(August 21, 2016 at 10:20 am)Rhythm Wrote: Why would a camera be full of mind (mindful?...lol) but not have a mind, whereas a human being is full of mind , but -does- have a mind? The structure of the brain appears to be at least -capable- of operating in the same way that the digital circuits of the camera do, and that may be what they are actually doing. You are, in effect, only objecting to the camera having a human mind, or of having as robust a mind, not objecting to it having a mind. Perhaps it doesn't see red as you see red (different underlying structure)...but neither do I...and I hope you allow that I see red.A table is full of electrons, with all kinds of electrical bonds and perhaps even a little bit of variable flow here and there, but I wouldn't say my desk is electronic.
Quote:Then it seems reasonable to at least suggest that one of those elsewheres -could- be a camera, and that such a suggestion is wholly compatible with your comments in that regard.It may be that a camera is integrated enough to have some actual experience. Certainly, it has sensory apparatus, processing, memory, etc. I'm agnostic on whether/what a camera experiences, though. My point was that its an error to say that because elemental mental events are happening all over and in the camera, that there's some unifying principle. I'd consider it an interesting possibility-- perhaps all mind is reducible to magnetic fields and we will some day be able to use magnetic helmets to give us experiences beyond the capacity of the brain. But that's just fun stuff to talk about.
Quote: In this context, is your spark of mind qualitatively different from my "ability of matter to interact"?Not if it's true, because it would mean that mind is intrinsic to interactions, right at the most fundamental. But qualitatively, it would still be important to say that the matter is self-aware, and aware of the interactions happening within it.
Quote:If something can be full of this spark stuff, but not have a mind...and in fact require a brain structure or brain analog.....then it's the brain analog which allows for the mind which we are attempting to explain. Rocks (and cameras) are full of spark, but this does not allow for them to have a mind. Now..we might say that if this spark weren't present then a brain analog wouldn't have a mind....but we've just explored the sufficiency of the brain structure-sans-spark as a hypothesis.If we're talking about human experience, then the brain is where the cool kids hang out. No doubt. Elements of mind must combine into more complex arrangements, and new properties should be expected to supervene. No single reception event, for example, could allow for "flatness."
Quote:This is why I prefer my proposition to yours. Your's positively -requires- that mine be true, mine does not require that yours be true. Yours requires a heretofore undiscovered force or quality, mine does not. This makes any claim that your theory requires -less- of something......a misleading statement. It requires a great deal more, and assumes the truth of the contrapositive, while explaining less...if anything at all, on it's own merits. Ultimately, yours may be true...but we'd know no more on account of that knowledge about why the structure of the brain does what it does to this spark (which isn't necessary in the first place)..and we'd still have to defer to the structure of the brain to provide an explanation for mind...rather than just spark of mind - which is something that cameras are full of too and not at all what we're referring to when either of us refer to our minds.I'm not endorsing this theory. As I say, there are many levels of organization at work in the brain, and I'm agnostic about which level is the minimal requirement for the supervenience of mind. However, by a process of reduction, I see only a few "critical mass" moments which seem likely contenders. One, in the human brain, would be the minimal composition that a neuron requires to fire. A single neuron firing seems like a fair candidate for the essence of mind.
However, it seems to me that in a Universe capable of sustaining minds, that it would be better to look to the fabric for answers to psychogony, than to courser forms. Subjective awareness isn't something that can pop up as a purely material property unless something very special is in the fabric of the Universe which makes it possible.
Let's say your hypothesis is true. In this case, you have a descriptive hypothesis, rather than an explanatory one-- it explains where to look for mind, and might give us paths to try in researching it more deeply. However, it doesn't explain what it is that makes matter have this capacity for subjectivity.