Isn't the fine tuning argument ad hoc?

[Mister Agenda]

Well, I'd like to point out that the proposed multiverse solution to the Fine-tuning argument is contrary to Occam's Razor, i.e it is multiplying entities beyond necessity, and in this case, potentially to an infinite degree.

I myself am only just beginning to get acquainted with the relevant science on the matter. In my thread on this (over in the philosophy section), Apopgenia said something interesting along the lines of that a major assumption is that the "constants" of our universe are unlikely, shen it isn't even sure how that can be known or assessed in the first place.

To the best of my knowledge, multiple universes were not originally propsed as a solution to fine-tuning, multiple universes would be a consequence if certain other physics hypotheses turn out to be true. In that case, multiple universes would be a simpler explanation than whatever would be needed to explain why the hypothesis is true but the logical consequences of it are not.

---

I don't know TEG. To me the question is more philosophical. How can there be any order at all, not just this particular example?

Throw a handful of nickels, there's a chance they'll all land heads up: that's an orderly pattern. For them NEVER to land all heads up would also be an orderly pattern. Order is a natural consequence of chaos. A complete absence of order would be a paradox, because that would be a form of order in itself. If you can always bet 'whatever happens, it won't be orderly!' and win, you've got a sure thing...and that's a form of order.

---

I meant as in comparison to the God hypothesis. If you had to choose between (a) the multiverse theory or (b) the God hypothesis, which of the two would be the simplest explanation? It would be (a) of course because it's more consistent with reality as we understand it.

Actually, the simplest explanation would be God in that case. That was the point of my post: if you posit the multiverse hypothesis, then you're going against Occam's Razor to potentially an infinite degree. Occam's Razor just has to do with which hypothesis accounts for the data least redundantly, not which is more consistent with reality as we usually understand it (i.e naturally rather than supernaturally).

Occam's razor is only violated if you multiply entities unneccessarily. One of the problems with God as a hypothesis is that it doesn't actually explain anything, so it's always unnecessary.

In the case of multiple universes, IF the constants could be much different than they are, we didn't beat the odds, there are so many universes that no matter how small the chance, some of them can allow life and we're in one of those.

In the case of an omnipotent God, the constants could be anything that God felt like and it could still support life, because an omnipotent being could have us live on the surface of black holes if it wanted. Only a universe in which life could arise naturally is a God-like power necessary as an explanation. Plus, multiple universes are still not unlikely in this scenario...why would this being only create one uinverse?

A less-than-omnipotent God might be a more parsimonious explanation than multiple universes except...we have no basis to presume that the universe is singular. I'm not aware of ANY natural explanation for our universe where the physics entails that there be only one. If we live in an eternal cyclic universe, there could be others. If we live in a universe caused by a quantum fluctuation, universes could 'happen' all the time. We don't know if there are multiple universes, but we are justified in saying that we know that there could be. We know it's possible, that it doesn't violate what we know of the laws of physics. We aren't justified in saying we know there could be an ultrapowerful being that made only one universe and we have no physics that suggests such a being is possible.

---

WHAT? God is LESS parsimonious than an infinite number of universes? -_- Come on.

From this statement I must conclude that you're using a non-standard definition of God without ANY of the infinite properties usually ascribed to it...a multiverse with infinute universes has only two infinite properties: the number of universes and future time if they never cease to exist entirely, which they seem not to (I'll leave aside that the number of universes in a multiverse doesn't have to be infinite as an explanation for supposed fine-tuning, as many universes as there are planets in our universe should be plenty).

Please give a more detailed description of the finite God you're referring to so we can better evaluate if it's more parsimonious than multiple universes as an explanation. It's hard to conceive why even a finite God would ever only create one universe...the math suggests we could make one in the right kind of supercollider, and I doulbt we'd stop at one once we figured out how to do it. A 'god' like that would also need an explanation for it's existence; it can't be one of those 'ground of all being' versions of God if it's defined as completely finite.