RE: Supreme Court Cases (and other interesting cases) - A Thread!
May 31, 2017 at 10:24 am
(This post was last modified: May 31, 2017 at 10:39 am by TheRealJoeFish.)
Here's one that came out yesterday. It's the first immigration/deportation case decided during President Trump's term.
Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions
May 30, 2017
8-0, Opinion written by J. Thomas and joined by all other Justices
TL;DR: If you're a lawful permanent resident, being 20 or older and having sex with someone 16 or 17 years old isn't enough to get you kicked out of the country for "abuse of a minor."
Facts: Juan Esquivel-Quintana was a 20-year old Mexican Citizen and a lawful Permanent US Resident who lived in California. He was charged with statutory rape stemming from "unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator" for having sex with his 16-year-old girlfriend. He pleaded no contest to this charge in state court and was convicted.
Based on this conviction, the Department of Homeland Security began deportation proceedings against Esquivel-Quintana under the Immigration and Nationality Act, or the "INA." The INA states, in relevant part, that any alien - including a permanent resident - may be deported if convicted of an "aggravated felony." The INA has a list of offenses that constitute aggravated felonies, and one of these is "sexual abuse of a minor."
In a deportation hearing, an Immigration Judge ruled that Esquivel-Quintana had "sexually abused a minor" for the purposes of the INA, and was thus subject to deportation. The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed, and the US Court of Appeals (in a divided opinion) ruled that it was required to defer to the Board's interpretation.
Holding: A violation of California's statutory rape laws does not qualify as "sexual abuse of a minor" under the INA, and thus does not allow for deportation of the offender.
Reasoning: The first principle applied is that, under Federal Law, when determining if a person may be deported for a criminal offense, you look not at what actually happened in the particular case but instead at whether the law, itself, is a "deportable offense." In other words, you don't ask "are this guy's particular actions bad enough that we should deport him," you ask "is the crime this guy was convicted of the sort of crime we want to deport people for, in general." (Although it wasn't addressed in the opinion, this is presumably to prevent discretionary or inconsistent deportation.)
Under that principle, the Court considers, essentially, the smallest possible violation of the crime, and sees if that constitutes a deportable offense. In this case, the way you could violate California's crime in the "smallest possible way" would be if you were someone who turned 21 that day and had consensual sex with your partner who was 17-and-364-days-old. That scenario is what the Court looks at to see if the offense described by the statute is one for which we can deport someone.
So, the Supreme Court's next question is: Does a 21-year-old having sex with an almost-but-not-quite-18-year-old constitute the particular aggravated felony of "abuse of a minor?" And the answer, the Supreme Court unanimously said, is "no."
The main reason this is not "abuse of a minor" is because, under the "generic federal definition" of sexual abuse of a minor "requires that the victim be younger than 16." Basically, when we talk about a "minor" in terms of contract law - as in, can this person buy a house or smoke cigarettes - "minor" means "under the age of majority; that is, younger than 18." However, when we talk about a "minor" in terms of consent, it means "younger than the age of consent to have sex," which - in federal law and in 40 of the 50 states - is 16 (or younger, in some states). The Supreme Court noted that the federal and majority-of-states definition of 16 years for age of consent to have sex is supported by many law dictionaries and other sources, all of which suggest that this is what is meant when "minor" is used in the context of a law concerning statutory rape.
The federal government argued that the "common sense" understanding of "sexual abuse of a minor" includes any "illegal sexual activity directed at a person younger than 18." The Supreme Court disagreed with this argument for a few reasons. It first noted that, in many states, there are parallel statutes, one of which criminalizes sexual activity with someone younger than 16, and the other of which criminalizes sexual activity with someone younger than 18 when the older person is one who holds a position of trust or power over the person (such as a family member, teacher, or other guardian). The Supreme Court said that, for the INA's purposes, we can only deport for an aggravated felony; that is, one that has circumstances that go beyond any normal felony. In a lot of states, the Supreme Court said, the "aggravating factor" can be either that 1) the age is under 16 or 2) the older person has a position of power or trust over the younger person. If neither one of these factors is present or required - and it's not in California's law in the instant case - the law cannot be said to describe an aggravated felony as required by the INA.
