That's only a problem for people who beg a biblical god.  Do I seem like the kind that would beg a biblical god If I was rattling the cup? 

-but..yeah..sure.  It;s a problem for the argument only in that it could also provide warrant for other beliefs...but, for the most part, people who use it aren;t necessarrily worried in those other beliefs..and may even incorporate "maximal evil" in their own.  Hello Satan. It;s not a problem..in that such an objection is not an objection to a maximally great x...but..in objection..is an affirmation of this. Lending credence to the notion that anyone who properly understood such god claims could not rationally deny them on the grounds of the argument itself.

IOW, it's a problem only insomuch as it may not be sound..but it is valid (not in all formulations, I only defend platingas s5 operator on academic grounds)..which is a hell of an improvement over begging biblical gods, like a fuckin beggar.......or the gods of A-T theology like a know nothing.

(January 22, 2018 at 5:31 pm)Neo-Scholastic Wrote:

(January 19, 2018 at 10:22 pm)polymath257 Wrote: Well, for one, Aristotle thought that any movement (which he regarded as any change at all) requires a force. We now know that isn't true: motion thorugh space doesn't require a force--a *change* of direction or speed does.

Talk about straw man! Philosophy 101, my friend. The 1W has nothing to do with Newtonian physics. It’s about change.

(January 19, 2018 at 10:22 pm)polymath257 Wrote: As for contingency, a unicorn isn't something that 'possibly exists' but simply fails to do so. It is something that *doesn't* exist. There is no modifier on existence. Something either exists or not.[/i]

&

Quote:…change is just that: change. It isn't a 'potential' that is 'actualized', it is simply a change… Things either exist or they do not. A non-existent thing doens't have properties like potentiality.

It is quite possibly the case that unicorns cannot possibly exist in all possible worlds. Things either exist or they don’t. Sure. But both points are irrelevant.

The distinction between act and potency is necessary to resolve the dilemma between Parmenides and Heraclitus of how things can change while preserving their being. It’s difficult to argue that things don’t have a range of potentials into which they could change. An acorn has the potential to grow into a mature tree, but no potential to become a puppy. At the same time, the acorn is the same oak as the mature tree. It’s an actual thing manifesting its potential.

And I strongly disagree here. Things have the possibility of interaction with other things, which can change either or both. Identity above the microscopic level isn't preserved, except in language (the ship of Theseus is, strictly speaking, a different ship when the first board is changed. WE are the ones that use language to say the two ships are the 'same' in some sense. I am not the same person I was yesterday if we are speaking strictly. it is only the vagaries of language that make me the same as in the past.
So, no, that acorn is NOT the same as the full grown tree. There is a causal connection, but they are not the same thing. For one thing, the tree has a much larger mass than the acorn, so they are not equal (which means all properties have to be the same). And that 'potential' of growing into a tree has, at its base, a whole environment to support it. A different environment (say with genetic engineering of the right level of technology) might well be able to make it grow into a puppy.
In particular, again, change is simply change. It isn't a pre-existing 'potential' that is 'actualized'. We don't have things bundled up with all of their potentials, some of which are actualized and others are not. We simply have things that interact with other things in certain ways.

As for 'possible worlds', well, to the extent it is a coherent notion, it is useless and to the extent it can be used, it is incoherent. The notion of 'logical consistency' is way, way, way too weak to get anywhere.

(January 22, 2018 at 5:31 pm)Neo-Scholastic Wrote:

(January 19, 2018 at 7:41 pm)FireFromHeaven Wrote: 1. Change involves a potential being actualized
2. A potential must be actualized by something already actual
3. Some things do not exist necessarily and require their potential for existence to be actualized
4. If the thing doing this actualizing has potentials, it would also require another actual thing to actualize it
5. Therefore the chain of actualization must conclude in some purely actual thing
6. Since this thing would be purely actual it would be unchanging and eternal
7. There could only be one such being as there would be no unactualized potentials to differentiate one such being from another
8. Since it caused all non purely actual things it would be omnipotent
9. (EDIT Forgot to include.) Since all non purely actual things, including intelligent beings, came from this Pure Actuality, it would neccessarily be both intelligent, since a cause cannot give something it does not at least possess virtually, and all knowing since the attributes of all things flow from it
10. And that is basically the monotheistic God

