Theists, What Do You Get Out of Religion?

[Mister Agenda]

When alternatives result in paradoxes and unsolvable dilemmas that means the proposed solutions are inadequate, incomplete, or down right false. The first alternative is that neither the thermostat nor the cheetah engage in goal-seeking behavior. The second alternative is that both the thermostat and the cheetah engage in goal-seeking behavior.
The first alternative posits that the cheetah is without intention. Anyone, but the most strident eliminative materialist, can see that that is false.
The second is false because it attributes mental properties to the thermostat. A panpsychist would argue that this may not be entirely false. And I am open to considering this a real possibility, but the current state of that theory is very inadequate.
The solution to the problem lies in recognizing the difference between essential and accidental properties. The goal-seeking behavior of the cheetah is an essential part of being a cheetah because the final end of any living thing is to live and thrive. It could not do if intentional behavior were removed. In contrast to this, the function of any artifact, like a thermostat is an accidental property of its composition. Any apparent goal-seeking behavior by the thermostat is derived from a person that has an intended goal in actuality.

You left out the part where you demonstrate that an ontological naturalist cannot ascribe intention to the cheetah and not to the thermostat. And that seems to be a very peculiar use of the term 'accidental property' when talking about thermostats, since 'seeking' a particular temperature is an intended property, but you do not seem confused on the issue otherwise.

Really? LOL! It should be obvious. What is the meaning of a rock? Or a waterfall? Or a caterpillar?

It depends on the person ascribing the meaning. Those things (and pretty much anything) can mean different things to different people.

The meaning of things come from recognition of the ideas they instantiate or some correspondence with those ideas. To understand this, you must know a little something about the problem of universals, as conceived by Plato, refined by Aristotle, and perfected by the Schoolmen. Plato observed that part of what allows us to identify universals from particulars is that the particulars, to greater and lesser degrees, all manifest the same form. But Plato imagined these as forms as distinct entities, which was problematic for several reasons, primarily because forms multiply without restraint. Aristotle observed that forms, while real, don’t float around in some separate realm, but are always embodied. While this was an improvement, comparison between particulars to determine a common form is only really possible by referring to an infinite series of super-universals above the universals. The Scholastic solution accepts that forms are embodied but that the intellect perceives the idea of the form by means of abstraction. However the idea of a form must exist in potential before it can be actually manifest in the intellect. In order for something to move from potential to actuality it must do so by means of something already in act. Thus the idea must exist in full actuality. And since God is the only being that is fully in act, the perfect form of any idea must already be in His intellect.

And if a person is not a Platonist, this is not persuasive at all.

Duh! I said as much earlier. What is at issue is why we have that capacity. Having that capacity is inconsistent with ontological naturalism.

That's an assertion. I see no reason why ontological naturalism would keep people from assigning meaning to things. What is it in onotologial naturalism that requires people assigning meaning to be a paradox?

You say that for the ontological naturalist the apparent intentional behavior of human beings is an illusion, but that does not seem to be a necessary consequence. It sounds like you are conflating it with the position that there is no such thing as free will.

I can see your point. Determinism logically follows if the physical universe is causally closed. That leaves no obvious demarcation points for the ?

Quantum mechanics allows for effects without causes, so the universe does not seem to be 'causally closed' or entirely determined. Nothing happens to a particle to cause it to decay. Nothing happens at planck distances to cause virtual particles to appear. Indeterminacy is the why, but not the cause.

It seems to be a pattern of yours that when someone holds a position that you have trouble parsing, you always conclude that they are contradicting their own position rather than considering that you may not fully understand their position.

That is always a possibility. If so, I only do so when the topic is the mind-body connection, and I like to believe I have a pretty good grasp of the main theories. The reverse is much more likely. I make constant reference to and use the terms of neo-Scholastic philosophy, which is, as you say, hard to parse.

Not to mention, only convincing to someone who buys into neo-Scholastic philosophy. Maybe you should start a thread to educate and persuade us that it is valid before trying to convince us of the conclusions to which it leads you.