Subjective Morality?

[robvalue]

We do have to agree on what the supposed facts refer to, in the first place. Otherwise we're not even talking about the same thing.

If we're saying there are facts about reality based on what is "good", then we need to agree what we mean by "good", or else we're not talking about the same facts. We can both be correct, about different things. If we're trying to decide what is factually good or not in the first place, then we need to decide what kind of fact we're talking about, and how we will decide.

1) Inherent truths about reality

If this is the claim, then we either determine some scientific method by which we may try to model those truths, or else we just say there’s no way of us knowing. Even if there are such inherent truths, then they surely just mean more than, "X is good, Y is not good". What does "good" mean to reality? Why should anyone care?

2) Truths derived from axioms

This is fine, and all we can do is test for internal consistency or appeal to consequences. The truths are then obviously contingent upon the axioms, and are of no practical use to anyone who doesn’t agree with them. They can’t be universally applied to any other moral/ethical systems. They are all true, within their own systems. You can’t call an axiom factually incorrect. They might be stupid or have no practical use, but they are by definition true within their own system. Axioms may contradict each other of course, and a person may or may not care about that. We can say the system is flawed if we want.

3) Scientific facts

Now we're getting somewhere. If I want to demonstrate that X is good scientifically, I need to know what "good" actually means. This is why agreement is so important. Otherwise, we're studying different things. We could both be correct, but about different subjects.

I was thinking of a similar example to try and demonstrate this. I claim that all the fences around my garden are tall, and I want to prove it scientifically. What is the first thing you would ask?

We all know what tall means, but if we're going to make factual statements, we need a precise definition. Does it mean 6 feet and over? 8 feet and over? Does it mean higher than the average of all fences in the area? Does it mean what 99% people would call tall? If we don’t agree here, then I can say it’s factually talk by one definition, and you can say it isn’t by another, and we’re both correct.

Can we make the meta-definition that all definitions of tall must refer to being 6 feet and over? We could, if we wanted to, but this is still just defining the word further. Anyone who doesn’t agree would come up with different facts, and again, we could both be right. This is the equivalent of trying to shoe-horn the desired definitions of "good" in without doing any science or philosophy, but just appealing to popularity, utility or emotion. For something so vague, it’s the No True Scotsman. Khem seems to want to do this, but you don’t, which is very confusing to me if you’re supporting the same position.

[DLJ]

...
It’s a loaded question.
...

This is reminding me of the school playground occurrences when some older child asked e.g. T-Rex or Slade? (or was it Bowie?  Not sure, I was only 5 or 6 years old).  My reply was "Ugh?"  Later I asked my older sister what that was about and was told it was about musical preferences and not important.

Observing the playground throng over the next few months I discovered that it was important with regards to credibility / pecking order / acceptance into an in-group, specifically when there was the question "Leeds Utd or Liverpool?" (yes, this was the early '70s) - a 'wrong' answer might earn you a punch on the nose.  I learned that the best answer was "Rugby".

So when faced with the "cognitivist or non-cognitivist" question, I can only reply... "please explain to me why I should care?"

Of course, it's not simply a childhood thing...
In the US: Liberal or Conservative?
In Straya: Holden or Ford?
Here, there's a lovely lady I know from the local Socrates Cafe (meetup), she has a medical background and is smart as a whip.  But do you know how I know that she is deep-down evil and depraved?  She chooses Coke over Pepsi and Potter over Tolkien.  It's hard to identify with anyone like that.

[The Grand Nudger]

I was thinking of a similar example to try and demonstrate this. I claim that all the fences around my garden are tall, and I want to prove it scientifically. What is the first thing you would ask?

The same questions I'd ask you if you told me that you were going to measure the growth rate of a daisy.  What moral realism is telling you is that moral facts are like daisy facts or fence facts.  You should expect to find yourself asking the same questions and employing the same fundamental assumptions and axioms.  If you do, and if you grant credibility to the product of this process with regards to daisies and fences....it's unclear why you would not do the same for moral propositions.   

We all know what tall means, but if we're going to make factual statements, we need a precise definition. Does it mean 6 feet and over? 8 feet and over? Does it mean higher than the average of all fences in the area? Does it mean what 99% people would call tall? If we don’t agree here, then I can say it’s factually talk by one definition, and you can say it isn’t by another, and we’re both correct.