First, these demonstrations are not about attributes of God as such; but rather, His effects used in place of a definition. (Question 1, Article 7, Reply to Objection 1). So while we call God the ‘Prime Mover’ that is actually an effect of our God who is Himself incomprehensible. It’s a very subtle but important thing to keep in mind. Similarly, to say that God is intelligent is easily misunderstood since His intellect is completely unlike ours and we can ponder it only by comparing it with the deficiencies of our own.

Secondly, line 9 is also just restating a general principle of Scholasticism, i.e. that a thing cannot give what it does not have. While I agree with the principle, it takes a lot to unpack for people who are not familiar with what it’s all about. Throwing it into the mix seems more confusing than clarifying.
In Feser’s defense, I would say that Ways 1, 2, and 3 are very closely related and mutually supporting. I fully understand the impulse to make those connections explicit. Thomistic philosophy is much bigger than the 5 Ways and rests in an even bigger classical tradition. Often time the so-called refutation of one of the 5W is dispensed with in another or is dealt with elsewhere in the Summa.

I don't want to put forth objections so much as inquire:

As I see it, 1-5 are pretty plausible. I don't exactly get where 6 is coming from though. "Purely actual means eternal" doesn't bother me so much as "purely actual means unchanging." It may seem like a nitpick, but others (like Spinoza) have a concept of God which is purely actual but at the same time, "a dynamic nature in action, growing and changing, not a passive or static thing (Karl Jaspers)." Granted, the scholastics conceived of a god which was situated outside of nature. Spinoza's God was situated outside of nature too-- but also inside of it to the extent that nature was completely formed of God. 

(Spinoza's definition of God, if you're interested)


I'm not trying to compare Cartesian concepts to scholastic ones here, I'm just trying to get at why "purely actual" indicates an unchanging nature. It may be that this is due to scholastic conceits, or maybe there is another piece of logic backing this up. Spinoza is obviously describing a God who is "purely actual" but his God is subject to change/modification. Otherwise his God is similar to the scholastic's god in that he is causa sui. IDK, maybe I'm confusing things by bringing Spinoza in, but I was just trying to give a reference point. What am I missing that logically demonstrates that purely actual entails unchanging?

My second question is less convoluted. In your opinion/assessment how valid is the scholastic principle "a thing cannot give what it does not have"? I am unfamiliar with the concept, but it sounds like leftover Aristotle that made its way into Aquinas' stew. Wouldn't you say that such a concept is counter to naturalistic observation (ie. a cute cuddly bird can descend from a ferocious dinosaur) or am I missing the essence of the statement?

If I may, -we- gave that bird it's "cute and cuddliness", it's biological inheritance did not.   Every chicken still thinks it's a T Rex. IDK if the contention is mistaken, only that if it is, the cute and cuddliness of birds probably isn't a good counter example.



You could go the other way with it, though, and maintain that whatever is cute and cuddly about birds and i part of their biological inheritence would have been cute and cuddly about dinosaurs as well. I'm sure that, if they were around today..we'd keep the brightly feathered and manageable ones. Mostly because we do. Even though people don;t generally keep living raptors (despite being cute) or buzzards (despite being cuddly, no shit..buzzards like to nuzzle) as pets.

(January 22, 2018 at 11:04 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote:

(January 22, 2018 at 5:31 pm)Neo-Scholastic Wrote: First, these demonstrations are not about attributes of God as such; but rather, His effects used in place of a definition. (Question 1, Article 7, Reply to Objection 1). So while we call God the ‘Prime Mover’ that is actually an effect of our God who is Himself incomprehensible. It’s a very subtle but important thing to keep in mind. Similarly, to say that God is intelligent is easily misunderstood since His intellect is completely unlike ours and we can ponder it only by comparing it with the deficiencies of our own.

