On Hell and Forgiveness

[polymath257]

I am saying that I have yet to see a coherent argument being made that doesn't have basic flaws. Furthermore, by refusing to define the relationship 'greater', the whole position on the religious side boils down to hand waving.

So, yes, your refusal to make the required argument means we are ignorant of what you are specifically claiming. This is *your* job to make your argument, not mine. If you think there is a coherent way to assign 'greater' to all virtues simultaneously, please make that argument. If you then make a claim that there is a 'greatest' in that ordering, then make that argument. Both of these claims seem wildly unlikely, though.

But at this point, all you have done is mumble vague platitudes that are unlikely to be anywhere close to correct.

And yes, until you actually do the work, what we understand about orderings makes your claims dubious, at best. More specifically, it appears that many virtues are mutually at odds, making a consistent resolution of these issues doubtful.

It seems silly to me, to argue in one instance, that you don't know what is meant, and then in another instance, to say that it is incoherent.  If you don't understand it, then how can you assess it at all?  I don't expect you to do the work except for your own claims... it's just confusing that you are making claims, and subsequently claim you don't know what you are talking about.

There is some disagreement on what is a great making quality or virtue.  This disagreement however is objective, and not just making statements concerning ones self.   Plantinga describes a maximally great being, or a maximally excellent being in the ontological argument.  I think that the following definition of greatness seems to fit "denoting the element of something that is the most important or the most worthy of consideration"  I am (just now) thinking, that perhaps it is the phrasing "greater" that is tripping you up.  That these "great" make properties can be maximized, as in not lacking in this attribute, or posessing the quality which is contrary in nature.  

As to the claim that some of these are mutually exclusive, that's your claim, and I'm guessing that you are not insinuating that I do your work for you.

Since to be incoherent *means* that no sense can be made of it, I fail to see your problem reconciling not understanding something that is incoherent.

As for consistency of the different virtues, that *is* your job to show they are consistent. I already gave some that seem to be interconnected in ways that preclude maximizing more than one. They don't have to be mutually exclusive to destroy your position. They only need to not allow mutual maxima.

Yes, I have read Platinga. His version of the ontological argument is just as much nonsense as all the previous ones. Possible worlds don't help. When talking about 'most' or 'greatest' or anything along that line, you have to show such actually exists given your way or odering least to most, or lesser to greater. Not all ways of ordering allow single maxima, or even any maximum at all.