Arguments Against Thomistic philosophy

[polymath257]

First, these demonstrations are not about attributes of God as such; but rather, His effects used in place of a definition. (Question 1, Article 7, Reply to Objection 1). So while we call God the ‘Prime Mover’ that is actually an effect of our God who is Himself incomprehensible. It’s a very subtle but important thing to keep in mind. Similarly, to say that God is intelligent is easily misunderstood since His intellect is completely unlike ours and we can ponder it only by comparing it with the deficiencies of our own.

Secondly, line 9 is also just restating a general principle of Scholasticism, i.e. that a thing cannot give what it does not have. While I agree with the principle, it takes a lot to unpack for people who are not familiar with what it’s all about. Throwing it into the mix seems more confusing than clarifying.
In Feser’s defense, I would say that Ways 1, 2, and 3 are very closely related and mutually supporting. I fully understand the impulse to make those connections explicit. Thomistic philosophy is much bigger than the 5 Ways and rests in an even bigger classical tradition. Often time the so-called refutation of one of the 5W is dispensed with in another or is dealt with elsewhere in the Summa.

I don't want to put forth objections so much as inquire:

As I see it, 1-5 are pretty plausible. I don't exactly get where 6 is coming from though. "Purely actual means eternal" doesn't bother me so much as "purely actual means unchanging." It may seem like a nitpick, but others (like Spinoza) have a concept of God which is purely actual but at the same time, "a dynamic nature in action, growing and changing, not a passive or static thing (Karl Jaspers)." Granted, the scholastics conceived of a god which was situated outside of nature. Spinoza's God was situated outside of nature too-- but also inside of it to the extent that nature was completely formed of God. 

(Spinoza's definition of God, if you're interested)

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By ‘God’ I understand: a thing that is absolutely infinite,

i.e. a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, each

of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence. I say

‘absolutely infinite’ in contrast to ‘infinite in its own kind’.

If something is infinite only in its own kind, there can be

attributes that it doesn’t have; but if something is absolutely

infinite its essence ·or nature· contains every positive way

in which a thing can exist—·which means that it has all
possible attributes. (Ethics 1D6)

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I'm not trying to compare Cartesian concepts to scholastic ones here, I'm just trying to get at why "purely actual" indicates an unchanging nature. It may be that this is due to scholastic conceits, or maybe there is another piece of logic backing this up. Spinoza is obviously describing a God who is "purely actual" but his God is subject to change/modification. Otherwise his God is similar to the scholastic's god in that he is causa sui. IDK, maybe I'm confusing things by bringing Spinoza in, but I was just trying to give a reference point. What am I missing that logically demonstrates that purely actual entails unchanging?

My second question is less convoluted. In your opinion/assessment how valid is the scholastic principle "a thing cannot give what it does not have"? I am unfamiliar with the concept, but it sounds like leftover Aristotle that made its way into Aquinas' stew. Wouldn't you say that such a concept is counter to naturalistic observation (ie. a cute cuddly bird can descend from a ferocious dinosaur) or am I missing the essence of the statement?

I have to admit that 'a thing cannot give what it does not have' seems at first reasonable, but if you look at specific examples, it is shown to be nonsense quickly. The sun does not have to be alive to give the means of life (energy). Gasoline doesn't have to possess explosions to be able to explode. Wood doesn't have to have fire in it to burn. The list goes on and on and on.

And we can go further. If 'change' is potential that is actualized, then when something moves it has the 'potential; to be someplace else. That 'potential' is NOT actualized by something outside of the body moving. So, in this case, we have actualization without possession.

The whole ontological basis of potentiality and actuality is much more complex than required to explain the observed phenomena and fails miserably to do so in many cases. it is a philosophy that should have died a respected death 400 years ago instead of being zombified as it is today.