On naturalism and consciousness

[The Grand Nudger]

Let me start with sentience. As you know, I don't think sentience has any meaning if its determination requires arbitration: "X complexity means sentient, <X complexisty means not sentient."

Any meaning as a concept - or any meaning as a description of what we assume to be our "exterior" circumstances/environment.

Therefore, the most primitie building block of sentience has to be rooted in a kind of atomic consciousness (by which I mean an indivisible minimal consciousness, not any relation to a physical atom, which is misnamed anyway)

Because the system has it in some example of "entity" that means that all (or the vast majority) of the particles in the system must have "consciousness" as an attribute? How hard do you want me to unpack this?

That being said, there are certain ideas which are probably required to establish meaning at any given level of complexity.

-Or certain architectures, physical structures doing observable work.

Just being minimally conscious, for example, wouldn't allow you to see meaning in people's behaviors. It's definitely possible, through reflection or drug use or meditation, to arrive at a mental state in which you can see light and hear sound, and perceive no deep meaning in any of it.

I'd wonder whether being "minimally conscious" really raises up to whatever bar we set for "sentience"? Is it possible that something could be minimally conscious - but not sentient?

On the other hand, I'd argue a computer could see "meaning" in Chad's lightswitches. For example, it could process an alarm as a trigger for an escape behavior, or a bathroom light as a trigger for a cleanliness inspection algorithm.

Whatever "meaning" either system has is a subjective experience, isn;t it? The architecture of computers explains why this is so - I would draw a similar analogy to the human brain and relevant sensory apparatus. There's only so much either can do - and their limits are disturbingly similar.

But without the sentient experience of a motivated mind, these kinds of meaning aren't very meaningful, in the sense that people have the experience of meaningfulness.

To you, or us, yes - perhaps, but being a subjective experience...is this a problem? We would expect to require translation between different architectures. Or, to put it another way, we would expect their experience to be different than our own.

They are just assignations of outputs at one level to behaviors at a new level: the 0-->0, 1-->10, 2-->3 or whatever that I mentioned before. In this case, 0 means "do 0" and 1 means "do 10" and 2 means "do 3," and nothing more.

Algorithm. I agree with all of that, comp mind suggests that this is also how our "mind" is generated. It doesn't demand that they be of identical construction- it asks if they achieve a similar effect (because we can observe those) based upon consistent principles -of computing-.

[bennyboy]

Therefore, the most primitie building block of sentience has to be rooted in a kind of atomic consciousness (by which I mean an indivisible minimal consciousness, not any relation to a physical atom, which is misnamed anyway)

Because the system has it in some example of "entity" that means that all (or the vast majority) of the particles in the system must have "consciousness" as an attribute? How hard do you want me to unpack this?

I don't know what hardness and unpacking mean together, so however hard you want.

You might misunderstand me, so let me rephrase. I wouldn't say a human mind supervenes on the brain (or anything else) as a whole. I would say that the most fundamental components of mind are assembled into the whole.

This is not really incompatible with your model, anyway, because you're arguing that logic gating is the fundamental element of mind. That would mean that you could theoretically map the functions of a brain part to an electronic circuit, integrate the two, and do a transplant with no effect on the experience of the person.

My position is not that different in this regard, except that I don't look for a (to me at least) arbitrary structure or function, but to the exchange of energy, probably at the subatomic level, as that fundamental element.

Just being minimally conscious, for example, wouldn't allow you to see meaning in people's behaviors. It's definitely possible, through reflection or drug use or meditation, to arrive at a mental state in which you can see light and hear sound, and perceive no deep meaning in any of it.

I'd wonder whether being "minimally conscious" really raises up to whatever bar we set for "sentience"? Is it possible that something could be minimally conscious - but not sentient?

It certainly wouldn't raise it to what we think of as human sentience. This can be studied with Buddhist meditators and such, who reach states they describe as "eternal not-being" and the like.



All this is interesting, but I have to say, we're still not talking about the same things when we say words like "conscious" or "mind." I do not accept any definition of mind or consciousness which excludes a specific reference to the subjective experience of qualia. You do not accept any definition which cannot be coined in purely mechanical/physical terms.

[Chas]

Because the system has it in some example of "entity" that means that all (or the vast majority) of the particles in the system must have "consciousness" as an attribute? How hard do you want me to unpack this?

I don't know what hardness and unpacking mean together, so however hard you want.

