(November 30, 2017 at 11:17 am)Neo-Scholastic Wrote: LOL 10 theists, 11 opinions...
JOR:
A little research confirmed my original belief. The theological definition of perfection is nested in the classical and scholastic traditions and, as such, has a more precise meaning than common contemporary usage., so it was a nice surprise to see the Angelic Doctor give a precise definition:
"...the first active principle must be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is said to be most perfect according as it is in act, because we call perfect that which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection" & "...created things are then called perfect when from potency they are brought into act, this word 'perfect' signifies whatever is not wanting in act..." - Question 4 Article 1 of the Summa
Pardon me for being a bit brusque; I haven't slept. But it seems that one can readily draw an isomorphism between these notions of completeness and the type of definition I gave Steve and CL, that a perfection is a standard or template which, in its fulfillment, amounts to a perfection.
(November 30, 2017 at 11:17 am)Neo-Scholastic Wrote: So this definition returns us to Question 2 and first of the 5 ways.
The above is how the word 'perfection' is defined according to natural reason and also seems to match biblical references to perfection, as in Matt 5:48, 1 Co 13:10, Php 3:15, and especially Jas 1:14, 17, 25 & 3:2. The Greek root used is 'teleioo' which means to bring to an end or completeness.
People commonly think of moral perfection as compliance with specific prohibitions and performance of various obligations. However, these prohibitions and obligations are derivative. The base concept for moral perfection is virtue which is a kind of good. And good is associated with the degree to which a thing fulfills its potential (the degree to which it is in act). A strong, cunning, and ferocious tiger is a fine exemplar of tigerness and by that standard considered 'good'; although many a monkey would beg to differ. A complete tiger is one at actualizes all the virtues of what it means to be a tiger. And what goes for tigers goes for all types of things, from triangles to people.
Two things to note here. First, this raises the question of what it means to be a 'good' example of the kind of which God is an example. As noted with Steve, there appears to be some deep circularity here if God is both the specimen of a completed kind of his type, and also the standard setter as to what constitutes the completeness of his kind. And the apophatic dimensions which you mention below only complicate the picture. (If my reading of the Divine Simplicity entry in the SEP is sound, positing the type of apophatic theology that you propose below has the potential for rendering the doctrine of God's simplicity incoherent. That was my take on what I read, but the issues are a little too deep for my grasp.) The second thing to note is that if there is such a circularity involved, it essentially returns us to the starting line with the issue of the enhanced Euthyphro and your solution that God by necessity is morally perfect. The latter is not my primary concern though, as I am more critically concerned with how that circularity manifests itself in the definition of other aspects of God's nature.
(November 30, 2017 at 11:17 am)Neo-Scholastic Wrote: SteveII:
I am concerned that when we talk about the Nature of God or His attributes that we may both be on thin ice. That concern is why I mention how we do not truly know what God is (as the Father) but only what He is not. This is how Aquinas puts it:
"Although we cannot know what God is, nevertheless in this doctrine we make use of His effects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition...even as in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about a cause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of a definition of the cause." - Question 1, Article 8 of the Summa
I take this to mean that what we casually refer to as attributes are more specifically effects of a God who remains incomprehensible. So for example, when we say that God is Ominipotent, what we are actually referring to is His presence in all potency. Or that when we say He is Merciful, Mercy is truly the effect of His agency and not an attribute of God properly. This is not exactly the kind of subtle distinction I would present or defend to most of this lot. Just something to keep in the back of our minds.
Thank you for the note to Steve; I benefited from it as well.
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