RE: Philosophical zombies
March 2, 2018 at 1:19 pm
(This post was last modified: March 2, 2018 at 1:20 pm by polymath257.)
(March 2, 2018 at 1:14 pm)Hammy Wrote:(March 2, 2018 at 1:07 pm)polymath257 Wrote: "Zombies in philosophy are imaginary creatures designed to illuminate problems about consciousness and its relation to the physical world. Unlike those in films or witchcraft, they are exactly like us in all physical respects but without conscious experiences: by definition there is ‘nothing it is like’ to be a zombie. Yet zombies behave just like us, and some even spend a lot of time discussing consciousness."
Chalmers actually spends a lot of time on exactly this issue in his book.
Well that kind of P-zed is still logically possible because it's logically possible for dualism to be true. But of course, dualism is retarded and science has refuted it.
I'm much more interested in a non-retarded version of a P-zed. A person who seems conscious to everyone else, but isn't, and we have no way to tell, even with neurological tests.
I think we *would* be able to test: look to see if the brain structures for consciousness are there and have the correct levels of activity.
(March 2, 2018 at 1:14 pm)Hammy Wrote:(March 2, 2018 at 1:07 pm)polymath257 Wrote: "Zombies in philosophy are imaginary creatures designed to illuminate problems about consciousness and its relation to the physical world. Unlike those in films or witchcraft, they are exactly like us in all physical respects but without conscious experiences: by definition there is ‘nothing it is like’ to be a zombie. Yet zombies behave just like us, and some even spend a lot of time discussing consciousness."
Chalmers actually spends a lot of time on exactly this issue in his book.
Well that kind of P-zed is still logically possible because it's logically possible for dualism to be true. But of course, dualism is retarded and science has refuted it.
Exactly my claim.