Secondly, line 9 is also just restating a general principle of Scholasticism, i.e. that a thing cannot give what it does not have. While I agree with the principle, it takes a lot to unpack for people who are not familiar with what it’s all about. Throwing it into the mix seems more confusing than clarifying.
In Feser’s defense, I would say that Ways 1, 2, and 3 are very closely related and mutually supporting. I fully understand the impulse to make those connections explicit. Thomistic philosophy is much bigger than the 5 Ways and rests in an even bigger classical tradition. Often time the so-called refutation of one of the 5W is dispensed with in another or is dealt with elsewhere in the Summa.

I don't want to put forth objections so much as inquire:

As I see it, 1-5 are pretty plausible. I don't exactly get where 6 is coming from though. "Purely actual means eternal" doesn't bother me so much as "purely actual means unchanging." It may seem like a nitpick, but others (like Spinoza) have a concept of God which is purely actual but at the same time, "a dynamic nature in action, growing and changing, not a passive or static thing (Karl Jaspers)." Granted, the scholastics conceived of a god which was situated outside of nature. Spinoza's God was situated outside of nature too-- but also inside of it to the extent that nature was completely formed of God. 

(Spinoza's definition of God, if you're interested)

---

By ‘God’ I understand: a thing that is absolutely infinite,

i.e. a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, each

of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence. I say

‘absolutely infinite’ in contrast to ‘infinite in its own kind’.

If something is infinite only in its own kind, there can be

attributes that it doesn’t have; but if something is absolutely

infinite its essence ·or nature· contains every positive way

in which a thing can exist—·which means that it has all
possible attributes. (Ethics 1D6)

---

I'm not trying to compare Cartesian concepts to scholastic ones here, I'm just trying to get at why "purely actual" indicates an unchanging nature. It may be that this is due to scholastic conceits, or maybe there is another piece of logic backing this up. Spinoza is obviously describing a God who is "purely actual" but his God is subject to change/modification. Otherwise his God is similar to the scholastic's god in that he is causa sui. IDK, maybe I'm confusing things by bringing Spinoza in, but I was just trying to give a reference point. What am I missing that logically demonstrates that purely actual entails unchanging?

My second question is less convoluted. In your opinion/assessment how valid is the scholastic principle "a thing cannot give what it does not have"? I am unfamiliar with the concept, but it sounds like leftover Aristotle that made its way into Aquinas' stew. Wouldn't you say that such a concept is counter to naturalistic observation (ie. a cute cuddly bird can descend from a ferocious dinosaur) or am I missing the essence of the statement?

I have to admit that 'a thing cannot give what it does not have' seems at first reasonable, but if you look at specific examples, it is shown to be nonsense quickly. The sun does not have to be alive to give the means of life (energy). Gasoline doesn't have to possess explosions to be able to explode. Wood doesn't have to have fire in it to burn. The list goes on and on and on.

And we can go further. If 'change' is potential that is actualized, then when something moves it has the 'potential; to be someplace else. That 'potential' is NOT actualized by something outside of the body moving. So, in this case, we have actualization without possession.

The whole ontological basis of potentiality and actuality is much more complex than required to explain the observed phenomena and fails miserably to do so in many cases. it is a philosophy that should have died a respected death 400 years ago instead of being zombified as it is today.

(January 22, 2018 at 11:04 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote: I'm not trying to compare Cartesian concepts to scholastic ones here, I'm just trying to get at why "purely actual" indicates an unchanging nature. It may be that this is due to scholastic conceits, or maybe there is another piece of logic backing this up. Spinoza is obviously describing a God who is "purely actual" but his God is subject to change/modification. Otherwise his God is similar to the scholastic's god in that he is causa sui. IDK, maybe I'm confusing things by bringing Spinoza in, but I was just trying to give a reference point. What am I missing that logically demonstrates that purely actual entails unchanging?

