Philosophical zombies

[Edwardo Piet]

[You appear to be replying to me as if I'm Rob or something... which is odd. Lol.]

See, this just shows how confused you are. OF COURSE we know that we're conscious in the tradtional sense. It's the ONLY thing we know. We can't even talk about knowledge without talking about awareness/consciousness.

You don't know what you're talking about if you think consciousness in the traditional sense isn't known. It's all science even studies: phenomena.

I think I'm done with this convo if you can't even accept that you know that seeming to you is seeming to you. You may as well be another one of those guys arguing that 2+2=5 in another universe. Those morons who thinks Science is above all including the very axioms that science is fucking based on.

Would a p-zombie be able to talk meaningfully about consciousness? Wouldn't the fact that they *think* they are conscious mean, by your reasoning, that they are? And doesn't that show the impossibility of p-zombies?

You're incorrectly addressing a first person issue from the third person. That's the answer.

Yes, p-zeds can talk about consciousness all they like. They seem like normal conscious people from the outside, but on the inside they aren't conscious.

Each conscious person knows that they are conscious. And if you, as a conscious person, think you might not be conscious.... you're highly confused.

Talking about consciousness is different to thinking you're conscious. Furthermore, it's possible to have unconscious thoughts. So best to spot your equivocations.

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Are we insisting that self deception would be impossible for a p-zed..as a silent premise?

Unconscious self-deception wouldn't be impossible. But yes conscious people know they are conscious.

[The Grand Nudger]

Okay, then a p-zed at least could convince itself that it was conscious.  It would seem conscious to itself, perhaps it could even convince itself of the cartesian theater..as we do, right?

Would it really matter that this is not actually whats going on...any more than it doesn't matter that this is not actually whats going on in ourselves?

[Edwardo Piet]

A philosophical zombie is something that is physically identical to a human in every way, yet has no conscious experience.

I will correct this definition and say: Physically identical to a human being in every way, except for the part of their brain that produces consciousness, and it's impossible for any other person or scientist to tell the difference. So that, we have a non-conscious person walking around as if they're conscious.

Obviously their mind would be different to the extent that it removes their consciousness. And obviously the mind is the brain and is physical. None of that is worth debating anyway, dualism is retarded. The point is no one would be able to tell the difference. And yes it is possible. It is not realistic for human beings, because if some of us are conscious it makes sense that humans evolved with consciousness and we're all conscious.... but there's no reason to believe intelligent beings need be conscious.

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Okay, then a p-zed at least could convince itself that it was conscious.  It would seem conscious to itself, perhaps it could even convince itself of the cartesian theater..as we do,  right?

Would it really matter that this is not actually whats going on...any more than it doesn't matter that this is not actually whats going on in ourselves?

What do you mean convince itself? Convince other people and behave as if it is convinced it's conscious, you mean?

It has no 'self' to convince. Nor does it consciously think it does. It might have unconscious beliefs that it does, but the light isn't on. From its own non-perspective it is 100% asleep.

[polymath257]

No, because a p-zed is just a person who seems conscious from the outside but on the inside isn't. Having a physically identical brain isn't part of the definition of p-zed.

Actually, yes it is. According to David Chalmers, who was the one who invented the concept of p-zombies. Look at the video in the OP.

From Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/

"Zombies in philosophy are imaginary creatures designed to illuminate problems about consciousness and its relation to the physical world. Unlike those in films or witchcraft, they are exactly like us in all physical respects but without conscious experiences: by definition there is ‘nothing it is like’ to be a zombie. Yet zombies behave just like us, and some even spend a lot of time discussing consciousness."

Chalmers actually spends a lot of time on exactly this issue in his book.

[Edwardo Piet]

Would it really matter that this is not actually whats going on...any more than it doesn't matter that this is not actually whats going on in ourselves?

If you weren't conscious you wouldn't know it.... but thankfully you are conscious (if you like being alive that is, if you don't then I bet you wish you weren't conscious) and you do know it.

You can't even not know you're conscious if you're conscious, no matter how much you think you don't know it. You're just confused and calling something else "conscious" you know you're not unconscious. If you were unconscious you wouldn't be alive. You've be a biological organism that moved around and behaved alive.... but you wouldn't be alive. There would be no 'you' for your 'life' to matter to.

[The Grand Nudger]

We seem conscious to ourselves, and so we are.  If a p-zed was as good at self deception regarding it's own operation as we are, why wouldn't it be able to fit that seeming metric? You did just tell me that unconscious self deception was possible. Well, I'm positing that the p-zeds unconscious self deception is the proposition that it's a conscious agent.

Amusingly, we seem to be doing something very similar.

