Russia and Ukraine

[The Grand Nudger]

It's the difference between applying combat power at the point of contact, and applying mobility to decide the point of contact.

The organic logistical resources for a Russian division are paltry enough that without combat, they can expect to move maybe 150 miles off the railhead/jump-off before having to pause or regroup. Without combat. Once they apply their artillery, which is a major part of their ground doctrine, that mileage shrinks.

Here's a detailed look at the issues the RF Army has with organic transport. It's in the context of a Russian invasion of NATO, granted, but it still presents problems in the face of the determined Ukrainian defense we've seen, and bears reading. If you find the time to do so, I'd sure appreciate your ground-pounder's opinion on the points it makes. Its summation:

The Russian army will be hard-pressed to conduct a ground offensive of more than 90 miles beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union without a logistics pause. For NATO, it means it can worry less about a major Russian invasion of the Baltic states or Poland and a greater focus on exploiting Russian logistic challenges by drawing Russian forces further away from their supply depots and targeting chokepoints in the Russian logistic infrastructure and logistic force in general. It also means that Russia is more likely to seize small parts of enemy territory under its logistically sustainable range of 90 miles rather than a major invasion as part of a fait accompli strategy.

From the Russian perspective, it does not appear that they are building their logistic forces with fait accompli or blitzkrieg across Poland in mind. Instead, the Russian government has built an ideal army for their strategy of “Active Defense.” The Russian government has built armed forces highly capable of fighting on home soil or near its frontier and striking deep with long-range fires. However, they are not capable of a sustained ground offensive far beyond Russian railroads without a major logistical halt or a massive mobilization of reserves.

Good read.  

From a ground pounders perspective, the way that russia has been trying (and apparently failing) to solve those problems is a dream come true.  Even with a halt they seem ineffective, as that convoy sitting on the road made clear for these many weeks.

Say they managed to solve that basic challenge of getting enough trucks (which they appear to be trying to do by seizing vehicles at buy here pay here lots......) - there's still the issue of inexperienced armor crews trying to turn out and run from close infantry ambush as they lead those formations down skinny roads - that ends in tears and broken metal and no supplies delivered.  Of russian infantry being too busy looting commandeered civilian homes to properly support their armor that ends up destroyed or abandoned in a field worth precisely jack shit being towed by fierce ukrainian..checks notes...farm tractors.  Of the complete lack of close air support.....which blows my fucking mind.    

I was completely wrong in my expectations at the outset - but, in fairness, I'd been told a whole bunch of shit about russian equipment and soldiers and tactics that may have been representative of the russian forces sometime in the 90's when it was all put together...but it's clear that -that- russian army can be found nowhere on the battlefield in ukraine.  I could have saved myself trouble typing much of this by saying that from a ground pounders perspective, russian forces..operating the way they have been... are a loot pinata at a murder party. That shit makes mech infantry rock hard.