RE: The Free Will Defense - Isn't it Unusable?
August 25, 2013 at 1:15 am
(This post was last modified: August 25, 2013 at 1:20 am by genkaus.)
(August 23, 2013 at 3:58 pm)MindForgedManacle Wrote: The Free-will Defense to the problem of evil can, I believe, be simply summarized as saying that the explanation for a benevolent, all-powerful and perfect god allowing for evil/suffering to exist in his creation is that [libertarian] free will is something so good that keeping it intact is necessary for said deity, even though it allows for agents to possibly do evil. There are some problems with this for theists I think, that I'd like to see them answer.
Firstly, I'd like to know how libertarian free will is such a high good. To clarify, proponents of this apologetic heavily imply this since the whole purported reason for evil existing is to allow for the preservation of free will. Anyhow, there doesn't seem - on the face of it - to be anything about libertarian free will that "makes" it good in the way that other things can be said to be (making people happy, preventing harm, etc.). The only response that seems to make come close to making sense is to say that it safeguards moral blameworthyness/praise. But that would seem to clash with the orthodox belief that all praise and glory is to be to God. Or rather, all it seems to say is that it is so that God can get himself praised by his creations.
Another thing is that under libertarian free will, you can be inclined without being necessitated. And yet according to a literal reading of Genesis (which seems a widespread view) Adam and Eve were so easily swayed by the serpent into disobeying God. If God had wanted us to truly not sin, could he not simply have inclined us not to sin or disobey him, or made the first 2 humans be so inclined (but not necessitated) to listen to him over all others? If the answer is no, then that's tantamount to determinism (i.e all humans would have eaten the forbidden fruit), which contradicts the above.
I think these needs defending.
Lastly, - and I think this is the biggest issue - the libertarian concept of free will doesn't have a tenable or coherent formulation (currently). This is I think reflected in the fact that under 14% of philosophers subscribe to it, versus say compatibilusm's ~60%. Even Robert Kane, who's thought to have given a clever whack at working it out, isn't convinced of his attempt and sustained heavy critique by the likes of Dennett.
So if there isn't a coherent formulation of libertarian free will, then theists cannot use the Free will defense, yes? Sorry for the length. o3o
This is more of a critique of your argument rather than a reply.
First of all, you seem to be equating evil with suffering. An understandable mistake - considering theists often equate omni-benevolent with all good. Suffering among humans can have many causes, from our physiological make-up to large-scale natural disasters. Of those only agent-caused suffering can be conceivably regarded as evil. Regarding an earthquake or disease as an act of evil would be plain insane.
I would regard the "problem of suffering" as a greater argument against theology than the "problem of evil". If "good" is defined as something according to god's will, "evil" as something against it, "free-will" as will independent of god's will - then free-will would be a sufficient explanation for existence of evil. Basically, the argument is "free-will is good because god wants it, but a logical result of it would be the possibility of existence of evil". Regardless of all the other logical gymnastics to justify why god's will should be considered good or why should we consider that as free-will, this part of the argument remains valid.
The problem of suffering is more difficult to answer. God's omnibenevolence also presumes that he does not want you to suffer (one reason why suffering is often regarded as evil). Being omnipotent (and ignoring why that in itself would be illogical), he should be capable of negating suffering without negating the free-will. Compare it to the political concept of freedom. Even though you are free to attempt murdering someone, the government will try to stop you. While your will to murder has not been violated even if your actions have not been realized. At the very least all the non-agency induced suffering should not exist at all. The explanation given by theists for this is either to somehow blame human agents for the suffering (however convoluted or illogical that may be) or to somehow glorify suffering by calling it "for the greater good" (which renders their god a sadistic megalomaniac on a whole another level).
Finally, regarding the issue of why free-will is considered good - and for this part, the existence of god is irrelevant as is the actual existence of free-will. Assume for now that we consider happiness and joy to be good and pain and suffering to be evil. The fact of human psychology is that a great part of our happiness is tied to our sense of self-worth and pride. The idea of being responsible for our own actions - actions which may not necessarily lead to happiness themselves - itself adds a whole new dimension of happiness to our psyche. On the flip-side, it adds a whole new dimension of suffering through guilt and shame. Which is why regardless of there being a god, the idea of having free-will is considered good - with good meaning conducive to one's happiness.
(August 24, 2013 at 7:51 am)discipulus Wrote: I however, see no logical contradiction in the propositions: "God exists" and "evil exists".
Me neither. But then, I regard your god as especially evil.
(August 24, 2013 at 2:33 pm)MindForgedManacle Wrote: I think a more powerful and explicit formulation would be along the lines of:
P1) God is omnibenevolent, omnipotent and omniscient.
P2) God's actions are in line with and a reflection of his nature.
P3) God created the universe.
P4) The universe contains evil, and evil is not a reflection of God's nature.
C) ?
Whether or not that entails a contradiction is hard for me to say. This is the sort of issue the Free-will Defense is supposed to guard against I think, which I don't think works (hence the thread :p).
Its hard to say because of P1 and P2. You have defined god's nature as self-contradictory and then you ask if a non-contradictory conclusion can be drawn from those premises.
