of the presumption of the rational mind. On what basis do you prefer to dismiss this argument?]

[Cato]

And yet, I have beliefs. At least I think I do. Does this thought constitute a belief?

Chad,
Do you have a blog called Subversive Thinking and go by the name Jime? Your argument looks a lot like this:

http://subversivethinking.blogspot.com/2...sical.html

[The Grand Nudger]

And yet, I have beliefs. At least I think I do. Does this thought constitute a belief?

It may not, as Apo and I are so fond of chewing on -in one way or another- from time to time, lol.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Do you have a blog called Subversive Thinking and go by the name Jime? Your argument looks a lot like this:http://subversivethinking.blogspot.com/2010/12/alex-rosenberg-powerful-metaphysical.html

Perhaps it is a coincidence, but I was working on the same idea. My thesis was based on semiotics and the relationship between signs and the signified. It occurred to me that since signs, as physical artifacts, had no inherent meaning that other physical properties such has brain-states also had no inherent meaning. From a purely objective point of view meaning must be assigned to physical systems from the outside via intellection. I have not made up my mind as to whether meant the absence of an epistomic link or an ontological one. Either way mental properties cannot be reduced to physical ones.

I came across Jime's blog some time ago and learned about Alex Rosenberg's argument. It seemed to present the thesis in a much more succinct way. I also found it interesting that a self-avowed atheist would present the same idea, so I posted it to see what others thought.

...Brains states which underpin beliefs aside from being configurations of matter are already about something. Similarly if I write out a "Spare any change?" sign on a scrap of paper, the piece of paper is just a piece of inert material, compositionally. But now it also conveys my belief that someone is going to throw me some coin, which is my intention.

In your example, the paper does not in itself have meaning. It must be interpreted and assigned meaning from the outside. If your note is written in English it will have no meaning to someone who only knows Chinese. Likewise a brain-state, as a physical thing, has no meaning unless one is assigned to it. When you say conveys your intention, what then is the ontological status of your intention. Is the intention a thing in and of itself, conveyed first by your brain then transferred to paper? This implies something independent of both your brain and the paper that has been transferred. What is that thing?

And yet, I have beliefs. At least I think I do. Does this thought constitute a belief?

It may not, as Apo and I are so fond of chewing on -in one way or another- from time to time, lol.

Exactly the point. So what is the logical conclusion of such a belief if not nihilism?

[Whateverist]

...Brains states which underpin beliefs aside from being configurations of matter are already about something. Similarly if I write out a "Spare any change?" sign on a scrap of paper, the piece of paper is just a piece of inert material, compositionally. But now it also conveys my belief that someone is going to throw me some coin, which is my intention.

In your example, the paper does not in itself have meaning. It must be interpreted and assigned meaning from the outside. If your note is written in English it will have no meaning to someone who only knows Chinese. Likewise a brain-state, as a physical thing, has no meaning unless one is assigned to it. When you say conveys your intention, what then is the ontological status of your intention. Is the intention a thing in and of itself, conveyed first by your brain then transferred to paper? This implies something independent of both your brain and the paper that has been transferred. What is that thing?

I don't think so. Whereas pieces of papers are not the sort of thing we think of as assigning or conveying meaning, brains are precisely the kind of thing we think does so. So when we consider the compositional make up and process of our brains, we aren't looking at something akin to a piece of paper. We are looking at the biological processes of the creature we have observed as engaging in the conveyance and reception of meaning.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Whereas pieces of papers are not the sort of thing we think of as assigning or conveying meaning, brains are precisely the kind of thing we think does so.

To me that is part of what makes the problem so interesting. Why do you (and I) make an exception for one particular physical system? What makes the brain different from the paper is the presence of operations you associate with mind. We do not suppose that ink and paper, thermostats, and computers have minds?