Theists: What do you mean when you say that God is 'perfect'?

[SteveII]

For a something  to be described as 'perfect', I did say "maximally ideal for its intended purpose." You have very good examples of that above. 

I think for a someone, it simply won't work to discuss purpose. We don't say someone is 'perfect' period. We talk about components--ideal attributes, characteristics, abilities, etc. For example, a perfect husband, a perfect gentleman, a perfect friend, a perfect student, perfectly innocent, has perfect pitch, is perfect for the job. No human is perfect in all attributes, characteristics or abilities. 

It seems that you are suggesting that to be perfect, as a being, is to fulfill to the highest degree a standard or model of function, role, behavior, or being, and that such standards must be capable of failing to be met.  This is fine as far as it goes, but it raises some more intriguing questions.  One such question is what it means for a classless being to meet a standard.  Since God is the only exemplar of his kind, it does not seem sensible to apply a standard permitting of degrees to a class which does not vary in degree.  But a more important question is from where do the standards which God meets come from, and by that I am not speaking of human institutions, but the metaphysical question of what defines the desirable perfections which God meets?  It makes no sense to suggest that God meets all standards for reasons already alluded to, so the question becomes what defines what are the desirable standards for God to meet?  As with the Euthyphro dilemma, there is the question as to whether the standards for love and justice and so forth lie outside himself, or derive solely from God in and of himself.  If they lie outside himself, then God becomes in some sense superfluous, as we can derive our standards for love and justice from this independent source.  If they come from within God himself, then that makes them somewhat arbitrary and trivial.  To say that God meets the standards he sets for a being such as himself makes God and his standards seem rather trite, and appealing to them as a standard we are obligated to follow seems peurile.  (And the question of God's assigning our meaning and purpose, of his providing those things for us, becomes dependent on this arbitrarily derived set of values.    God becomes just another being with a self-interested point of view.  When evolution provides us with biases and values such as the desire for life, theists typically criticize this sourcing of our values, meaning, and purpose as being "arbitrary" and therefore meaningless.  It's hard to see how a God who considers himself the best thing in the world, independent of any external standards, is any less arbitrary and meaningless.)  As you will recall, the euthyphro dilemma was (allegedly) resolved by appealing to the perfection of God's moral nature.  However, in this instance, such an appeal is futile as it occurs in the context of defining just what it would mean for God to be perfect, so appealing to God's perfection in this case would be an example of circular reasoning.  

(ETA:  It also raises the spectre of just what the deeper meaning of saying that God is, by nature, and necessarily, morally perfect is.  If the standard of moral perfection is satisfied by God simply being what God happens to be, morally, then his morals indeed are metaphysically arbitrary, and appeals to the alleged 'perfection' of God's moral nature is again, reasoning in a circle.  It makes little rational sense to justify God's morals by effectively saying that, "God is moral because his nature meets the standard of being what its own definition of what it means to be good happens to be.")

I think your definition of 'perfect' is not quite right. A perfect attribute is not the best as a result of comparison. It is the best because it achieves a standard for which we could conceive no better. For example, the perfect husband is not so because he is a little better than the next best husband. It is possible that there is and ever was only one husband and he may or may not have been perfect. 

Regarding God's attributes, they too are not simply the best, but achieve a standard for which no better could be conceived. As I have said before, it does not matter if we cannot discern what this might be. 

In the case of God we also talk about attributes. It just so happens that the attributes are all perfect (part of the definition of God) so it is handy and appropriate to say God is perfect. 

Ignoring for the moment the implications of your stance for divine simplicity, this really doesn't answer the question.  You assert that whatever 'perfection' happens to be, then God has it.  That really doesn't address the question of what perfection happens to be.

I'm not convinced of the doctrine of divine simplicity. Since a finite mind can't know what exactly 'perfection' entails in one of God's attributes, we are stuck with discussing it conceptually.  

Regarding perfect justice and perfect mercy, I think there are two problems with your argument 

1. Justice is an application of objective standards so if applied without error, you can have perfect justice. But mercy is not the same thing. First, I don't think mercy is an essential attribute of God like justice or holiness is. I think rather that mercy flows from another essential attribute: Love. Second, as only a product of an essential attribute, it is qualified and limited by all the essential attributes (the nature of God) as well as his free will to make choices consistent with that nature.

Well, again, ignoring aseity, the complaint that perfect justice and perfect mercy could not be simultaneously met was asserted in the context of the hypothesis that God exhibits all possible perfections.  Once you start picking and choosing which are necessary attributes of God and which are not, you've abandoned the context upon which the complaint was based.  You can't consistently maintain that God exhibits all possible perfections and then assert that God has primary and secondary attributes.  Beyond that, I'm sure other examples could easily be derived, such as Hammy's observation that God cannot be both perfectly good and perfectly evil.  The main thrust is that if God has perfections, they are selective and not a consequence of God simply possessing "all the marbles."

I don't think mercy is a  necessary attribute but rather contingent because it requires two others to exists: justice and love. Justice provides the framework that established the need for mercy and love provides the reason to offer it. Additionally, mercy is an action that can be (and is) applied subjectively to a situation as part of a other goals or reasons. God had mercy on someone because of intercessary prayer, because if some future event that brought greater good, or because he accepted Jesus' free gift of salvation, etc. 

 

2. When God shows mercy (like salvation), it is not instead of justice. Justice was satisfied--the price paid by Christ.

I think it's fairly reasonable to assert that many times in the old testament, God showed mercy toward the Israelites.  God made trade-offs between mercy and justice when dealing with his people.  While it might be argued that God does not dispense mercy "in place of" justice in the post-resurrection era, it's simply a fact that this was not always the case.  So, no, I think you're wrong here.

That is just proving that mercy is a contingent property of God rather than a necessary one and is often applied subjectively.