(May 24, 2015 at 8:00 am)Cato Wrote:

(May 22, 2015 at 10:30 pm)bennyboy Wrote: There is nothing intrsinsic to the senses and to the flow of ideas which show whether I'm in the Matrix, the mind of God, a BIJ or an actual physical space.

Until there is evidence demonstrating that there is something more than what you are calling physical space, the idea remains wholly unsubstantiated and wildly speculative at best; fiction. Even if there were some undetectable reality as you propose, me, you and everyone else are obligated to navigate existence as if physical reality is the only game in town due to our evolved traits. Musing about some ultimate reality becomes rather pointless; a true what if d-o-g spells cat investigation.

You are setting an unproven assertion as the default position, but this is wrong.  The default must be that existence is experiential, since it is through experience that all else is. . . well, experienced.  This is true for ALL experiences-- even those of learning and knowing.

So if you want to say all those experiences by which we learn and from which we infer physical reality are of a certain nature or have a certain ultimate source, you're going to have to step up to the BOP. You don't get to claim that "seems" is "is" and make skeptics bear the burden of proving you wrong.

(May 23, 2015 at 11:44 am)Jörmungandr Wrote: I think I see where you're going with this, so if I may be so bold as to sketch out where I see your argument leading at the risk of creating a strawman.

Since the original question was about morality and not pencils, I assume your point about realism was drawn in order to support a point about morality.  That point is this, that if there is an objective morality then that morality is fixed and can be known in spite of the varying perceptions of individual subjects.  That enough observations of objective morals can lead in the sum to an accurate picture of what those objective morals are.  However the problem comes in that we are perceiving moral truths and not pencils.  The only access to these moral truths lies in the subjectivity of the individual observer.  As a consequence we have multiple independent attestations to the proper contours of objective morality.  Each religion paints a different picture of those contours.  Islam is distinct in its perceptions from those of Christianity, Vaishnavite Hindu is independent from Taoist, and Buddhist despite being atheistic has its own picture which is distinct from that of the Jains.  As I contend, positing realism simply asserts that there is a fact of the matter concerning the proper contours of objective morality, it does not help us determine what those contours are.  If my sketch is correct, then you would be suggesting that summation of the independent perceptions of objective morals would provide us with a true picture of their underlying substance.

The problem is that each of these views presents irreconcilable witness to what those contours are.  The Hindu vision cannot be 'summed' to the Christian vision to produce a more accurate picture of the contours of objective morality.  At most, one of these views is correct.  But they might all be wrong.  They might all be looking at a bent pencil.  They all have their revelations concerning objective morality, and they all claim to have the correct contours.  What is needed is a way to test the different versions in some way.  This is the perennial question of the physical sciences: how to test whether one's perception of the contours of objective reality are correct.  The procedure of summing up observations is analogous to verificationism, in which a perception of reality was counted as validating the model of reality if it confirmed that view.  The problems of theory dependence and confirmation bias led to reformulating the criteria for testing physical models.  This led to the theory of falsificationism; the theory which most successfully resists falsification is deemed the most accurate.  But how do we apply such lessons to morals?  How do we test moral systems to determine whether they contain accurate perceptions of objective morals?  It would seem the only data we have to test such things are the individual moral judgements of thinking subjects.  Each individual's perception of what is moral counts as evidence as to what objective morality consists of.  But this leads us in a circle to the relativism that we are trying to avoid by postulating realism, by supposing that there is a way to get at the hidden reality which is independent of individual subjectivities.  Our goal to establish the contours of objective morality has led us back to the dependence for the perception of those contours upon individual, independent perceptions.  Thus, 'summing up' the individual perceptions leads right back to the problem of relativism, of morality by the argument of numbers; argumentum ad populum as to what is objective morality.

I hope I haven't gone too far off the track of where you were heading.  This is just my surmising, and I'm not attributing these views to you.  But I hope I have made some relevant observations along the way.

As a realist you are speaking my lingo!! Regarding varying opinions, "A person can be right, everyone can be wrong, but not everyone can be right!" However, I would be remiss to not give credence to the father of realism, "The truth is the simplest and most complicated thing to have ever existed; while no man hits it precisely, no man misses it entirely."