In Scholasticism, act and potency are mutually exclusive attributes. It’s like virginity. A maiden is a potential lover. However, following coitus the potential has been actualized. Now the woman, formally a maiden, is an actual lover. For God there are no potentials that are not already actualized. Therefore, He can neither gain nor lose any attributes to become other than what He already is.

(January 22, 2018 at 11:04 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote: My second question is less convoluted. In your opinion/assessment how valid is the scholastic principle "a thing cannot give what it does not have"? I am unfamiliar with the concept, but it sounds like leftover Aristotle that made its way into Aquinas' stew. Wouldn't you say that such a concept is counter to naturalistic observation (ie. a cute cuddly bird can descend from a ferocious dinosaur) or am I missing the essence of the statement?

One of the reasons I enjoy the Scholastics so much is their careful attention to nuanced and precise distinctions. It’s taken me a lot of time and study to understand and recognize many of those distinctions, such as act/potency, accidental/essential, kind/degree, etc. That is why I find it so often futile replying to many posts objecting to the 5W and my frustration with Christian apologists ignorant of the concepts that inform the 5W.

That’s why I don’t have the patience to deal with post’s like Polymath’s. Polymath is too far gone in his or her denial of intelligibility. Polymath is committed to the idea of a world without any ‘whatness’, one in which there are no things (just accidental collections) and descriptive language just floats free without any correspondence to real objects. Likewise, people who cannot understand the notion of privation (because they do not recognize the necessary conditions for intelligibility) will never realize that ‘maximally evil’ is an oxymoron. That’s one reason why my posts are getting fewer and fewer. Even when conversing with the most astute AF members, we seem to be talking past one another for lack of a common nomenclature.

(rant over)

Anyways, the phrase mostly has to do with final cause. For example, potter has the intention of creating a vessel that will hold water, flowers etc. and makes a vase that manifests that intention. Or something like authority. The authority of the cop is derived from the civilian authorities whose authority derives from the electorate. If the electorate has no authority it cannot give it to the civilian leaders who cannot give it to the cop. The specific purpose of any given organ is derived from the purpose of the organism which is to thrive which is derived from the purpose assigned to it by Providence. A purposeless universe cannot give purpose to an organism that gives purpose to the organs. Personally, I think the purpose of the heart is to pump blood. But even a simple and seemingly obvious fact like that doesn't even makes sense if your worldview excludes final cause. And yet without final cause there can be no quiddity or whatness. In effect, a world without whatness is basically absurd and unintelligible. There’s no sense wondering if Theseus has the same boat as before because without final cause there can’t even be such a thing as a boat.

(January 23, 2018 at 5:42 pm)Neo-Scholastic Wrote:

(January 22, 2018 at 11:04 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote: I'm not trying to compare Cartesian concepts to scholastic ones here, I'm just trying to get at why "purely actual" indicates an unchanging nature. It may be that this is due to scholastic conceits, or maybe there is another piece of logic backing this up. Spinoza is obviously describing a God who is "purely actual" but his God is subject to change/modification. Otherwise his God is similar to the scholastic's god in that he is causa sui. IDK, maybe I'm confusing things by bringing Spinoza in, but I was just trying to give a reference point. What am I missing that logically demonstrates that purely actual entails unchanging?

In Scholasticism, act and potency are mutually exclusive attributes. It’s like virginity. A maiden is a potential lover. However, following coitus the potential has been actualized. Now the woman, formally a maiden, is an actual lover. For God there are no potentials that are not already actualized. Therefore, He can neither gain nor lose any attributes to become other than what He already is.

(January 22, 2018 at 11:04 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote: My second question is less convoluted. In your opinion/assessment how valid is the scholastic principle "a thing cannot give what it does not have"? I am unfamiliar with the concept, but it sounds like leftover Aristotle that made its way into Aquinas' stew. Wouldn't you say that such a concept is counter to naturalistic observation (ie. a cute cuddly bird can descend from a ferocious dinosaur) or am I missing the essence of the statement?

