I think the potentially fatal flaw of the proof is the fact that there is not and cannot be a Gödel number for God's proof of X's existence or nonexistence, possibly rendering the ideas here moot.
Gödel numbers are positive integers, and there is no way to exhaustively enumerate X and then ecode that into a Gödel number. Thus God's awareness or exhaustive enumeration of X, presuming in this case that it exists, is inexpressible by Gödel's machinery and thus it can be argued that Gödel's theorem does not apply.
There is also, of course, no way to assign a Gödel number to the idea of arranging all subsets of R according to cardinality, and yet such an arrangement is necessary for God to prove that X does not exist.
An analogy might go like this:
While it is impossible to accelerate up to the speed of light, it is not forbidden to travel at the speed of light. Similarly, while it is forbidden to effectively enumerate or construct X, immediate and inexplicable knowledge of X might not be forbidden.
It still is the case, though, that God cannot be omniscient. It's just that the potential for maximal knowledge might still be there, allowing for the possibility of a supreme being.
Gödel numbers are positive integers, and there is no way to exhaustively enumerate X and then ecode that into a Gödel number. Thus God's awareness or exhaustive enumeration of X, presuming in this case that it exists, is inexpressible by Gödel's machinery and thus it can be argued that Gödel's theorem does not apply.
There is also, of course, no way to assign a Gödel number to the idea of arranging all subsets of R according to cardinality, and yet such an arrangement is necessary for God to prove that X does not exist.
An analogy might go like this:
While it is impossible to accelerate up to the speed of light, it is not forbidden to travel at the speed of light. Similarly, while it is forbidden to effectively enumerate or construct X, immediate and inexplicable knowledge of X might not be forbidden.
It still is the case, though, that God cannot be omniscient. It's just that the potential for maximal knowledge might still be there, allowing for the possibility of a supreme being.
Jesus is like Pinocchio. He's the bastard son of a carpenter. And a liar. And he wishes he was real.
