On naturalism and consciousness

[Surgenator]

Here's my problem with looking for the fundaments of consciousness in anything larger than the most fundamental particles: how do flowing electrons "know" as they flow through a transistor that they are representing data? Would you say that every eddy and whirl of river water represents a "gate" condition right at that point where a single current splits? How about a crack in a rock which splits one way or the other depending on slight variations in temperature? Is it doing a super-advanced environmental calculation, or is it just random stuff that happened?
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The last question is whether ALL actions at the QM level are logical decisions, or just "stuff happening." And I think this brings us back to a philosophical decision-- is something data only if we call it so?

For the love all things rational, stop spreading your misrepresentation of physics. You clearly don't know how electricity works and definetly not QM.

[pocaracas]

I think the great unknown in this discussion is how a brain goes from a gazillion "gates" to a thought.
I doubt the gates are at some sub-particle level. I'd put them at the axon level, but I can't be sure... and I also seriously doubt those would be standard digital logic gates... more like "Multiple-Input, Multiple-Output"gates, with multiple levels in each of the multiple outputs...

[bennyboy]

Here's my problem with looking for the fundaments of consciousness in anything larger than the most fundamental particles: how do flowing electrons "know" as they flow through a transistor that they are representing data? Would you say that every eddy and whirl of river water represents a "gate" condition right at that point where a single current splits? How about a crack in a rock which splits one way or the other depending on slight variations in temperature? Is it doing a super-advanced environmental calculation, or is it just random stuff that happened?
...
The last question is whether ALL actions at the QM level are logical decisions, or just "stuff happening." And I think this brings us back to a philosophical decision-- is something data only if we call it so?

For the love all things rational, stop spreading your misrepresentation of physics. You clearly don't know how electricity works and definetly not QM.

So have we officially moved on to the trolling phase of this thread? Are you going to call me a poo-poo face and make fun of me with hilarious meme pictures?

If you think that my understanding of QM is insufficient in the context of this argument, go ahead and set me straight. Explain the difference between gates at the macro level and events at the quantum level. Or, since you know so much more than me, let's head to 1-vs-1 debate, and you can bring the details of your apparently much-superior mechanical theory of mind. I doubt you'll do that, though, since you said:

In physical monism, a mind is not necessary. So it is not required to prove how a mind arises.

As for me, I don't claim to have all the answers, but there are many layers and levels involved in the mind, whatever philosophical perspective you take on it, and in my opinion each of them is worth discussing in turn.

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I think the great unknown in this discussion is how a brain goes from a gazillion "gates" to a thought.
I doubt the gates are at some sub-particle level. I'd put them at the axon level, but I can't be sure... and I also seriously doubt those would be standard digital logic gates... more like "Multiple-Input, Multiple-Output"gates, with multiple levels in each of the multiple outputs...

Well, that's a tricky one. In mechanical terms, a picture of some neurons should let us see pretty readily that what you're saying is correct. (rat neurons)



But I'm not sure rhythm is necessarily referring only to digital logic. Wouldn't an analog comparator with multiple inputs still be a kind of gate?

My question is still this: what separates any complex physical process, which necessarily can be seen as having inputs and outputs, from an official, mind-producing "gate"?

[Whateverist]

My question is still this: what separates any complex physical process, which necessarily can be seen as having inputs and outputs, from an official, mind-producing "gate"?

Uh .. the flesh and blood mind asking the question? The effrontery of the human mind and its attempts to tell reality how it must work never ceases to amaze me.

[bennyboy]

My question is still this: what separates any complex physical process, which necessarily can be seen as having inputs and outputs, from an official, mind-producing "gate"?

Uh .. the flesh and blood mind asking the question? The effrontery of the human mind and its attempts to tell reality how it must work never ceases to amaze me.

Could you please elaborate a little more? This sentence interests me, but I don't want to misunderstand you.

[Surgenator]

For the love all things rational, stop spreading your misrepresentation of physics. You clearly don't know how electricity works and definetly not QM.

If you think that my understanding of QM is insufficient in the context of this argument, go ahead and set me straight. Explain the difference between gates at the macro level and events at the quantum level. Or, since you know so much more than me, let's head to 1-vs-1 debate, and you can bring the details of your apparently much-superior mechanical theory of mind.