-even if we don't agree here, your fence is still as tall as it is.  I'm not sure what the problem is?  If you say tall is six feet and up, and I say it's eight...and we measure your fence and find that it's 7'4......it's the 7'4 that makes either claim (the fence is tall - 6f, the fence is tall - 8f) objectively true or false.

Now, if you told me that you were going to scientifically prove that all the fences around your garden are tall by measuring how many of the pickets where white...I'd have questions, lol.  

Can we make the meta-definition that all definitions of tall must refer to being 6 feet and over? We could, if we wanted to, but this is still just defining the word further. Anyone who doesn’t agree would come up with different facts, and again, we could both be right. This is the equivalent of trying to shoe-horn the desired definitions of "good" in without doing any science or philosophy, but just appealing to popularity, utility or emotion. For something so vague, it’s the No True Scotsman. Khem seems to want to do this, but you don’t, which is very confusing to me if you’re supporting the same position.

We can make definitions of anything we like.  Objectivism, realism (not just moral realism, all realism) demands that these definitions be accurate in some mind independent way.  So..as above, if you make the definition of tall 6foot..and your fence is 7'4..then it's objectively true..in the same way that anything else is objectively true...that your fence is tall.  

It's not enough that you make the definition, though, saying that 6 foot and up is tall doesn't demonstrate that any fence is tall.  For the claim "this fence is tall" to be a fact..then the height of the fence must be mind independent, and greater than 6 feet.  

If you have a commitment to scientific naturalism or scientific realism or even logical realism....you make all of the same relevant commitments.

[robvalue]

Let me add that science isn’t about right versus wrong. It’s not binary like that; it’s logical system that behave that way. In science we are looking to model apparent truths about reality as closely as possible. Our model works, if it works. It’s circular pragmatism in that regard. We can talk about how well it works, of course, and if it could be improved.

It may be that the thing we're modelling works nothing like we think, but our models still work "as if" it works that way, and that’s all we can ever do. (That’s my pragmatic "as if" rule I’ll be mentioning in our thread more later )

I behave in the way in which I think best serves my goals; in the case of morality, I try to behave in the ways I consider to achieve "good" outcomes. Am I correct? Well, experience shows me that I appear to be correct, as far as I can fathom. I could always be completely missing the mark, and somehow my actions are causing really bad outcomes in ways I can’t possible know about. There’s nothing I can do about that. If I’m somehow "bad" through some strange inherent measuring device, I don’t care, unless someone explains what that actually means.

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PS: again, I don’t understand the question of whether realism "is true". Of course it is, with respect to whatever definitions you want to use. Internally consistent systems can be set up. Can you make statements which somehow transcend any morality or ethics anyone could ever have? No, you can’t. So again, I don’t see the point of the question. It’s logically settled as far as I can see.

[The Grand Nudger]

Let me add that science isn’t about right versus wrong. It’s not binary like that; it’s logical system that behave that way. In science we are looking to model apparent truths about reality as closely as possible. Our model works, if it works. It’s circular pragmatism in that regard. We can talk about how well it works, of course, and if it could be improved.

Perhaps morality is also a circular pragmatism in that regard.  Does this make you skeptical of scientific facts?  

It may be that the thing we're modelling works nothing like we think, but our models still work "as if" it works that way, and that’s all we can ever do. (That’s my pragmatic "as if" rule I’ll be mentioning in our thread more later )

If things were different things would be different, for sure.

I behave in the way in which I think best serves my goals; in the case of morality, I try to behave in the ways I consider to achieve "good" outcomes. Am I correct? Well, experience shows me that I appear to be correct, as far as I can fathom. I could always be completely missing the mark, and somehow my actions are causing really bad outcomes in ways I can’t possible know about. There’s nothing I can do about that. If I’m somehow "bad" through some strange inherent measuring device, I don’t care, unless someone explains what that actually means.

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PS: again, I don’t understand the question of whether realism "is true". Of course it is, with respect to whatever definitions you want to use.  Internally consistent systems can be set up. Can you make statements which somehow transcend any morality or ethics anyone could ever have? No, you can’t. So again, I don’t see the point of the question. It’s logically settled as far as I can see.

