Do you wish there's a god?

[Angrboda]

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Where did I misread you on this?  Exactly how is what you said an argument that moral realism is in any way necessarily dependent upon theism?

And I'll simply point out that your belief that it is a result of something other than poor thinking on your part may simply reflect more poor thinking on your part.

This is what I said

"Sure if an atheist, sees conceptions like the existence of a moral reality, an arc of a moral universe, of moral laws that exist as “intrinsic laws of the cosmos built into the heart of reality.” “a good that’s the source of all things right and true, etc…”, as beliefs dependent on some form of theism, then it should go without saying that their atheism requires a rejection of these very things. Believing in them undermines their disbelief.

Some atheists view the existence of a moral reality, of reality possessing moral properties, as teleological, and telelogy implies the existence of God, and since God does not exist, all teleological aspects of reality are to be denied or rejected as false.

Now you may not be such an unbeliever, but that’s beside the point."

Where here did I say that the whole class of moral realism, or even moral realism requires the existence of God, as you suggested?

That's not relevant to what I was replying to and itself doesn't establish that moral realism depends upon the existence of God.

Gae wrote that, "moral realism doesn't actually require the existence of a god..then they would be plain and simply wrong, just as you are plain and simply wrong," and you replied the following in an attempt to refute his point that moral realism does not depend upon God.

It depends on what form of moral realism you're referring to, if its akin to some form of platonic moral realism, than yes that's dependent on platonic theism.

If we're talking about yours, which is just dressed up subjectivism than no. In our previous argument over this, I got you to concede to the idea of taste realism, that thin crispy pizza with the right proportion of cheese is objectively good. According to your logic, all thats required to shift any subjective preference to objectivism, is defining some measurable criteria to qualify one's subjective preferences. You fail to recognize your incoherencies, that's perhaps why you've done a poor job of selling moral realism onto other atheists here.

Neither your reply to Gae nor the statement you quoted above demonstrate that moral realism depends upon God. And the statement you quoted was a response to Gae pointing out that a person's atheism can only inform their moral realism if their moral realism depended upon the existence of God. In making that claim, that "In any case, your notion that this is somehow a product of atheism is fatally misconceived," Gae was pointing out that moral realism was not intrinsically linked to atheism. To which you responded, "I'm merely pointing out that the reason why many atheists reject moral objectivism, is because of their atheism. Clearly you're not included in this assessment, since you agree that moral objectivism is true. Whether one can reconcile moral objectivism and atheism is beside the point here," which is another example of you mistaking the subset for the whole. There are no separate versions of atheism for those who believe in moral objectivism and those that don't. What you are describing is a consequence of their beliefs independent of their atheism. The only thing that the entire class of atheists share is that they do not have a belief in a god. If that is what atheism is, the only way their atheism could inform their views on moral realism is if God were necessary for an atheist to embrace moral realism and it's not. What you are pointing out is that some atheists have rejected moral realism because they have rejected a belief in God AND hold that moral realism is dependent upon a belief in God. That may be true, but since atheism isn't the position that moral realism depends upon God, then your initial claim that many atheists reject moral objectivism because of their atheism is wrong, and a more accurate statement would be that many atheists reject moral objectivism because they believe that moral objectivism depends upon God. Since the latter is a statement about what some atheists hold to be true and is not a part of atheism itself, your claim that they reject it because of their atheism is wrong. Atheism, in itself may be a condition upon which rejection of moral objectivism is premised, but it alone is not necessary and sufficient for rejection of moral objectivism. So you were simply wrong in premising their rejection of moral objectivism upon their atheism. And your parenthetical that whether atheism and moral objectivism can be reconciled is not the point there was in fact the point because by claiming that atheism itself was the cause of these atheist's rejection of moral realism, you were implicitly claiming that it could not be reconciled with their atheism, because if it can be reconciled with their atheism, then those atheist's rejection of moral objectivism is premised upon a false belief, that moral objectivism requires God, and it is that false belief which informs their rejection of moral objectivism, not their atheism. (It's trivially true that anything in combination with a false belief can reach any desired conclusion, so the fact that this false belief employs atheism in reaching its conclusion gets you nothing as you could prove anything that way.)

(You also make the same mistake in responding to poca just now when you say, "The only reason why I should not believe it exists, is based on presupposition that such a reality can’t exist, so I need to find some excuse to dismiss it, or claim it’s not real. It’s dictated by your atheism, and you just fail to acknowledge it." As pointed out already, unless it's a necessary fact of atheism that atheism dictates its rejection, then it isn't atheism that dictates its rejection.)

I noticed that you snipped my quote of you saying that the existence of other minds was self evident. Probably a wise move. Nonetheless, I would like to know exactly what evidence you have that other minds exist such that you think it is self evident that they do. Since you analogize the self evidence of the existence of other minds to the self evidence of objective morals, if the existence of other minds is not self evident, then by analogy, neither is the existence of objective morals. So, please, demonstrate that the existence of other minds is self evident.