Natural Evil

[Ryft]

I would dispute your accusation of creating a straw man because the quote is in context of your assertion that God is both omnipresent and [not] existentially part of creation when it comes to causation of pain and suffering (which is what we're discussing).

You need to give due consideration to the words that I use, for I try to choose them quite carefully—such as the word "existentially," by which I draw out the distinction that "God exists transcendentally but is active right in the middle of both prosperity and calamity." In other words, God is not ignorant of, perplexed by, or powerless in the face of human pain and suffering because, as he reveals throughout the Bible—which I provided you some examples of—he is ultimately in control of it all. But, again, "His existence apart from the universe does not preclude his control of and activity within the universe" (emphasis added). That is why your suggestion (Msg. 67) that God could be "detached from the causes" of pain and suffering sets up a straw man; such a suggestion posits a God different from or weaker than the one revealed in Scripture, who is not detached from the causes.

He either is part of the causation or he is not—and, frankly, equivocation on the matter that he can be both doesn't wash. ... There simply is no room for prevarication on the matter. He is either [fully] responsible, partly responsible, or not responsible.

I can only assume that you began responding to my post without first reading it completely, since I argued quite unequivocally that God is in control of both the good and the bad (humanly speaking, as you say), whether deliverance or judgment, peace or calamity, harvest or famine and so on. Nothing happens apart from the providence of God's will and purpose. "Are you saying that, yes, God is responsible for pain and suffering?" I am not sure how someone could read my responses and draw any other conclusion. When I cite biblical passages that state in very black-and-white terms that God is in control of it all, it is baffling how you could think that I have failed to communicate my position on the matter.

You [identified] falsely the question "where" is God (when it comes to pain and suffering) as a locational question and dismissed it as irrelevant ...

First, it is unfair to say that I did so "falsely," as if I knew what you really meant but tried to pretend you meant something different. Rather, it would be fair to say that I did not understand your meaning rightly and was therefore mistaken (e.g., "You identified mistakenly the question...")—although I think I understand your meaning now, given how you have subsequently fleshed it out. Second, I did not dismiss it as "irrelevant" but as incoherent, since God cannot be tied to spatial coordinates (which was, again, an apparent misunderstanding of your meaning).

Given [our] human perspective, what is God's role in inflicting unnecessary pain and suffering upon mankind, when he is in a position to prevent such things?

This commits the loaded question fallacy, akin to asking, "When did you stop beating your wife?" Just as that question first assumes that I had beaten my wife at all and then asks when I stopped, so your question assumes that "unnecessary" or gratuitous pain and suffering exists and then asks what God's role in it might be. What I am doing is hitting the brakes on your question and raising a red flag over the assumption built into it. Since I had agreed that the fire does not happen apart from God's sovereign will, it is incoherent to suppose that he would prevent it or question-begging to suppose that it was gratuitous (unwarranted or purposeless). You cannot ask me to concede the debate prior to engaging it. I dispute that gratuitous evil or suffering is even possible, much less that it exists, just as I would dispute that I have ever beaten my wife. In order to ask about God's role in X, you must first establish that X exists or is even possible—for it would be utterly meaningless to ask about God's role in something that does not and cannot exist.

I am going to "appeal to emotion" again ...

I wish that you would not, since that is fallacious and thereby fails to address the question at issue. (It is also troubling to think that you would persist in a fallacy after has been identified and explained.)

The quoted biblical references speak of incidents which reveal a purpose for God's actions. But in cases where we can see no reasonable purpose for the infliction of pain and suffering, which are beyond human ability to avoid, what is your position on his reasoning?

First, the Bible is clear in its theology about the nature of God, sometimes describing in perspicuous black-and-white terms that he is in control of it all, that nothing happens apart from his will, and that he works out all things according to the purpose of his will. And then on top of that the Bible provides some unequivocal examples of those very truths in action (such as the case of Sennacherib). Therefore we are provided sufficient reason to trust God in circumstances where he has not explained himself.

Second, there is an analogy in how I would raise my children. I not only make it clear to them that there is a purpose behind the things I do, even if they do not know or understand it at the time, but also in certain cases I do take the time to explain to them what the purpose was. Consequently (just as I would tell them) they have sufficient reason to trust me in circumstances where I do not explain myself; and sometimes that trust is of life-or-death importance.