You might misunderstand me, so let me rephrase. I wouldn't say a human mind supervenes on the brain (or anything else) as a whole. I would say that the most fundamental components of mind are assembled into the whole.

This is not really incompatible with your model, anyway, because you're arguing that logic gating is the fundamental element of mind. That would mean that you could theoretically map the functions of a brain part to an electronic circuit, integrate the two, and do a transplant with no effect on the experience of the person.

My position is not that different in this regard, except that I don't look for a (to me at least) arbitrary structure or function, but to the exchange of energy, probably at the subatomic level, as that fundamental element.

I'd wonder whether being "minimally conscious" really raises up to whatever bar we set for "sentience"? Is it possible that something could be minimally conscious - but not sentient?

It certainly wouldn't raise it to what we think of as human sentience. This can be studied with Buddhist meditators and such, who reach states they describe as "eternal not-being" and the like.



All this is interesting, but I have to say, we're still not talking about the same things when we say words like "conscious" or "mind." I do not accept any definition of mind or consciousness which excludes a specific reference to the subjective experience of qualia. You do not accept any definition which cannot be coined in purely mechanical/physical terms.

I urge you to read The Mind's I: Fantasies and reflections on self and soul by Daniel Dennett and Douglas Hofstadter.

It will give you an appreciation of mind as an emergent property of the brain.

---

I took another look at this, and it still seems to me that Churchland is playing a kind of shell game. Yes, the robot's processing can be called thought, and it's behaviors can be said to have meaning, but only in the context of a sentient observer. Otherwise, it's still all just stuff happening. To the credit of the robot, the same goes toward people as well: it is only because sentient observers (the self and others) see meaning in human behaviors that they are said to represent intentionality.

You ignore, or are unaware of, all of the data from neuroscience. The data clearly show that the mind is brain-based.

Besides, where resides your sentient observer?

[bennyboy]

You ignore, or are unaware of, all of the data from neuroscience. The data clearly show that the mind is brain-based.

Besides, where resides your sentient observer?

Part of my answer is now the OP of a recent thread I made: the idea of the transcendence of supervenient properties.

Setting that aside for now, I think you can safely assume everyone here knows about brain experiments, the function of various brain parts, maybe a little about the cognitive effects of selective brain damage, etc.

But that's not what we've been talking about. What is it in the brain that causes the existence of mind? Is it the specific organic nature of neurons? Is it the complexity of data being processed? Is it something intrinsic to some kinds of chemistry, or to all electrical bonding, or to events at the subatomic level? What's the most fundamental "thing" upon which the human mind supervenes?

Sure, it seems to be somewhere in the brain, in the case of humans. But here's the important part-- some of the properties of the human brain are specific only to the human brain, some are common to all systems capable of data processing, and some are common to all matter in the universe. Since the brain consists of layers of supervenience: atoms on subatomic particles, molecules on atoms, proteins on molecules, neurons on proteins, neuronal networks on neurons, brain parts on neuronal networks, human experience on brain parts, the important question is on what level does that "spark" occur?

Does a single firing neuron have a primitive "mind"? Do 10 neurons? Is the simple act of neurotransmitters stimulating an axon minimally sufficient? Is it any time an electron's orbit is affected by the assimilation of a photon, or that two atoms come into contact, causing them to share an electron?

It's obvious that the human mind is rooted IN the brain, but in order to say that mind is primarily OF the brain, you have to show that it does not originate in the sub-structures upon which the brain supervenes. And that has not been shown. And since the brain is processing massive data, you also have to show that it isn't the processing itself, INDEPENDENT OF THE SPECIFIC MECHANISM DOING THE PROCESSING, that is mind.

[The Grand Nudger]

You might misunderstand me, so let me rephrase. I wouldn't say a human mind supervenes on the brain (or anything else) as a whole. I would say that the most fundamental components of mind are assembled into the whole.

Yes, but it may be the interaction of all of those components that creates the effect. Not an attribute possessed by each individual component.

This is not really incompatible with your model, anyway, because you're arguing that logic gating is the fundamental element of mind. That would mean that you could theoretically map the functions of a brain part to an electronic circuit, integrate the two, and do a transplant with no effect on the experience of the person.

I'm arguing that the basis of thought is the -principle- behind the gates. The gates are useful as an explanation of how a physical system achieves the effect.

