Soldiers life threatened by his own side.

[liam]

I start with nothing. I then assume that personal happiness is worth pursuing. Now, I can give you reasons why I assume this, why I think this particular assumption is a good one to make, and how a personal (or "selfish") value of happiness doesn't necessitate a parasitic / dystopian society (which I will as it becomes necessary), but ultimately I can't support it without appealing to something else which also ultimately rests upon an assumption or is in some way circular / question begging. So far as I can tell, the assumed value of personal happiness is the only assumption my moral philosophy makes - all other criteria / values are derived from this assumption.

While my concept of right is drawn from a partially asserted value, there is no moral theory that is not. My assertions are merely that life is so valuable (assertion 1: Life is valuable) that it deserves some inviolable rights (assertion 2: Rights are needed) and acts. Yet again, yours also requires certain assertions: 
-Assertion 1: Happiness is good
-Assertion 2: The many deserve more consideration than the few
-Assertion 3: The consequences of an action should determine whether the act is good or not (while it may be claimed that my argument asserts that the act is what should determine the act's morality. However, it rather asserts that the act may be good or bad, this is no assertion in this, to say that "X is good/bad because of the moral value of X" requires no assertion, it is self-evident, whereas "X is good/bad because of it's moral value derived from it's congruence with Y" implicates Y and the assertion that Y itself is a good thing to be congruent to.)
-Assertion 4: The outcomes that are expected will be those that result from any action
-Assertion 4.1: The outcomes that I expect will be those which produce most Y and least -Y
-Assertion 5: There is an absolute that states that 'we cannot act contrary to the greatest production of happiness'

These assertions do not necessitate the value of consequential actions and they certainly do not disprove it, but rather call it into question. Furthermore, and this is a matter of personal curiosity, how would you handle a situation whereby two exact amounts of hapiness are in conflict, whereby the two potential benefactors from any decision would benefit and suffer in equal proportions? Would this require naught but random guesswork? thanks

One of your assumptions seems to be that humans have natural rights. This, to me, is a poor assumption. Firstly, what is a natural right and how do we know it exists? Secondly, it's natural? Does that mean it's respected in the natural world (i.e. in the wild)? Humans, in the natural world, are no more valued or respected than any other animal and are killed, eaten, ignored, and fled from in the same manner as other animals. If a natural right doesn't cause you to be treated differently from anything else in the natural world then what is the point of it to begin with? I'd contend rights are granted by society, not adopted from the natural world. If you say it's the natural order of things not to be harmed, then I say you're delusional - you'd be quickly dispelled of this notion after being dropped in the middle of an ocean, desert or jungle. Both our values (happiness and natural rights) are assumed, however, they're not equal; my assumed value, happiness, actually exists whereas I see no reason to believe in a natural right to be assumed valuable in the first place.

Perhaps it would be time for me to adjust my position slightly in terms of rights, this is not to be confused with abandoning it but intrinsic right seems somewhat harder to prove than i initially imagined. But first I must address your claims.
That I state that there is a 'natural right' is to say that it is derived from the nature of man, not to say that it is the right given in natural situations. I would agree that they are drawn, in some sense, from normative attitudes, but rather feel that these rights are drawn from the society and are therefore not subject to relativism of any kind. That we exist in society necessitates the rights that are necessary to maintain society and those within it, to best serve society there must be certain rights ascribed to each member which it is impermissible to violate.

Despite how you have understood what I said, I would not posit that rights come from nature in the sense of the natural world but rather the natural intrinsic value of life and thought. These are the most precious things that we have or know of and so we should, as we do with other precious things, protect them from harm. This may seem an abstract classification of right but because of what life is (i.e- the 'nature' of life, from whence my meaning of 'natural right' stems, my apologies for any misunderstanding ) we have an obligation to protect it. While this may rest on certain assertions, I would argue that the value of sentient life is true because it is rare, valuable (in terms of knowledge, emotion, protection itself etc.) and it is reflexively the very essence of the universe itself. Perhaps I am naively claiming that sentient life (and rather knowledge, reason and understanding more specifically) is important but there seems to me to be nothing else of intrinsic value in the universe and the condition of rationality and consciousness must be allowed to exist, thus to preserve this, from either a consequential or absolutist perspective, we must grant onto these things an absolute right.


Thank you for the debate so far, whilst it has been heated it has been very productive and my movement towards the social base of right seems testament to that. Here's to hoping it continues