If you want argue about a physical explanation of the mind, Rythm is more informed than myself. If you want to argue about QM or basic science, bring it on.

[bennyboy]

If you think that my understanding of QM is insufficient in the context of this argument, go ahead and set me straight. Explain the difference between gates at the macro level and events at the quantum level. Or, since you know so much more than me, let's head to 1-vs-1 debate, and you can bring the details of your apparently much-superior mechanical theory of mind.

If you want argue about a physical explanation of the mind, Rythm is more informed than myself. If you want to argue about QM or basic science, bring it on.

I want to talk about about whether QM events can be considered in Rhythm's gate-based model of mind, and whether my idea that all energetic exchanges may be said to involve a kind of fundamental "mind stuff"-- i.e. single-substance, dual-property physico-idealism, is compatible with his view. If you have something useful to say about QM in this context, which I don't know, then I'm all ears, and I'll swallow my pride and learn something.

[pocaracas]

My question is still this: what separates any complex physical process, which necessarily can be seen as having inputs and outputs, from an official, mind-producing "gate"?

A "gate"?
It seems that's your greatest hurdle, here... one single "gate", one single neuron can't do much more than react to some input. Perhaps insects and other very small animals operate like this... a particular sensory input triggers a handful of neurons which result in a particular response.

Like it's been said too often in this thread (and other like it) a thinking mind is probably an emergent property of many, many, many, many such "gates" working together. Instead of a direct trigger from sensory "data" to action, we have several intermediary steps which aid in the decision to act... some don't even lead to any action...

[bennyboy]

Like it's been said too often in this thread (and other like it) a thinking mind is probably an emergent property of many, many, many, many such "gates" working together. Instead of a direct trigger from sensory "data" to action, we have several intermediary steps which aid in the decision to act... some don't even lead to any action...

This opens up a lot of questions. For example, would a boolean "on" qualify as an idea, and would a cascade following such an idea be called thinking?

As for emergence, I'd start pulling out gates one by one, and look for that critical mass at which processing could no longer be called mind. Is there really such a line, or is it purely arbitrary? My own take would be that if gates are mind, then a single gate would be the "atomic" element of mind, though it would no more resemble a human mind than a photon resembles a human brain. In other words, I wouldn't describe a human mind as being supervenient on the brain; I'd describe mental elements as being supervenient on (or equivalent to) the simplest gates, and the human mind as being super-supervenient on those elements.

[The Grand Nudger]

Who says we don't?

In this convo...lol, I guess I will.

How would you know whether every subatomic particle is bursting with mind, or whether the universe is a giant mind, or whether in all reality, it is only a few specially-evolved entities on a little blue dot which are imbued with the special privilege of not only existing but knowing what it's like to exist? What exactly would mind "on display" look like? Would it walk and talk? Show motivated behaviors that we can relate to as human beings?

All good questions for you. I would expect to observe "mind" (under CTM) as systems capable of performing a robust range of logical operations on abstracted inputs - yielding useful (and reliable) outputs to the system in question. I would expect that effect to be more pronounced as the complexity and scale of the architecture increases. So that's what "minds on display" appears to be to me.

Frankly, if we're talking about observation, I don't even know that other people have minds-- ultimately, I must make philosophical assumptions to arrive even at that seemingly obvious conclusion.

Allow me to be the guy that knows that then(lol?). I know that you possess a mind the same way that I know that gravity exists. I'm ok with my limitations (more on that in a minute). I'm trying to explain a possible state of affairs for "the unknown" by reference to the known. By reference to observation. As a fun fact, you know what else, ultimately, makes assumptions? Computers. They don't have to assume that their inputs are an accurate description of the "external" state of affairs. Indeed, that there even -is- an external state of affairs. Logical operations proceed with the implied modifier "if". The accuracy of that "if" is an issue of peripherals (what you and I might call senses).

-But, to perform logical operations they do make those assumptions. They can even express this uncertainty, as a meta analysis of their architectural limitations (and they don't require any high lvl language or programming to accomplish this).

