The problem of evil revisited.

[Angrboda]

This whole argument is also premised on the assumption that suffering builds character. While this is a commonly held platitude, there seems little evidence that in general, suffering builds more character than it destroys. In particular, Jonathan Haidt notes that adversity only appears to be beneficial to certain character types and at certain stages of life; for all others, the suffering is purely gratuitous, or worse.

---

This excerpt is based on a defense that evil serves to warn people away from immoral conduct, but the same could readily apply to 'character building'.

...If we must suffer as a warning from God, we would expect it to far more clear. Most people who suffer have no idea that it is part of a warning from God. Indeed, the whole question of whether evil is a warning is far from certain among theists. We would expect God to communicate His purposes to the sufferers of a natural disaster. He could easily do this through dreams, religious experiences or by writing it in holy books. For example, it could have been clearly stated in the Bible that the purpose of hurricanes is to remind people that they must commit less sin. Alternatively, the survivors of a hurricane could have dreams that inform them that the purpose of the hurricane was to help them to mend their ways.

. . . . .

The theodicy runs up against problems at (d). Unwitnessed suffering of very young children does not appear to warn anyone of anything.

At point (e) we note that the theodicy is incapable of explaining the geographical variations in human suffering. For example, it is uncontroversial that an inhabitant of Bangladesh is far more likely to experience suffering (e.g. due to flooding) than a randomly chosen human elsewhere in the world. There is surely a possible world where suffering is distributed approximately evenly, giving everyone a chance to experience it first hand. Undoubtedly, learning about severe suffering and death (e.g. by TV news) may act to warn people to some extent, but it would seem reasonable that first hand experience of suffering is far more likely to effectively warn people. As a result, it seems that we can only make sense of the theodicy if we make the implausible assumption that the inhabitants of Bangladesh need far more warning than the average human.

Finally, referring to (f), it appears that the theodicy has dubious ethical consequences. When people work towards reducing human misery, their actions make the implicit assumption that such suffering serves no worthwhile purpose. Given that God is trying to warn people by causing them suffering, it is not at all clear that we should act to help people. For example, it seems that we would be directly opposing God's wishes if we give the casualty of a natural disaster some pain killing drugs before he experiences any significant suffering. To be in line with God's wishes, we should first allow the victim to receive a warning by suffering somewhat. Since this is absurd, we have good reason to doubt the plausibility of the theodicy.

The Evidential Argument from Evil, Nicholas Tattersall

And finally, if suffering builds character, and character leads to reward, is this not a prescription for seeking out suffering?