I would actually expect some effect with such a comprehensive translation btw. We're formatting data not between a mac and a pc - but between HAL and a game of mousetrap, when it comes to comparing human brains and electronic circuits. Because -at least some- portion of the experience of the person is rooted in their biological structure (we see what we see because of the abilities and limits of the arrangement of our eyes, for example..I would say all experience is limited thusly, but I'm leaving you space and hoping that we agree on this particular item) formatting to a system with dissimilar architecture would likely involve handling experience which has no correlate between systems. Something about the experience would have to be changed.

My position is not that different in this regard, except that I don't look for a (to me at least) arbitrary structure or function, but to the exchange of energy, probably at the subatomic level, as that fundamental element.

I don't look for arbitrary structures either. I look for very specific structures. Those capable of implementing boolean functions (also, specific) - at the least. "Exchanges of energy" don't necessarily have that capability.

It certainly wouldn't raise it to what we think of as human sentience. This can be studied with Buddhist meditators and such, who reach states they describe as "eternal not-being" and the like.

So, you know how I would explain this with regards to my model. How would you explain that? What could give rise to a difference between minimally conscious entities and sentient entities, as we've established them?

All this is interesting, but I have to say, we're still not talking about the same things when we say words like "conscious" or "mind." I do not accept any definition of mind or consciousness which excludes a specific reference to the subjective experience of qualia. You do not accept any definition which cannot be coined in purely mechanical/physical terms.

Is there a problem with that? I'm looking to explain the unknown by reference to the known. Comp Mind doesn't actually state that there is "no qualia" - that nothing's happening. It expects there to be (and it expects it to have the attributes often associated with it). I don't actually know that this is the way our mind comes to be. What I do know is that very material structures exist which can adequately describe any statement we make about it(mind) -and that's unsurprising, we're talking logic after all.

What comp mind does say that rubs people raw regarding qualia is that it.
-a: is nothing like our folklore presents it
-b: is mechanical (there's no man behind the curtain)

Also, I think the harshest words about qualia come from Neural Net theories. Those are the guys who have the real tough question of locating a "mind" if their model is an accurate depiction, lol. In vanilla comp mind we still have the option of isolating some specific part of a system and saying, "this is the structure that generates mind". NN or quantum guys go more with "all this -truly- random shit is happening and it's having a very particular effect....."

(lol, I know that's a cartoon version of NN.......before I get roasted by some nerd ..have I linked NAND2tetris yet? )

[bennyboy]

I don't look for arbitrary structures either. I look for very specific structures. Those capable of implementing boolean functions (also, specific) - at the least. "Exchanges of energy" don't necessarily have that capability.

I call them arbitrary because you've chosen to identify particular structures as having mind, and others as not, based on your own ideas, but not necessarily on observable facts about the nature of consciousness. To be fair, I think your particularly arbitrary structure of interest is a very good candidate and one worth considering. But I think mine is, too.

So, you know how I would explain this with regards to my model. How would you explain that? What could give rise to a difference between minimally conscious entities and sentient entities, as we've established them?

In this case, the same thing: increased complexity.

You do not accept any definition which cannot be coined in purely mechanical/physical terms.

Is there a problem with that? I'm looking to explain the unknown by reference to the known.

The problem is that we already know about mind. We are not inferring it from other observations, but from direct experience of it, and none of the other observations we've made about the physical universe integrate well with what we know about mind.

For example, the subjectivity of mind is the only property which we fully accept as real, rather than as a "theory," but which cannot be observed. Even gravity, which is more ubiquitous than mind, is not approached in the same gnostic way in which we approach mind.

Comp Mind doesn't actually state that there is "no qualia" - that nothing's happening. It expects there to be (and it expects it to have the attributes often associated with it). I don't actually know that this is the way our mind comes to be. What I do know is that very material structures exist which can adequately describe any statement we make about it(mind) -and that's unsurprising, we're talking logic after all.

Statement: mind is the subjective experience of data processing.

Demonstrate that any physical structure, including the brain, can be proven to have this property. I don't think it can be done logically or through observation, without any philosophical assumptions.

Also, I think the harshest words about qualia come from Neural Net theories. Those are the guys who have the real tough question of locating a "mind" if their model is an accurate depiction, lol. In vanilla comp mind we still have the option of isolating some specific part of a system and saying, "this is the structure that generates mind". NN or quantum guys go more with "all this -truly- random shit is happening and it's having a very particular effect....."