One of the reasons I enjoy the Scholastics so much is their careful attention to nuanced and precise distinctions. It’s taken me a lot of time and study to understand and recognize many of those distinctions, such as act/potency, accidental/essential, kind/degree, etc. That is why I find it so often futile replying to many posts objecting to the 5W and my frustration with Christian apologists ignorant of the concepts that inform the 5W.

That’s why I don’t have the patience to deal with post’s like Polymath’s. Polymath is too far gone in his or her denial of intelligibility. Polymath is committed to the idea of a world without any ‘whatness’, one in which there are no things (just accidental collections) and descriptive language just floats free without any correspondence to real objects. Likewise, people who cannot understand the notion of privation (because they do not recognize the necessary conditions for intelligibility) will never realize that ‘maximally evil’ is an oxymoron. That’s one reason why my posts are getting fewer and fewer. Even when conversing with the most astute AF members, we seem to be talking past one another for lack of a common nomenclature.

(rant over)

Anyways, the phrase mostly has to do with final cause. For example, potter has the intention of creating a vessel that will hold water, flowers etc. and makes a vase that manifests that intention. Or something like authority. The authority of the cop is derived from the civilian authorities whose authority derives from the electorate. If the electorate has no authority it cannot give it to the civilian leaders who cannot give it to the cop. The specific purpose of any given organ is derived from the purpose of the organism which is to thrive which is derived from the purpose assigned to it by Providence.  A purposeless universe cannot give purpose to an organism that gives purpose to the organs. Personally, I think the purpose of the heart is to pump blood. But even a simple and seemingly obvious fact like that doesn't even makes sense if your worldview excludes final cause. And yet without final cause there can be no quiddity or whatness. In effect, a world without whatness is basically absurd and unintelligible. There’s no sense wondering if Theseus has the same boat as before because without final cause there can’t even be such a thing as a boat.

I think you misconstrue my point. The identification is a matter of our language and is decided by our general environment and goals. So, whether something is a chair is decided by *humans* because humans are the ones that use chairs. Yes, they are assemblages, but the identification as a chair is a convenience and NOT something inherent in the chair. Theseus' boat is a boat because humans agree it to be  a boat, not because of anything inherent in the boat itself.

What defines 'whatness' is more the physical conditions that keep it together and moving as a single entity than anything else. But raise the temperature a few thousand degrees and that whatness goes away. Have conditions that overcome the forces between atoms and you lose structural coherency and thereby 'whatness'.

As for the 'purpose' of organs, I'm sorry but this is *exactly* why scholastic philosophy is so far out of the standard. Organs were evolved. They evolved because they performed certain tasks useful for living things. That is their 'purpose' to the extent it is meaningful to talk about purpose here. So yes, the purpose of the heart is to pump blood (well, one purpose) because if the blood stops flowing the organism dies. So hearts that pump blood tended to be passed on to the next generation (this was very early in evolution, mind you). And literally, that is why the heart pumps blood. Not 'providence', but survival.

Causality is another aspect, but this goes much, much deeper. The Aristotelian concepts of cause are, for the most part, useless. The closest to being useful is that of effective cause, but even that has changed so much as to not be very close to the original conceptualization. In essence, A is a cause of B if there is some physical law that, from an initial condition of A will predict a later condition of B. In the absence of physical law, causality makes no sense at all.

But even with physical laws, there are situations where causality in the usual sense fails. Most quantum phenomena are, strictly speaking, not caused. There is no 'cause' for when a radioactive nucleus decays. It is a purely random event.

Another little aspect: you mentioned an acorn cannot become a puppy, but that is also false. if we *feed* it to a puppy, that acorn becomes part of that puppy.

Neo goes on about final cause, but what about material cause? Was there anything from which God caused everything else into existence? Most Christian apologists would say "no". In that case, why assert final cause but dismiss material cause out of hand?

God creates light from his own light. The true nature of existence is luminosity as you witness in yourself, existing through a judgment of an absolute being.

Let's be honest here.

It's all bollocks.