On Hell and Forgiveness

[Angrboda]

In seeking to establish that something has an objective basis, it seems a misstep to appeal to what a conscious being would want, as that appears to lead you into subjectivity.

Is it impossible for a subjective being to want or be aware of things that are objectively good or greater than?  If I have a choice between one strawberry or two strawberries for $1...I pick two strawberries, that's the better deal.  2 is greater than 1. 2 for 1 is a greater deal than 1 for one and that's why I want it.  If not, then noting the desires of some being does not necessarrily lead into a meaningful subjectivity.  Yes, those beings subjectively desire this or that thing, but if the "why" of their desire is objective..that would be it's basis, not their desires.  They want it because it is good, because it is greater than..it is not good or greater than because they want it.  

Not all subjective beings desire the objectively good, anyway.  Additionally, the above doesn't preclude the fact that some judgements are meaningfully subjective.  Maybe I pick the 1 for 1 because I like one of the strawberries better than the other.  

 To properly demonstrate that this is greater than that, you would need to show that the sun, the moon, and the stars would rather that any god have this rather than that.  However, since the sun, the moon, and the stars have neither wants nor preferences, proving that would seem impossible.

Anyway, until then.

The impossibility of that proof might be the operative function..but why a person would have to show that at all is unclear.

(I figured I'd drop that before our resident nubbins trip all over their dicks again)

The problems of god and his greats and greater thans and greatests are his own problems, not objectivities problems.  Your babykilling god may be something that a christian can't answer for without slipping into a meaningful subjectivity....but it's fairly easy for a neutral objectivist to accept that the skill and depth of ones ability to kill for no reason is something that can be measured...that we can rank babykilling gods by the babykilling metric and determine that the greater babykilling god is greater at babykilling.  We may decide that this is something we don't want to be great at (or that we don't want our gods to be great at) - and hey..fine, but that in and of itself eradicates the claim that the god we desire is the omni-greatest possible.  At least one other possible god is greater in at least one other thing.

Just a quick note. No, it's not impossible that one may have a subjective awareness of an objective fact, but ultimately one has to appeal to the reasons why that awareness is of an objective fact, not simply the possibility that it is. Remember, they are trying to prove the positive assertion that these subjective impressions have an objective basis, not simply that it's possible that they are not entirely subjective. That argument requires appealing to the reasons themselves. An appeal to subjectivity in the absence of reasons simply doesn't feed the bulldog.

Second, the claim is that the theist cannot prove that their god is greater than the baby killing god, not that I can prove that the baby killing god is greater. (Rereading your second point, I'm not sure I understand how being great at something that it is not great to be great at would make the baby killing god greater than the supposed omni-greatest god Yahweh. I guess I don't understand your point.)