RE: My thoughts on the Hard problem of consciousness
February 13, 2017 at 11:12 am
(This post was last modified: February 13, 2017 at 11:14 am by Neo-Scholastic.)
(February 13, 2017 at 9:39 am)emjay Wrote: ...under that view, has no causal affect on the material, no causal link can ever be proved between neural and phenomenal representation. So I just conclude they are both different sides of the same coin, and treat them as the same thing... talking and thinking about neural and phenomenal representations truly interchangeably.
What I find interesting is the tendency to consider third-person 'objective' phenomena real while first-person qualia and intentionality are the illusory epiphenomena. That is a completely arbitrary position. It seems to me that one could just as easily say that qualia and intentionality are what is truly real with causal power and that our model of the objective world is the epiphenomena without causal power. That is a dilemma that only occurs within the vocabulary of Anglo-american analytic philosophy though. Classical approaches do not suffer that problem.