Third, just because they do not know what my purpose is in some circumstance, it does not follow that there is no purpose; for example, this could be a case where I simply did not tell them what it is. This is the very same point I made to you about God, that ignorance about the purpose for X does not establish that it has none. (Arguments from ignorance are invalid.)

So what is my position on his reason or purpose? That there is good reason to trust that he has one, and no reason to think that he doesn't.

... many things appear gratuitous.

Indeed. But the skeptic would ask himself, "Does the fact that it appears gratuitous mean that it actually is gratuitous?" And the answer is no, of course. Just because something appears to be the case that does not somehow mean it actually is the case.

[Assuming the existence of God as we are], we must bear in mind that we are expected to worship this deity.

That is a related but separate issue from the one we are discussing. Let us finish this one before tracking its related tangents.

If God is not morally responsible, then morality is a relative matter rather than objective.

Non sequitur. From the fact that there is no one to whom God can even be morally responsible, it simply does not follow that therefore morality is relative.

We may claim that whatever God does is inherently moral ...

I am not sure who "we" refers to here, but if someone claimed that then I would dispute it—as I did in my previous post: "That assumes a moral order above God to which his nature and character conforms," whether inherently or otherwise, which "begs the question against God being ‘the objective source of moral goodness’."

... which makes the comparison to [the immovable object and irresistible force] contradiction a false analogy, since neither the immovable nor the irresistible can experience being moved or resisted from their perspective ...

No, sir. They are mutually exclusive. Surely you understand what that means. In other words: (1) If an immovable object is a given, then an irresistable force is logically impossible. (2) If an irresistable force is a given, then an immovable object is logically impossible. This is analogous to our discussion, and it plays out like this: (3) If gratuitous evil is a given, then God is logically impossible. (4) If God is a given, then gratuitous evil is logically impossible. (This is due to the very nature of the God that is being discussed, who is self-existent [aseity], holy, sovereign, eternal, actus purus, omnipotent, omniscient, etc.)

Your argument does nothing to deflect the apparent lack of necessity to these actions.

This is the ignoratio elenchi fallacy, since I have indeed provided sufficient reason to think it is not gratuitous—from the fact that God is in control of everything and that nothing happens apart from his will to examples where God had chosen to reveal his purpose in select cases (in order for people to trust that he is in control of everything and that nothing happens apart from his will). Moreover, I have confronted your every objection to the contrary and carefully explained why they failed to make your case, not least of which is the complete absence of any proof that pain and suffering is gratuitous—not appears gratuitous, but actually is gratuitous. And I could not have made your task any easier when I said that "God" and "gratuitous evil" are mutually exclusive: you need only prove a single case of gratuitous evil or suffering and I lose the debate.

Shifting the burden of proof much?

You said, "If God is able but not willing, then the failure to act is considered malicious" (Msg. 67). But that is an incomplete sentence, as I indicated in my response: "If God is able but not willing... to what?" You did not finish that sentence. Given the context of our discussion, I assumed you meant "to prevent some gratuitous evil or suffering." And in case that is what you meant, I pointed out that it "[assumes] the very thing to be proved (that gratuitous evil or suffering exists at all)." In order to ask about God's ability and willingness to prevent X, you must prove that X even exists. Why? Because if X does not exist, then there is nothing for God to prevent.

This is not a case of me burden-shifting, but of me asking you to complete your sentence—carefully.

I would like you to clarify your position that [pain and suffering] doesn't exist ...

My argument does not deny that human pain and suffering exists, sir. It denies that it is ever gratuitous. And I grant that pain and suffering may appear gratuitous, but the issue is not about whether it appears gratuitous or not—which it obviously can and does—but whether it actually is gratuitous or not.

God has a purpose for it. Fine. We do not know this purpose. Fine. These concepts themselves must be then be established—validly—before an answer can be provided. You are skipping to the conclusion without a valid proposal that your axioms are indeed true.

What axioms?

Let me simplify your argument: "God can do what he likes because he is God. Deal with it."

Yes.

"Moral quality" is defined relatively by the recipient of action X, not objectively ...

That follows from your world view, perhaps, but this discussion regards the biblical world view.