Free Will Debate

[polymath257]

I have no idea, it's a good question.  Nevertheless, instrumental to the concept of a free will..as opposed to a local will, or just a will - fullstop.....is the idea that we are meaningfully outside of the clockwork universe.  That, even if you were the same, and all things were the same, the issue of choosing a or b fundamentally hinges on a you free of that empowered to and capable of going down either causal path.

The conflict between the apparent ultimate impossibility of the existence of any will on the one hand, and the apparent benefit of assigning responsibility based on pretension of the existence of a free will on the other, require much more sophisticated assessment than it seems to generally be given.

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Why would I make a different decision if *I* am exactly the same and *everything* else is also exactly the same?

The question is not why would you, but could you.

If I *could*, but never *do*, is it really possible?

I'm not even sure how to make sense of the phrase 'I could do different than I actually did'. If I run the scenario several times, then I am different each time, so I don't expect to make the same decision. But a singular event, I don't know what it even means to say it 'could' be different.

In what way is it 'possible'?

And if I am not involved through my beliefs, desires, etc, in what way is it *my* choice?

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Why would I make a different decision if *I* am exactly the same and *everything* else is also exactly the same?

I have no idea, it's a good question.  Nevertheless, instrumental to the concept of a free will..as opposed to a local will, or just a will - fullstop.....is the idea that we are meaningfully outside of the clockwork universe.  That, even if you were the same, and all things were the same, the issue of choosing a or b fundamentally hinges on a you free of that empowered to and capable of going down either causal path.

So it really is an example of an uncaused cause?