[Edwardo Piet]

"Zombies in philosophy are imaginary creatures designed to illuminate problems about consciousness and its relation to the physical world. Unlike those in films or witchcraft, they are exactly like us in all physical respects but without conscious experiences: by definition there is ‘nothing it is like’ to be a zombie. Yet zombies behave just like us, and some even spend a lot of time discussing consciousness."

Chalmers actually spends a lot of time on exactly this issue in his book.

Well that kind of P-zed is still logically possible because it's logically possible for dualism to be true. But of course, dualism is retarded and science has refuted it.

I'm much more interested in a non-retarded version of a P-zed. A person who seems conscious to everyone else, but isn't, and we have no way to tell, even with neurological tests.

The fact the creator of the definition has defined it in such a way that it has to be physically identical doesn't interest me. We already basically know non-physicalism is false.

But then again, you still have to ask what he means by non-physical. Does he mean mental as opposed to physical?

You see, if the physical parts of the brain that are conscious are deemed non-physical simply because they're mental.... then once again my point is, even though it really is a physical part of the brain, it is of course also mental, and it is possible that there are non-mental brains (brains without minds, or rather, without consciousness) and in that sense P-zeds are possible.

The creator, David Chalmers (who I am very familar with) is making a false dichotomy between physical and mental. As if non-physical=mental. The fact he makes a false dichotomy and thus created an overly narrow definition of a P-zed shouldn't stop us from debating P-Zeds. I'm pretty sure the P-zed debate has gone far beyond his mistakes.

I'm an epiphenomenalist, and Dennett doesn't think epiphenomenalism is possible either. But he has a very limited definition of that too, last I checked.

[polymath257]

Would it really matter that this is not actually whats going on...any more than it doesn't matter that this is not actually whats going on in ourselves?

If you weren't conscious you wouldn't know it.... but thankfully you are conscious (if you like being alive that is, if you don't then I bet you wish you weren't conscious) and you do know it.

You can't even not know you're conscious if you're conscious, no matter how much you think you don't know it. You're just confused and calling something else "conscious" you know you're not unconscious. If you were unconscious you wouldn't be alive. You've be a biological organism that moved around and behaved alive.... but you wouldn't be alive. There would be no 'you' for your 'life' to matter to.

But there is clearly a sense in which a p-zombie *would* know a great deal. They would be able to recall facts. They would be able to relate 'experiences'. They would be able to go on and on about how beautiful a painting is. They would be able to talk coherently about consciousness, etc.

They would act *in every way* as if they were conscious, including long discussions about consciousness where they insist they are conscious!

So, it is clear (to me) that a physically identical zombie that acts in *every* way the same as a conscious person is, in fact, conscious. They have an internal state. They know and feel.

You are missing the point by allowing for the consciousness center of their brain to be removed. That is CERTAINLY not allowed for a p-zombie. The whole point is that they are physically identical in every way and they don't have consciousness. The question is whether *that* is possible.

[The Grand Nudger]

He's probably working with the traditional dualist definition when he criticizes it.......but....he also thinks that consciousness is epiphenomenon. A side effect. That has to be squared away with the realization that mental events -are- physical events, ofc..and that physical events are an efficacious cause of other physical events. It's in that grey, I think..that he finds his free will compatibilism.

[polymath257]

"Zombies in philosophy are imaginary creatures designed to illuminate problems about consciousness and its relation to the physical world. Unlike those in films or witchcraft, they are exactly like us in all physical respects but without conscious experiences: by definition there is ‘nothing it is like’ to be a zombie. Yet zombies behave just like us, and some even spend a lot of time discussing consciousness."

Chalmers actually spends a lot of time on exactly this issue in his book.

Well that kind of P-zed is still logically possible because it's logically possible for dualism to be true. But of course, dualism is retarded and science has refuted it.

I'm much more interested in a non-retarded version of a P-zed. A person who seems conscious to everyone else, but isn't, and we have no way to tell, even with neurological tests.

I think we *would* be able to test: look to see if the brain structures for consciousness are there and have the correct levels of activity.

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"Zombies in philosophy are imaginary creatures designed to illuminate problems about consciousness and its relation to the physical world. Unlike those in films or witchcraft, they are exactly like us in all physical respects but without conscious experiences: by definition there is ‘nothing it is like’ to be a zombie. Yet zombies behave just like us, and some even spend a lot of time discussing consciousness."

Chalmers actually spends a lot of time on exactly this issue in his book.

Well that kind of P-zed is still logically possible because it's logically possible for dualism to be true. But of course, dualism is retarded and science has refuted it.

Exactly my claim.