When I say that all interchanges might involve mind, I'm not talking about QM particles having memories, and missing their kids, and appreciating Mozart. I'm talking about building blocks, upon which a more complex mind, like a human mind, could supervene, if those energetic interchanges are brought together in the right ways. Why not?

Why not? Well, because then you aren't talking about particles having mind, you're talking about particles providing the constituent components and environment in which mind may arise. Does it make sense to call a pile of rubber and steel ties a tire? The arrangement -under both of our conceptions- is a defining feature of "mind". Neither of us expect to find "minds" where that condition has not been met. I think you're being too loose with the word, I suppose.

The behavior of matter allows for logical operations to be performed, and the composition of any particular collection of matter either allows for or rules out it's use in performing those operations. Further, the composition of the matter tells us how robust it -could be- regarding such operations - and the arrangement of matter, finally, describes it;s implementation (and that too has a modifying effect on those operations - things like range of function, speed of calculation, depth and breadth of "program memory")
-just to provide commentary on precisely the same concept in an entirely different treatment.

This is how things like a desk supervene on atoms which consist of 99.9999999% space. So the problem with sand wouldn't be that there's no mind.

I think it would (be a problem), under both of our conceptions. As in "If matter accounts for mind, why doesn't a beach seem to have a mind" -or- "If mind is intrinsic to exchanges of energy at some fundamental level, why doesn't beach sand seem to have a mind?"

-To which we have both replied "architecture". There's no way to avoid observation in giving this answer, as "architecture" -is- an observation. Neither of us have to make the assumption - but since we're trying to perform logical operations - we do make the assumption.

Here's my problem with looking for the fundaments of consciousness in anything larger than the most fundamental particles: how do flowing electrons "know" as they flow through a transistor that they are representing data?

They don't. Electrons aren't the gates, they're the signals the gates use. The gates "know" - they use the electrons the same way that you and I use sound or visual data to convey ideas (states, in parlance) The electron is -how- they communicate, not -what- they are communicating. The -what- is abstraction.
(remind you of anything/one?)

Would you say that every eddy and whirl of river water represents a "gate" condition right at that point where a single current splits?

No, but I understand the question - and so I would say that a great many arrangements of matter can lead to the structure of a gate - but that doesn't mean that the gate is capable of doing work (often, a gate would work - if only it's structure were superimposed upon some more suitable material - the common forked broken twig would make a great OR gate - if only it were more conductive to electricity, for example).

How about a crack in a rock which splits one way or the other depending on slight variations in temperature? Is it doing a super-advanced environmental calculation, or is it just random stuff that happened?

Now -that- is good. No, it's not doing "super advanced" calculation...but it is computing data, in a loose sense. The nuts and bolts of computation is "just stuff happening" btw. Computation is possible because "stuff just happens"- a specific way. If it didn't, computation would not be possible. We're not really bending the fabric of the cosmos when we compute, we're leveraging it's observed behavior for effect. Gates can be abstracted to any architecture, all you need is "stuff happening" -reliably. Again, this would be why I caution against thinking of "mind" as something so spread out in the cosmos - if mind is everywhere, and stuff is "just happening" all the time (which it is) mind -might- express itself in beachsand - not just in a "special" arrangement.

It seems to me that data is only data if there is someone there to call it so. But that would mean that mind exists only where an existing mind sees meaning-- something akin to the Biblical God breathing life into man.

Sure, in that "data" is a human word that requires human beings to call something anything in a human language. But the word is not the thing, "data" is a concept that refers to something that does not rely on human beings to exist. Plants -demonstrably- handle data, for example. So do computers. So does your rock.

If you maximized the physical potential of a ton of rock, who knows what wondrous things could be created? And yet, we usually just pile rocks together.

Thus maximizing their potential -as structures...

There's no law that says evolution would maximize a given material's potential-- which in a simple way can be seen by the fact that there are idiots and geniuses with exactly identical brain chemistry.