I would content that Aristotle uses this view as the foundation of an argument to determine objective truth (including moral objective truth).

As written by me:

Aristotle attempts to resolve the imperfectus sensus through universalia in rebus; stating there are given universal perfections all particulars must essentially share in order to be part of some particular or universal set. This may be said to be the reasonable deduction of Aristotle regarding the sentiment of imperfection. If every particular is particularly perfect then it stands to reason that universal perfection may simply be the universally present particular perfections of any set of particulars or universals. While Plato induces Forms that exist independently as atemporal and aspatial universals whose universal perfection may be said to be inherited by any particular as only particular perfection; Aristotle deduces essential universal perfection is inherent to the particulars in question and are to be determined by experience as the universal particular perfections for any given set of particulars or universals; hence as the experience of any particular or universal set of universally shared particular perfections approaches infinity the knowledge of universal perfection approaches certainty and the imperfectus sensus approaches zero.

I had actually gone off on a tangent to talk about objective reality overall and not objective morality in particular. However, if I am to take what you have attempted to surmise I would say correction is required here:

(May 23, 2015 at 11:44 am)Jörmungandr Wrote: That point is this, that if there is an objective morality then that morality is fixed and can be known in spite of the varying perceptions of individual subjects.

Where I would say the objective morality may be determined is not in spite of the varying perceptions of individual subjects, but by combination/relation of the individual subject observations. This logic becomes apparent in an unanticipated observation by an individual. You see an object floating in the air that to your experience should not float, immediate response is to change medium and perspective of the object. You feel around it, walk around it, check if other observers feel and see the same thing. (indeed most magic tricks or slight of hand limit your opportunities to utilized variable means or orientations of observation.) Thereby it is not dependent on argumentum ad populum. Since the observations may be made by a single subject so long as they are of variable means and orientation they will begin to approach objectivity.

Needless to say someone will say that a single observer viewing by variable means or orientation will not overcome observer bias (which is funny since that is considered the primary way to overcome observer bias). While I do not think such is the case I am willing to consider it and make resolution by saying let us vary the observer as well (though it is not necessary so long as we sufficiently vary means and orientation of observation).

In short realism gives credibility to subjective observations by stating those observations are of limited views of an independent object and reflect truth in part though not truth overall. Similarly subjective moral truths are given credibility due to them being limited representations of the objective moral truth, though they do not capture that truth in total. Certainty (or objectivity) of moral truth is then facilitated by the consideration of subjective moral truth under variable means, orientations, and observers.

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(May 24, 2015 at 12:54 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote: Uh, I have no interest in a group debate, given the requirements of the format.  If Anima wants to choose to debate me alone, I'll oblige, but otherwise count me out.
(Of course, that depends on the format chosen.  I don't imagine a formal debate just being a free-for-all.)

I am good with that as well. Do we want multiple debates of the same subject? Or would you like to propose a different subject for debate?

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(May 24, 2015 at 1:53 pm)bennyboy Wrote:

(May 24, 2015 at 8:00 am)Cato Wrote: Until there is evidence demonstrating that there is something more than what you are calling physical space, the idea remains wholly unsubstantiated and wildly speculative at best; fiction. Even if there were some undetectable reality as you propose, me, you and everyone else are obligated to navigate existence as if physical reality is the only game in town due to our evolved traits. Musing about some ultimate reality becomes rather pointless; a true what if d-o-g spells cat investigation.

You are asserting and unproven assertion as the default position, but this is wrong.  The default must be that existence is experiential, since it is through experience that all else is. . . well, experienced.  This is true for ALL experiences-- even those of learning and knowing.

So if you want to say all those experiences by which we learn and from which we infer physical reality are of a certain nature, you're going to have to sack up to the BOP.

Benny has got this one covered!!

