Biblical circularity.

[Ryft]

Are you not just shifting the focus of the question, though?

No, I left the focus of the question exactly as it was, then answered it directly. Review your question and then my answer, taking notice that the focus did not change.

You had asked, "Apart from presupposing it, is there any other reason to suppose the Bible inerrant?" And I answered yes, there is. Since inerrancy is a conclusion, not an axiom, we presuppose it only for the sake of argument. But sometimes inerrancy is itself the very question, in which case presupposing it would be viciously circular (arguing from inerrancy to conclude inerrancy). Take for example biological evolution. We presuppose the truth of evolution when examining evidence for an ancestor of some species, that is, we reason from evolution or assume it arguendo. However, evolution is not an a priori axiom but rather an a posteriori conclusion; thus when evolution is itself the very question we do not presuppose it, for that would be viciously circular. In that case we reason to evolution, rather than from it. The same applies in the case of inerrancy. As I said, there are cases where we reason from the inerrancy of Scripture—for example, when Christians presuppose it when interacting exegetically on some biblical doctrine—but we do not presuppose it when inerrancy itself is the very question, for that would be viciously circular. "In a situation where inerrancy is itself the question," I said, "we admit that it is a conclusion and show how it follows; we reason to it, not from it, since it is a conclusion, not an axiom."

Why do you make a presupposition about "the transcendental truth of God and his self-revelation"?

Let us not open that Pandora's Box in this thread. It is not necessary to explain why that is our axiomatic starting point, when it is sufficient for answering your question to simply point out that it is. In other words, it is enough to indicate the axiomatic starting point, x, from which we reason to inerrancy, z.

(1) If x then y.

(2) If y then z.

(3) Therefore, if x then z.

Apart from the Bible, how do you know anything about the nature of God? You're basing your presupposition on your conclusion.

Incorrect, since the conclusion is inerrancy. Our presupposition, that the text is God's self-revelation and incapable of error, is not based on the conclusion, that the text does not err. That is in fact a complete inversion of what is being said here. It is the other way around; the conclusion is based on the presupposition. Given the nature of God, what he reveals is incapable of error ("If x then y"), and that which is incapable of error obviously does not err ("If y then z"). As such, given the nature of God, what he reveals does not err ("Therefore, if x then z").

There is no alternative to this, though [the assumption that the world our senses perceive is real].

Yes there is. One alternative is that the world is a computer-generated Matrix ("You think that's air you're breathing now?"). If this world is a computer-generated Matrix, then both natural selection and what your senses perceive are nothing more than the epiphenomena of the programming code; it seems real but actually is not. You reject this as an improbable alternative, of course, but on what basis? If on the basis that it conflicts with what is true given your world view, then that invalidly begs the question, as I pointed out. Moreover, there is also what your Dawkins lecture indicates with honesty, that your senses are reliable with regard to what is useful for our evolution, but not reliable with regard to truth and knowledge, thus drawing you back to the very issue Statler raised (knowledge).

P.S. Along with the audience I had a good laugh when Dawkins remarked, "I was reading Playboy because I myself had an article in it." Delightful innuendo.

Not believing there is an objective reality is not remotely equivalent to not presupposing anything about a divine creator ...

True. But there is, however, the thorny problem of accounting for and explaining objective reality consistent with your atheism (the problem being, of course, that you cannot do so). Of course you presuppose objective reality, along with pretty much everyone else, as do such things as reason, knowledge, and science (i.e., their intelligibility rests upon objective reality), but your atheism cannot account for it. In other words, you believe there is an objective reality but you have no valid justification for that belief consistent with your atheism.