(LONG) "I Don't Know" as a Good Answer in Ethics

[The Grand Nudger]

I am familiar with the businessman example. These sorts of problems plague every iteration of ethical monism, and it causes me to consider pluralism. I find myself seeing value in each and every one of the monistic theories, and I can't help thinking that each one says something important about ethics.

Agreed.  If there is some unifying moral theory, if you don't mind me using the phrase loosely....then I would expect it to draw from the separate monistic theories just as any other unifying theory brings together sub-disciplines in an overall field.  

 As far as monistic theories go, I really like utilitarian hedonism and virtue ethics. Virtue ethics is SO compelling, but also problematic. This isn't to say that desire satisfaction and others aren't appealing as well. If I had to pick one at gunpoint, I suppose utilitarianism would be the one. Otherwise, I'd have to put myself in the undecided category.

Same, my answer to the question of which one I find the most compelling is the same as my answer to the question of the happy businessman's life.  I don't know.  I can say, though, that the confluence between virtue ethics and utilitarianism..where doing some good thing x is both adhering to a rule or duty of a moral system -and- has a beneficial outcome shows that they aren't necessarily in competition with each other.  I don;t feel any particular need to choose, except so much as I would choose a flat head or a philips depending on the job in front of me.

In meta-ethics, I tend toward moral objectivism but I've yet to hear a satisfying response to error theory, so nihilism haunts me with its nightmares. How about you? What theories do you find most attractive?

So do I, and as far as a response towards error theory goes;  Firstly, in a great many examples of moral error theory, the dispute appears to be semantic.  A moral realist and a moral skeptic are not actually disagreeing, just arguing over the proper terms to couch their often shared positions in.   Another is the sense of trivial objection.  Skepticism applied to moral realism sometimes takes the form of simply objecting to words.  Not in the semantic sense, above, but in the propositional sense.  If we can demonstrate that we're talking about some objective thing x, and cogent propositions regarding that thing x can be arranged into a valid syllogism...then the conclusion is just as true as any other..including whatever logic is required to mount some skeptical argument or -any- hypothetical. Sure, we could still be wrong, but that's never not true. I, personally, consider objective meta-ethics a hedge against the ever present of objection "but what if we're wrong about that/are you sure that's what we're talking about". As above.."well, okay, IDK, I think we have good reason to think so, what do you think?". Like the other examples we were discussing, I apply skepticism and error theory to moral statements constantly. It seems as necessary as any of the rest to get an accurate picture..or as accurate a picture as we -can- get. In general...social contract, super-rationality, and blind construction seem to offer a good mix of deontology and consequentualism through objective meta-ethics.

As far as moral nihilism..that's a non starter to me. Literally, lol. It's the least impressive objection, in my view...and a constant source of pitched straw.