That should be your canary in the mine moment.  You're certain that some issue is logically settled..but simultaneously unsure of what that issue is. 

Realism is not the claim that internally consistent definitions (and pursuant truth claims) can be generated by a mind. Yes, that's contained within moral realism, but so are many things..including much of what constitutes contemporary subjectivism.

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So when faced with the "cognitivist or non-cognitivist" question, I can only reply... "please explain to me why I should care?"

Cognitivism is not a position on whether or why you should care.  It's just a question about whether you believe that our propositions express states of belief.  

Could I explain why you should care...yes.

Do you care..in a word, yes.

.......but neither of those things have any effect on whether or not you hold to a cognitivist description, or whether that description is accurate.

A moral realist, is a person who thinks that our propositions do express states of belief, who thinks that those beliefs can sometimes be true, and that those beliefs are constituted by something other than human opinion. That's it, that's all. The sort of subjectivism we see on the boards, most often, only disagrees on the last question.

[bennyboy]

The word "good" can be used to describe objective AND subjective phenomena. Language has got you hung up. You can say, that piece of cheesecake is "good"-- that refers to your subjective experience. You derived pleasure from it. When you say "Michael Jordan is a 'good' basketball player" you are referring to something objective. He isn't good at basketball in your opinion because there are objective criteria for measuring his goodness.

Michael Jordan is good by established rules. That's because basketball is a subset of life. We can say so-and-so is a good salesperson, or perhaps even a good parent, by similar methods. But when we want to talk about how to live IN GENERAL, we have a problem-- there is no definite context. It's like telling kids they have to make their own rules, and then saying, "Nu uh uhhhh. . . some rules are right and some are wrong." It doesn't make sense.

It's easy to do the same with specific mores-- I can say "Not picking up after your dog is bad," and we can agree on that rule, and then it's pretty easy to take pictures of people not picking up after their dogs.

A symphony is a bunch of marks on a paper, or certain frequencies of sound traveling around an auditorium. They are an expression of an artist's ideas and feelings about the organization of sound. However, to say therefore that music is objective would be a misrepresentation.

[The Grand Nudger]

The word "good" can be used to describe objective AND subjective phenomena. Language has got you hung up. You can say, that piece of cheesecake is "good"-- that refers to your subjective experience. You derived pleasure from it. When you say "Michael Jordan is a 'good' basketball player" you are referring to something objective. He isn't good at basketball in your opinion because there are objective criteria for measuring his goodness.

Michael Jordan is good by established rules.  That's because basketball is a subset of life.  We can say so-and-so is a good salesperson, or perhaps even a good parent, by similar methods.  But when we want to talk about how to live IN GENERAL, we have a problem-- there is no definite context.  It's like telling kids they have to make their own rules, and then saying, "Nu uh uhhhh. . . some rules are right and some are wrong."  It doesn't make sense.

"Good at basketball" is no more or less definite.  Keep in mind, realism isn't making any extraneous demands on the status of fact or truth content of factual claims.  

We did have to make our own rules - it's not as if a tablet fell from the sky( ) . 

It's still possible to say, sensibly, that some rules are right, some are wrong, some are better or worse than others.  You can go over the semantics of this entire class of statement all you like, in any subject.  Either these propositions express beliefs, that are sometimes true, and are constituted by something other than human opinion..or they are not.

Hell, every one of your own statements in this thread has to go through the same criteria.  

It's easy to do the same with specific mores-- I can say "Not picking up after your dog is bad," and we can agree on that rule, and then it's pretty easy to take pictures of people not picking up after their dogs.

If that were true, and you had pictures of a person leaving dogshit behind, then it would be as true and as objective..... as any other true or objective statement..... to say that the dogshit leaver is bad at life and a bad person, lol.

This, ofc, conforms to the moral intuitions of people who take the statement "leaving dogshit behind is bad" to be true. When you see someone do it..you do think "fuck, what a minor asshole!".

A symphony is a bunch of marks on a paper, or certain frequencies of sound traveling around an auditorium.  They are an expression of an artist's ideas and feelings about the organization of sound.  However, to say therefore that music is objective would be a misrepresentation.

-and yet we can confidently say that some compositions are objectively fucking awful.  My son, for example...is not mozart.

