(December 5, 2017 at 4:35 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote: What on earth are you talking about? In this context, what you are saying is that there is a standard external to God whereby his perfections are defined by whether or not he meets this standard.
Despite the mutual frustration, I want you to know that I value this conversation. Also please know that I am truly seeking clarity on the sticking points that divide us.
Your insistence that a reformed version of the Euthyphro dilemma applies to monotheism continued to puzzle me. It seems very similar to the following “dilemma”:
Are natural laws determined by the way the universe is or is the universe as it is because of natural laws?
I’m curious as to how you would differentiate the above from your reformed Euthyphro dilemma.
It seems to me that my problem with your reformed dilemma is two-fold. First, it does not include a place for human choice. Subsequently, it confuses the arbitrary acceptance of an objective standard for goodness with the unchanging, complete nature of God that serves as an objective standard of goodness. As such I would revise you dilemma as follows
Do people esteem the Lord’s commandments because He is God or do people esteem the Lord’s commands because they are good?
In short, it is a dilemma for us, not a dilemma for God. Does a moral system founded on God’s nature adequately serve as an objective standard for our notions of what constitutes the highest good? I would say there are good reasons to suppose that any objective standard would meet, at minimum, the following criteria:
The standard itself would not change.
The standard would not depend on external conditions.
The standard exists independently of any particular moral agent.
The standard must apply universally to all moral agents in all circumstances.
The only question remaining in my mind is why any individual would chose to accept or reject that which satisfies the above criteria as the foundation for his or her morality. One consideration for acceptance of the standard as one for goodness is to ask as Aristotle does, “What is the good that all men desire?” The next question is could the proposed standard serve as a guide to achieve such a universal desire. When I look at the above and compare it to the God of Classical Theism, whose existence I maintain has been adequately demonstrated by Aquinas, Leibnitz, Platinga, etc. (though their details vary) I see complete overlap. So as far as I’m concerned, the only thing remaining is for people to recognize the standard and choose it as their own.