So, when I ask why we don't see QM computation, why we don't seem to be capable, you say "we aren't maximized?". That wouldn't matter. Architecture is the base level. If a computational system were QM architecturally all function would be QM. Our standard ideas would be translations that the cpu abstracted into QM data, performed QM operations upon, and yielded QM output. We could convert this output after the fact, but it would be QM through and through. Architecture is the first and most important modifier of any computational system. It would be impossible for a QM system to be so "not maximised" as to -not- be engaging in QM computation. If it were, then it wouldn't be QM architecture.

If we consider the evolution of computers, we have smaller and smaller gates packed onto a chip. What does this mean? It means that on the older chips, much of the electric flow was wasted-- it was not organized into its maximal representation of data, and the greatest number of possible logical decisions. But let's say we continue reducing the size of systems until we get to 100% efficiency. What would that mean? I think it would mean we were working at the finest level of matter known to us: subatomic particles.

I think that's a convenient definition for efficiency, but I can run with it. If we were capable of creating such a system it would have many times the computational ability of our own biological systems (under CTM). Our apparatus is nowhere near that scale (which is why QM doesn't seem all that relevant to me, regarding -our- mind, btw). Again, such a conception (combined with your earlier comments about mind) would imply that beachsand possessed a "supermind". I don't think we'd miss it, if it did.

The last question is whether ALL actions at the QM level are logical decisions, or just "stuff happening."

Again, logical operations are "stuff happening" in computational systems.

And I think this brings us back to a philosophical decision-- is something data only if we call it so?

Sure, but it's "something" even when we aren't there to call it anything. That tree falling in the forest bit.

Explain the difference between gates at the macro level and events at the quantum level.

Mind if I?

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Macro gates completely depend on macro behavior. If things didn't behave the way they do, an AND gate could not be relied upon to yield a specific output under the specific conditions required so that logical principles can be abstracted into mechanical action (IOW, an AND gate -would not- be an AND gate). The "erratic" behavior at the level of QM doesn't facilitate this sort of operation. It's the difference between deterministic and probabilistic operation. Our neurons, for example, are at the "macro" level of architecture.

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But I'm not sure rhythm is necessarily referring only to digital logic. Wouldn't an analog comparator with multiple inputs still be a kind of gate?

A comparator is a chipset, comprised of multiple gates. No, I'm not talking about digital gates exclusively - but the principles behind their construction and how they achieve their effect.

My question is still this: what separates any complex physical process, which necessarily can be seen as having inputs and outputs, from an official, mind-producing "gate"?

Nothing, intrinsically. It would have to be a damned fine gate though. Capable of producing at least as much (and preferably much, much more) as the collections that we see involved in computation now (or the number of possible qm "intrinsic" minds under your conception).

And yes, gates that at least operate on QM principle - even if they do so in an inefficient and roundabout way - could be handled. Are the views compatible? We'd have to split the difference - likely.

my idea that all energetic exchanges may be said to involve a kind of fundamental "mind stuff"

Sure, "mind stuff" - but, in my view, not "mind" in toto. The gates are useless without a carrier signal. Course, the carrier signal is useless without the gates. If Qm underpins behaviors at the "macro" level, then QM underpins computing, as computing leverages behaviors - regardless of how they arise (both brains and computers are currently at the macro scale, in any case - reference to behavior at that level is probably going to be more informative, well understood -within- QM, as an explanation for my bias...lol). Keep in mind, this is just -one way- to account for mind. A QM mind would fit with NN Theory (neural network)even better than it would fit with "computational mind" - though there is some overlap. An NN "mind" might use probabilistic architecture (mirroring QM) -even though it is operating at or manufactured in the "macro" scale. My CTM "mind" is nothing more or less than the sum total of logical operations of physical systems. A QM NN is just "stuff happening" in a way that produces an identical effect (to the mind I offered). A probabilistic approximation (though, granted, interchangeable - indistinguishable in effect). I don't want to imply that a QM NN "mind" is the lesser of the two - we'd have to benchmark them side by side to know that...lol. A QM NN (and a "macro" NN)would be very close to "no mind", lol, btw. Which I think is fascinating (regardless of whether or not it describes our minds - just that mind can be described in a manner that makes it "disappear"..lol. I mean, it;s still there, something is there - but it's not anything like what we think it is. The thing we think is there, simply -isn't- in the most complete sense of the word).

Gotta put some blood in the water to draw the sharks.