I think that you might have a blindspot here. The same things that would call into question the status of a realist's moral facts call any and every other fact into question. This shouldn't be taken to mean that a realist has all their facts right..but that their criteria for establishing a moral fact is the same criteria you use to establish -any- fact...about -anything-. Including whatever it is you're using to call those facts into question. Before skepticism has any weight whatsoever, we have to agree..at least, that there -are or could be- moral facts. Moral facts may, ultimately, be about a person and their judgement or their attitudes....or we may be completely incapable of getting our facts right, or the right facts (this list of possible fails can go on forever) but we have to allow for facts for this to be true, and skepticism requires fact to denounce some other (purported) fact in the first place. We have to allow for a factual criteria by which to fail or fall short or for us to be ignorant of...for any of those claims to be substantial. Any objection to realism that purports that a persons judgement or attitude is the basis of a moral proposition, or that for whatever reason or no reason we can't get it right - agees that there are facts - they are contending that a realist has the wrong set of facts, or cannot access the right set (which, at least hypothetically, does exist).

A person who thinks that there are no and can be no moral facts is not a skeptic. They've taken a position of knowledge, claiming..at least..that there are and can be no moral facts (not even the moral facts that establish subjectivism). They need to have some explanation for their non-cognitivism. A person who thinks that whatever moral facts there are refer to people and their judgement, needs to demonstrate why we can have no mind independent facts of this particular subject even though a consistent use of axioms, semantics, and inference from any other subject would strongly and simply suggest that we do.

Can you see how these two currents of thought are at odds, and how no single response can satisfy both conjectures..? A person leveraging both simultaneously might feel or find that the impasse is insurmountable..they seem to have "defeated realism", that the issue is conceptually settled.... (which would be one hell of a lift, lol)....but it's not because realism can't field a cogent response to either objection..it's due to the fact that they have fielded an incoherent objection with respect to the two different sets of commitments required to maintain them. The response to the error theorist and judgement dependent objection is fundamentally wrong, by the noncogs objection...but then again so are error theory and judgement dependency, by the same. The response to the concogs objection is true, according to error theory or judgement dependent theory..but it doesn't matter that it's true. It's trivial.

Notice how well this dovetails with your misgivings about realism. We need to get past this whole idea that there's something fundamentally wrong with any of these positions. There just isn't. Past non cognitivism or nihilism, they simply disagree on points of fact - not that there are no facts to point to. Error theory and subjectivism state that we either can't get it right, or are wrong. All three (adding realism in) agree that there is something to get right and be wrong. Any position we take -on this issue- comes with a list of implications and consequences for every other equivalent proposition.

Since it's a comment on the availability or accessibility of fact and which facts are the right facts...that's a hell of alot of equivalent propositions.

[The Grand Nudger]

Here's a fun thing to do, for those with a subjectivist bent.  Imagine a moral assessment that you think is completely bonkers.  X is wrong because...

Like, skullfucking your neighbor is wrong because a person can't water their plants while you do it.

...and then set that aside some moral assessment you find amenable.

Like, skullfucking your neighbor is wrong because it hurts real bad™.  

Even if we concede that moral facts actually refer to people's opinions and judgements (rather than some mind independent property of x) - not all moral assessments are created equal.  Hilariously, we think that..because we don't think that the plant watering guy is on-point with the relationship between his predicate and properties of x accurately identified.

We think that this person is bad at words - because morality isn't a term that signifies the watering of plants. I mean, we could say it, we could use it, we could redefine morality to be about the watering of plants..but then we'd need a new word for morality, because no matter what we call it we're talking about something other than the watering of plants.

All of this, to demonstrate that even in a subjective framework.....it's not really the case that we can't objectively compare metrics or systems and determine that one is more accurate than the next.

[Foxaèr]

What I commonly see as being the mistake made by theists is the inability to distinguish between opinion and fact.

Generally, it is easiest to confirm subjectivity with I think and objectivity with I know.

The problem is that theists confuse religious fiction and faith with knowledge when it is mere opinion.

[The Grand Nudger]

Sure, but that can't be an actual problem for a subjectivist...because..to a subjectivist, all moral assessments are mind dependent.  Any moral fact is only a fact of the opinion in question.