(lol, I know that's a cartoon version of NN.......before I get roasted by some nerd ..have I linked NAND2tetris yet? )

This is why I think of mind as a transcendent property (looks like nobody will ever venture into that thread lol). Or you could look at it like this: in any system capable of complex enough functioning to supervene mind, no outside observer will be able to identify exactly what part of that complex functioning manifests as conscious experience.

This applies not only to ANNs. Imagine taking a snapshot of 1 second of brain activity-- not fMRI, but every single chemical interaction that happened, and then figuring out where in that mess consciousness was created. Many are confident that mind is "in there" somewhere, but that level of complexity allows for the random supervenience of so many forms that one of those supervened forms may be mind, rather than anything the specific system does.

And yes, I'm talking about transcendence again.

[pocaracas]

This applies not only to ANNs. Imagine taking a snapshot of 1 second of brain activity-- not fMRI, but every single chemical interaction that happened, and then figuring out where in that mess consciousness was created. Many are confident that mind is "in there" somewhere, but that level of complexity allows for the random supervenience of so many forms that one of those supervened forms may be mind, rather than anything the specific system does.

Imagine taking a snapshot of 1 second of intel i7 980x activity, not just heat loads, but every single transistor interaction that happened, and the figuring out where in that mess is a browser tab, or the video decompression from MPEG4 to screen...
I'm confident these are "in there", somewhere, but that level of complexity blah, blah, blah.... I hope you get the picture.
Just because we can't (yet?) understand it all, it doesn't mean it's not there.
Where else could it be?

[bennyboy]

This applies not only to ANNs. Imagine taking a snapshot of 1 second of brain activity-- not fMRI, but every single chemical interaction that happened, and then figuring out where in that mess consciousness was created. Many are confident that mind is "in there" somewhere, but that level of complexity allows for the random supervenience of so many forms that one of those supervened forms may be mind, rather than anything the specific system does.

Imagine taking a snapshot of 1 second of intel i7 980x activity, not just heat loads, but every single transistor interaction that happened, and the figuring out where in that mess is a browser tab, or the video decompression from MPEG4 to screen...
I'm confident these are "in there", somewhere, but that level of complexity blah, blah, blah.... I hope you get the picture.
Just because we can't (yet?) understand it all, it doesn't mean it's not there.
Where else could it be?

The difference is that the software was hard-coded. But what happens with a pure ANN? In that case, EVEN THE CREATORS of the system cannot know what patterns evolve toward cognition. Since we are not the creators of the brain, we do not know exactly what about it, or the information being processed in it, is responsible for consciousness.

I hope some of this discussion will move to my thread on the transcendence of emergent properties. I'm making the case that those supervenient properties, if they can be arrived at by multiple mechanisms, are transcendent-- they are a property of the universe rather than of the (arbitrary) mechanisms which they seem to supervene on.

Let's take a simple example: a wave. Now, a wave can supervene on a body of water. However, it can also supervene on any other liquid or solid. The necessity of having a medium does not make it sensible to claim that a wave is formed BY water, or that it is a property OF water. Wave-ness is better seen as an expression of the relationship between an underlying level of reality: gravity, surface tension, and momentum. The existence of a wave on a water surface is therefore a transcendent property.

If mind IS a transcendent property, then it is not correct to say that it is made by the brain-- only that in the case of humans, the brain is the particular medium on which mind supervenes. So the question "Where is the human mind" is not the right question. The answer is obvious-- it's in the brain. The question is whether the brain is the creator of mind, or only the medium which expresses the underlying reality that makes mind inevitable.

[Surgenator]

The question is whether the brain is the creator of mind, or only the medium which expresses the underlying reality that makes mind inevitable.

So how do you show that the brain is the medium the mind uses to expressed iitself? What experiment(s) will be able to show this?

[bennyboy]

The question is whether the brain is the creator of mind, or only the medium which expresses the underlying reality that makes mind inevitable.

So how do you show that the brain is the medium the mind uses to expressed iitself? What experiment(s) will be able to show this?

I didn't say the mind uses the brain to express itself. I said the mind, if it is supervenient on the brain, is a transcendental property-- i.e. that it is not specific to that particular medium. If it is, we're in big trouble, because the information or computation models of consciousness go right out the window, and you are stuck looking at brain chemistry.

As for evidence and experiments-- who cares? There's no good evidence for any kind of mind except the ones we've already accepted for philosophical reasons. Given any physical structure "X," how do YOU show that it has mind, or what experiments can you do on it to show that it experiences qualia? Hit it with a stick and see if it does anything?