Hello, Anyone interested in a debate?

[Angrboda]

I would content that Aristotle uses this view as the foundation of an argument to determine objective truth (including moral objective truth).

As written by me:

Aristotle attempts to resolve the imperfectus sensus through universalia in rebus; stating there are given universal perfections all particulars must essentially share in order to be part of some particular or universal set.  This may be said to be the reasonable deduction of Aristotle regarding the sentiment of imperfection.  If every particular is particularly perfect then it stands to reason that universal perfection may simply be the universally present particular perfections of any set of particulars or universals. ... Aristotle deduces essential universal perfection is inherent to the particulars in question and are to be determined by experience as the universal particular perfections for any given set of particulars or universals; hence as the experience of any particular or universal set of universally shared particular perfections approaches infinity the knowledge of universal perfection approaches certainty and the imperfectus sensus approaches zero.

(bold mine)

As noted in the analogy to science, we never have a universal set of particulars, so we are left assuming the particulars are representative of the whole.  In the case of actual moralities, there aren't sufficient number to presume representativeness; each morality is divergent in its particulars.  Aristotle may presume, but as in science, presumption of perfection in particulars fails to prevent you from falling into error by relying on those particulars.  We saw it with Galen's medical treatises, with Ptolemaic cosmology, with Newtonian physics — the reality is that you cannot guarantee a glimpse at what is hidden underneath simply by presuming you have a set of trustworthy views.  That's begging the question.  

That point is this, that if there is an objective morality then that morality is fixed and can be known in spite of the varying perceptions of individual subjects.

Where I would say the objective morality may be determined is not in spite of the varying perceptions of individual subjects, but by combination/relation of the individual subject observations.  This logic becomes apparent in an unanticipated observation by an individual.  You see an object floating in the air that to your experience should not float, immediate response is to change medium and perspective of the object.  You feel around it, walk around it, check if other observers feel and see the same thing.  (indeed most magic tricks or slight of hand limit your opportunities to utilized variable means or orientations of observation.)  Thereby it is not dependent on argumentum ad populum.  Since the observations may be made by a single subject so long as they are of variable means and orientation they will begin to approach objectivity.

Needless to say someone will say that a single observer viewing by variable means or orientation will not overcome observer bias (which is funny since that is considered the primary way to overcome observer bias).  While I do not think such is the case I am willing to consider it and make resolution by saying let us vary the observer as well (though it is not necessary so long as we sufficiently vary means and orientation of observation).

How does an individual get multiple views as to whether some specific moral fact is truth?  Do they not only have their own moral judgement to fall back on?  That's getting back to individual morals being 'composited' by them voting with their own particular sense of morality as being the only perspective they can contribute.  Again, the question is "how do we test" that a given moral hypothesis belongs to objective morality or not?  In the end, the only test is our individual judgement about the truth or falsity of the moral hypothesis.  We don't have multiple personalities that we can look at tentative moral facts with multiple perspectives.  The only test is the assent or dissent from the hypothesis; that leads us right back into morality simply being a matter of counting heads, which is the relativism you're trying to avoid.

In short realism gives credibility to subjective observations by stating those observations are of limited views of an independent object and reflect truth in part though not truth overall.  Similarly subjective moral truths are given credibility due to them being limited representations of the objective moral truth, though they do not capture that truth in total.  Certainty (or objectivity) of moral truth is then facilitated by the consideration of subjective moral truth under variable means, orientations, and observers.

The problem here is one familiar in science, namely the underdetermination of theory.  If you postulate that a set of moral truths is only imperfectly representative of the hidden reality, how do you determine which of the set is truly reflective of the reality, and which part of it is in error?  Do we simply take the intersection of all moral views and call that our set of hidden truths?  How do we know any better to trust the intersection rather than the differences?  Surely this is no way to arrive at objective moral truth.  More importantly, it obfuscates the reason why an objective moral fact is moral.  Am I not to kill because it angers God, or because it incurs bad karma, because it is contrary to my sense of empathy, because living persons have inalienable rights?  How do I determine why what is immoral is immoral from an incompatible set of explanations?  This revisits the question of multiple views by individuals: how does the Jew, Hindu, etcetera gain 'different angles' from looking at incompatible views?

No, I don't think positing moral realism helps one distinguish the particular contours of that objective morality at all.  We're thrust back into a situation in which what is considered objectively true is simply that which is most popular. Summation of independent views may work for pencils, but not for moral systems.

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Uh, I have no interest in a group debate, given the requirements of the format.  If Anima wants to choose to debate me alone, I'll oblige, but otherwise count me out.
(Of course, that depends on the format chosen.  I don't imagine a formal debate just being a free-for-all.)

I am good with that as well.  Do we want multiple debates of the same subject?  Or would you like to propose a different subject for debate?

I think you'll find that keeping up with one debate is difficult enough.  You should probably choose an opponent and start negotiating ground rules and question with them via PM.  If you decide later that you want to take on more, there's plenty of time for that.