Awwww, you replied while I was still editing. I hope you and/or Jorg will go back a post and read that version instead.

re: convergence of subjective views on objective truth
I think it's perfectly possible to have cultural or species bias. In the case of morality, this becomes instantly obvious if you try to see what other animals think about right or wrong in your efforts to remove species bias. Right away, then, it becomes obvious that all our moral ideas have a hidden context: "X is right in the context of people." The next question is this: do you brand people whose moral ideas differ from the average person's as animalistic and dysfunctional?

I think that's the Christian approach: they divide human feelings and ideas into two categories: those which we share with animals, and those which are unique only to humans. They then characterize a human life as the struggle to transcend the former and purify and magnify the latter. So the seven deadly sins could be seen as a list of those animal motivations which if allowed to run loose, will serve as an impediment to the full expression of those qualities which are uniquely human.

In short, you can coin morality in objective terms, but this requires a context-- and the choice of context is arbitrary and highly subjective. So there really can't be a big-M "Morality" out there somewhere for us to discover as we might discover say a black hole.

(May 24, 2015 at 2:16 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Awwww, you replied while I was still editing.  I hope you and/or Jorg will go back a post and read that version instead.  

re: convergence of subjective views on objective truth
I think it's perfectly possible to have cultural or species bias.  In the case of morality, this becomes instantly obvious if you try to see what other animals think about right or wrong in your efforts to remove species bias.  Right away, then, it becomes obvious that all our moral ideas have a hidden context: "X is right in the context of people."  The next question is this: do you brand people whose moral ideas differ from the average person's as animalistic and dysfunctional?

I think that's the Christian approach: they divide human feelings and ideas into two categories: those which we share with animals, and those which are unique only to humans (being the rational soul or ANIMA).  They then characterize a human life as the struggle to transcend the former and purify and magnify the latter.  So the seven deadly sins could be seen as a list of those animal motivations which if allowed to run loose, will serve as an impediment to the full expression of those qualities which are uniquely human.

In short, you can coin morality in objective terms, but this requires a context-- and the choice of context is arbitrary and highly subjective.  So there really can't be a big-M "Morality" out there somewhere for us to discover as we might discover say a black hole.

Very nice Benny!!

Plato and Aristotle divide the soul into three aspects. The first is shared by all things, the second by all animate things, and the third specifically humans. They have varying names but may be considered to be existence, subsistence, and coexistence.

You are correct in that Christians endeavor (as the ancient Greeks) to purify and transcend (rather than transcend and purify). Where existence is required to do or be anything, subsistence (driven by our animalistic qualities) is to be done right, properly, or purely, and coexistence shall transcend mere cohabitation with things (mutual existence) to proactive understanding and cooperation with things in accordance with a grand single design (teleological coexistence).

However, I would not state there is no big-M "morality." Just as theory of general relativity needs an absolute maximum which all are relative to if not relative to anything else (the speed of light) so to is there some absolute maximum of morality that all subjective morality is held as being relative to.

Prove it.

(May 24, 2015 at 2:45 pm)Anima Wrote: However, I would not state there is no big-M "morality."  Just as theory of general relativity needs an absolute maximum which all are relative to if not relative to anything else (the speed of light) so to is there some absolute maximum of morality that all subjective morality is held as being relative to.

The difference is that in relativity, the terms are defined: gravity is gravity, space is space, etc. In "morality," the term is not defined, and so while there may be an objective truth for each possible definition, there is no over-arching objective truth that applies to all definitions.

Definitions of "morality" that are good but will lead to a different "objective" truth:
-That is moral which serves the greatest good.
-That is moral which reduces suffering.
-That is moral which tends toward equality among members of a community.
-That is moral which minimizes the negative impact of humanity on the world.

There probably is a behavior, in any context, which would maximally cohere to any one of these definitions. There is probably not a behavior, in any context, which would maximally cohere to all of them. Therefore, what is moral is dependent not on an objective truth, but on a choice of semantics.

(May 24, 2015 at 1:54 pm)Anima Wrote: I would content that Aristotle uses this view as the foundation of an argument to determine objective truth (including moral objective truth).

