Finally an atheist proper, with views and questions

[The Grand Nudger]

So for me the strong form of error theory is what I currently hold to whereby a) moral talk makes claims about mind-indendent normative properties, b) no such properties exist, therefore c) all moral claims are in error. I don't think that necessitates abolitionism whereby we aim to jettison all moral talk at the minimum, and all moral thinking at the most. I think that moral thinking has been hugely helpful in the development of societies, so would favour a more conservationism approach.. I am currently working through the book "The End of Morality: Taking Moral Abolitionism Seriously". It lays out a number of different views to the "what now" question that are fun to tackle with

Re. your arson and gift giving question. Denying that moral properties as described above exist doesn't mean that I don't have strong views one way or the other. I believe arson isn't morally bad, but that doesn't entail that it means I think it is morally good or acceptable either (not suggesting you were saying that, but felt it needed saying). I have the same emotional reaction to people being injured, or property of people being damaged as the next man, and for me that suffices for me to criticise, prevent, punish etc. It would damage people and society if we let that happen, and I happen to not want such damage to society or people to occur.

IDK.  On the one hand, a moral realist might tell you that the properties that make arson...arson..are the same properties that make it bad, and it would be hard to sell the notion that the burning building was mind-dependent.  Then, on another hand - most metaethical theories don't require or claim that normative properties are mind-independent at all, so even if we were willing to say that normative properties were all mind dependent that fails to address quite a bit of the moral field.  Subjective, relative, and even noncognitivist moral theories can't be in error on account of there being no mind-independent normative properties.

Your emotional reactions are noncognitivist, your societal justifications are relativist, your wants are subjectivist.    

Error theory to moral properties is often regarded as similar to atheism towards gods. If I say a) claims about god are claims about mind-independent facts b) gods do not exist, therefore, c) all claims are in error it helps to see the analogy. To say that god loves people is in error is not to say that god does not love people. It is to deny that there is anything to do the loving. Similar, to claim that god is good would be in error, but that is not to say that therefore god is bad. Some great discussion of this in the book "A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory"

Questions about companions in guilt arguments are intriguing at the moment. I have Terence Cuneo's "Normative Web" lined up to read, and also Cowie and Rowland's "Companions in Guilt: Arguments in Metaethics". Current reading on epistemic error theory isn't a convincing parallel to me, although some do lean into that such as Bart Streumer in his "Unbelievable Errors"

Sounds like you're nerding out, good stuff.  Considering the above, it looks to me like you're crafting a narrow and open argument against moral realism, but could only mount a semantic argument with respect to noncognitivism, subjectivism, and relativism?  As in, moral realists are actually in error - the others are poor communicators if or when they express such moral properties as though they were realist ones?