The Supreme Court also said, essentially, that we don't want to allow differences in states' laws to mean that, in one state, a particular action isn't even a crime, whereas in another state it's an aggravated felony that can get you deported. The reason the Supreme Court looks at the law and not the particular circumstances is because it doesn't want "the generic federal offense of abuse of a minor [to be defined as] whatever is illegal under the particular law of the State where the defendant was convicted."
Lastly, the Supreme Court considered the possibility that judicial deference needed to be given to the Department of Homeland Security (under a doctrine called Chevron Deference, which basically says that when the interpretation of a statute is ambiguous, the agency enforcing that statute gets to resolve those ambiguities (within reason)). The Supreme Court said, essentially, the law regarding the INA and how we interpret it is very clear and not in the least ambiguous, so, DHS, no deference for you, come back, one year.
Conclusion: This case was a pretty easy one to decide for the Supreme Court. Basically, to go against this would be to ignore the entire 21-year history of how the INA was enforced. Justice Thomas has some weird views about how things should work, and has some... rather idiosyncratic theories of constitutional interpretation, but he's never been one to try to avoid applying precedent when it's clear. Thomas doesn't get a ton of chances to write majority (especially unanimous) opinions, so I'm sure they were glad to give him this one.
Ultimately, this is a good holding, as it preserves uniformity in what the federal government can deport people for, which is especially important at present. Additionally, as someone who thinks a lot of laws regulating the consensual sexual activity of 16-or-17-year-olds are rather... old fashioned (not to mention potentially harmful when they take away resources from/confound the issue of non-consensual sexual crimes), it's a good result to see that the full force of federal power will not be brought upon, say, a just-turned-21-year-old who had consensual sex with a just-about-to-turn-18-year-old.
Let me know if you have questions or if you disagree with my (or the court's) conclusions!
Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions
May 30, 2017
8-0, Opinion written by J. Thomas and joined by all other Justices
TL;DR: If you're a lawful permanent resident, being 20 or older and having sex with someone 16 or 17 years old isn't enough to get you kicked out of the country for "abuse of a minor."
Facts: Juan Esquivel-Quintana was a 20-year old Mexican Citizen and a lawful Permanent US Resident who lived in California. He was charged with statutory rape stemming from "unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator" for having sex with his 16-year-old girlfriend. He pleaded no contest to this charge in state court and was convicted.
Based on this conviction, the Department of Homeland Security began deportation proceedings against Esquivel-Quintana under the Immigration and Nationality Act, or the "INA." The INA states, in relevant part, that any alien - including a permanent resident - may be deported if convicted of an "aggravated felony." The INA has a list of offenses that constitute aggravated felonies, and one of these is "sexual abuse of a minor."
In a deportation hearing, an Immigration Judge ruled that Esquivel-Quintana had "sexually abused a minor" for the purposes of the INA, and was thus subject to deportation. The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed, and the US Court of Appeals (in a divided opinion) ruled that it was required to defer to the Board's interpretation.
Holding: A violation of California's statutory rape laws does not qualify as "sexual abuse of a minor" under the INA, and thus does not allow for deportation of the offender.
Reasoning: The first principle applied is that, under Federal Law, when determining if a person may be deported for a criminal offense, you look not at what actually happened in the particular case but instead at whether the law, itself, is a "deportable offense." In other words, you don't ask "are this guy's particular actions bad enough that we should deport him," you ask "is the crime this guy was convicted of the sort of crime we want to deport people for, in general." (Although it wasn't addressed in the opinion, this is presumably to prevent discretionary or inconsistent deportation.)
