RE: Overthrowing oppressive regimes by military force
March 8, 2016 at 12:46 am
(This post was last modified: March 8, 2016 at 12:53 am by Rayaan.)
I agree with the OP's observation.
The US and its allies in many ways have used all these extremists groups in order to further destabilize the Midde Eastern regimes. This is something increasingly evident in the recent situation in Syria and with ISIS.
For instance. a document obtained by Judicial Watch on May 18, 2015, formerly classified as "secret," is a US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) document that provides evidence of Western support for Islamist extremists. The DIA report, dated August 12, 2012, reveals that in coordination with the Gulf states and Turkey, the West intentionally sponsored violent extremist groups for the purpose of destabilizing Assad, and that these “supporting powers” desired the emergence of a "Salafist Principality" in Syria to "isolate the Syrian regime."
The rise of such a Salafist Principality in the region would offer the supporting powers (the West, Gulf countries, and Turkey) a tool for regime change in Syria, which is exactly what they want. As the document states, "If the situation unravels there is the possibility of establishing a declared or undeclared Salafist Principality in eastern Syria (Hasaka and Der Zor), and this is exactly what the supporting powers to the opposition want, in order to isolate the Syrian regime, which is considered the strategic depth of the Shia expansion (Iraq and Iran)."
According to Brad Hoff, an independent journalist, teacher, and former US Marine who served during the early years of the Iraq War, the DIA report provides extraordinary confirmation that US intelligence envisioned the terror group ISIS as "a US strategic asset." As he wrote in the Levant Report on May 2015, "US intelligence predicted the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS), but instead of clearly delineating the group as an enemy, the report envisions the terror group as a US strategic asset."
The pararells are many ...
A December 13, 2006 cable, titled "Influencing the SARG [Syrian government] in the End of 2006," reveals that as far back as 2006 - five years before the "Arab Spring" protests in Syria - destabilizing the Syrian government was a central motivation of US policy. The cable, written by William Roebuck, a former US Ambassador to Syria nine years ago, outlines strategies for taking advantage of conflicts and "looming issues" in Syria so as to make President Assad weaker and more vulnerable. In his summary of the cable, he wrote:
"We believe Bashar's weaknesses are in how he chooses to react to looming issues, both perceived and real, such as the conflict between economic reform steps (however limited) and entrenched, corrupt forces, the Kurdish question, and the potential threat to the regime from the increasing presence of transiting Islamist extremists. This cable summarizes our assessment of these vulnerabilities and suggests that there may be actions, statements, and signals that the USG can send that will improve the likelihood of such opportunities arising. These proposals will need to be fleshed out and converted into real actions and we need to be ready to move quickly to take advantage of such opportunities."
So, in public the US was in favor of economic reform, but in private the US saw conflict between economic reform and "entrenched, corrupt forces" as an "opportunity." In public, the US was opposed to "Islamist extremists," but in private it saw the "potential threat to the regime from the increasing presence of transiting Islamist extremists" as an "opportunity" that the US should try to take advantage of.
The US and its allies in many ways have used all these extremists groups in order to further destabilize the Midde Eastern regimes. This is something increasingly evident in the recent situation in Syria and with ISIS.
For instance. a document obtained by Judicial Watch on May 18, 2015, formerly classified as "secret," is a US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) document that provides evidence of Western support for Islamist extremists. The DIA report, dated August 12, 2012, reveals that in coordination with the Gulf states and Turkey, the West intentionally sponsored violent extremist groups for the purpose of destabilizing Assad, and that these “supporting powers” desired the emergence of a "Salafist Principality" in Syria to "isolate the Syrian regime."
The rise of such a Salafist Principality in the region would offer the supporting powers (the West, Gulf countries, and Turkey) a tool for regime change in Syria, which is exactly what they want. As the document states, "If the situation unravels there is the possibility of establishing a declared or undeclared Salafist Principality in eastern Syria (Hasaka and Der Zor), and this is exactly what the supporting powers to the opposition want, in order to isolate the Syrian regime, which is considered the strategic depth of the Shia expansion (Iraq and Iran)."
According to Brad Hoff, an independent journalist, teacher, and former US Marine who served during the early years of the Iraq War, the DIA report provides extraordinary confirmation that US intelligence envisioned the terror group ISIS as "a US strategic asset." As he wrote in the Levant Report on May 2015, "US intelligence predicted the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS), but instead of clearly delineating the group as an enemy, the report envisions the terror group as a US strategic asset."
The pararells are many ...
A December 13, 2006 cable, titled "Influencing the SARG [Syrian government] in the End of 2006," reveals that as far back as 2006 - five years before the "Arab Spring" protests in Syria - destabilizing the Syrian government was a central motivation of US policy. The cable, written by William Roebuck, a former US Ambassador to Syria nine years ago, outlines strategies for taking advantage of conflicts and "looming issues" in Syria so as to make President Assad weaker and more vulnerable. In his summary of the cable, he wrote:
"We believe Bashar's weaknesses are in how he chooses to react to looming issues, both perceived and real, such as the conflict between economic reform steps (however limited) and entrenched, corrupt forces, the Kurdish question, and the potential threat to the regime from the increasing presence of transiting Islamist extremists. This cable summarizes our assessment of these vulnerabilities and suggests that there may be actions, statements, and signals that the USG can send that will improve the likelihood of such opportunities arising. These proposals will need to be fleshed out and converted into real actions and we need to be ready to move quickly to take advantage of such opportunities."
So, in public the US was in favor of economic reform, but in private the US saw conflict between economic reform and "entrenched, corrupt forces" as an "opportunity." In public, the US was opposed to "Islamist extremists," but in private it saw the "potential threat to the regime from the increasing presence of transiting Islamist extremists" as an "opportunity" that the US should try to take advantage of.