Under that principle, the Court considers, essentially, the smallest possible violation of the crime, and sees if that constitutes a deportable offense. In this case, the way you could violate California's crime in the "smallest possible way" would be if you were someone who turned 21 that day and had consensual sex with your partner who was 17-and-364-days-old. That scenario is what the Court looks at to see if the offense described by the statute is one for which we can deport someone.
So, the Supreme Court's next question is: Does a 21-year-old having sex with an almost-but-not-quite-18-year-old constitute the particular aggravated felony of "abuse of a minor?" And the answer, the Supreme Court unanimously said, is "no."
The main reason this is not "abuse of a minor" is because, under the "generic federal definition" of sexual abuse of a minor "requires that the victim be younger than 16." Basically, when we talk about a "minor" in terms of contract law - as in, can this person buy a house or smoke cigarettes - "minor" means "under the age of majority; that is, younger than 18." However, when we talk about a "minor" in terms of consent, it means "younger than the age of consent to have sex," which - in federal law and in 40 of the 50 states - is 16 (or younger, in some states). The Supreme Court noted that the federal and majority-of-states definition of 16 years for age of consent to have sex is supported by many law dictionaries and other sources, all of which suggest that this is what is meant when "minor" is used in the context of a law concerning statutory rape.
The federal government argued that the "common sense" understanding of "sexual abuse of a minor" includes any "illegal sexual activity directed at a person younger than 18." The Supreme Court disagreed with this argument for a few reasons. It first noted that, in many states, there are parallel statutes, one of which criminalizes sexual activity with someone younger than 16, and the other of which criminalizes sexual activity with someone younger than 18 when the older person is one who holds a position of trust or power over the person (such as a family member, teacher, or other guardian). The Supreme Court said that, for the INA's purposes, we can only deport for an aggravated felony; that is, one that has circumstances that go beyond any normal felony. In a lot of states, the Supreme Court said, the "aggravating factor" can be either that 1) the age is under 16 or 2) the older person has a position of power or trust over the younger person. If neither one of these factors is present or required - and it's not in California's law in the instant case - the law cannot be said to describe an aggravated felony as required by the INA.
The Supreme Court also said, essentially, that we don't want to allow differences in states' laws to mean that, in one state, a particular action isn't even a crime, whereas in another state it's an aggravated felony that can get you deported. The reason the Supreme Court looks at the law and not the particular circumstances is because it doesn't want "the generic federal offense of abuse of a minor [to be defined as] whatever is illegal under the particular law of the State where the defendant was convicted."
Lastly, the Supreme Court considered the possibility that judicial deference needed to be given to the Department of Homeland Security (under a doctrine called Chevron Deference, which basically says that when the interpretation of a statute is ambiguous, the agency enforcing that statute gets to resolve those ambiguities (within reason)). The Supreme Court said, essentially, the law regarding the INA and how we interpret it is very clear and not in the least ambiguous, so, DHS, no deference for you, come back, one year.
Conclusion: This case was a pretty easy one to decide for the Supreme Court. Basically, to go against this would be to ignore the entire 21-year history of how the INA was enforced. Justice Thomas has some weird views about how things should work, and has some... rather idiosyncratic theories of constitutional interpretation, but he's never been one to try to avoid applying precedent when it's clear. Thomas doesn't get a ton of chances to write majority (especially unanimous) opinions, so I'm sure they were glad to give him this one.
Ultimately, this is a good holding, as it preserves uniformity in what the federal government can deport people for, which is especially important at present. Additionally, as someone who thinks a lot of laws regulating the consensual sexual activity of 16-or-17-year-olds are rather... old fashioned (not to mention potentially harmful when they take away resources from/confound the issue of non-consensual sexual crimes), it's a good result to see that the full force of federal power will not be brought upon, say, a just-turned-21-year-old who had consensual sex with a just-about-to-turn-18-year-old.
Let me know if you have questions or if you disagree with my (or the court's) conclusions!
How will we know, when the morning comes, we are still human? - 2D
Don't worry, my friend. If this be the end, then so shall it be.
Don't worry, my friend. If this be the end, then so shall it be.