As written by me:

Aristotle attempts to resolve the imperfectus sensus through universalia in rebus; stating there are given universal perfections all particulars must essentially share in order to be part of some particular or universal set.  This may be said to be the reasonable deduction of Aristotle regarding the sentiment of imperfection.  If every particular is particularly perfect then it stands to reason that universal perfection may simply be the universally present particular perfections of any set of particulars or universals. ... Aristotle deduces essential universal perfection is inherent to the particulars in question and are to be determined by experience as the universal particular perfections for any given set of particulars or universals; hence as the experience of any particular or universal set of universally shared particular perfections approaches infinity the knowledge of universal perfection approaches certainty and the imperfectus sensus approaches zero.

(bold mine)

As noted in the analogy to science, we never have a universal set of particulars, so we are left assuming the particulars are representative of the whole.  In the case of actual moralities, there aren't sufficient number to presume representativeness; each morality is divergent in its particulars.  Aristotle may presume, but as in science, presumption of perfection in particulars fails to prevent you from falling into error by relying on those particulars.  We saw it with Galen's medical treatises, with Ptolemaic cosmology, with Newtonian physics — the reality is that you cannot guarantee a glimpse at what is hidden underneath simply by presuming you have a set of trustworthy views.  That's begging the question.  

(May 24, 2015 at 1:54 pm)Anima Wrote:

(May 23, 2015 at 11:44 am)Jörmungandr Wrote: That point is this, that if there is an objective morality then that morality is fixed and can be known in spite of the varying perceptions of individual subjects.

Where I would say the objective morality may be determined is not in spite of the varying perceptions of individual subjects, but by combination/relation of the individual subject observations.  This logic becomes apparent in an unanticipated observation by an individual.  You see an object floating in the air that to your experience should not float, immediate response is to change medium and perspective of the object.  You feel around it, walk around it, check if other observers feel and see the same thing.  (indeed most magic tricks or slight of hand limit your opportunities to utilized variable means or orientations of observation.)  Thereby it is not dependent on argumentum ad populum.  Since the observations may be made by a single subject so long as they are of variable means and orientation they will begin to approach objectivity.

Needless to say someone will say that a single observer viewing by variable means or orientation will not overcome observer bias (which is funny since that is considered the primary way to overcome observer bias).  While I do not think such is the case I am willing to consider it and make resolution by saying let us vary the observer as well (though it is not necessary so long as we sufficiently vary means and orientation of observation).

How does an individual get multiple views as to whether some specific moral fact is truth?  Do they not only have their own moral judgement to fall back on?  That's getting back to individual morals being 'composited' by them voting with their own particular sense of morality as being the only perspective they can contribute.  Again, the question is "how do we test" that a given moral hypothesis belongs to objective morality or not?  In the end, the only test is our individual judgement about the truth or falsity of the moral hypothesis.  We don't have multiple personalities that we can look at tentative moral facts with multiple perspectives.  The only test is the assent or dissent from the hypothesis; that leads us right back into morality simply being a matter of counting heads, which is the relativism you're trying to avoid.

(May 24, 2015 at 1:54 pm)Anima Wrote: In short realism gives credibility to subjective observations by stating those observations are of limited views of an independent object and reflect truth in part though not truth overall.  Similarly subjective moral truths are given credibility due to them being limited representations of the objective moral truth, though they do not capture that truth in total.  Certainty (or objectivity) of moral truth is then facilitated by the consideration of subjective moral truth under variable means, orientations, and observers.

The problem here is one familiar in science, namely the underdetermination of theory.  If you postulate that a set of moral truths is only imperfectly representative of the hidden reality, how do you determine which of the set is truly reflective of the reality, and which part of it is in error?  Do we simply take the intersection of all moral views and call that our set of hidden truths?  How do we know any better to trust the intersection rather than the differences?  Surely this is no way to arrive at objective moral truth.  More importantly, it obfuscates the reason why an objective moral fact is moral.  Am I not to kill because it angers God, or because it incurs bad karma, because it is contrary to my sense of empathy, because living persons have inalienable rights?  How do I determine why what is immoral is immoral from an incompatible set of explanations?  This revisits the question of multiple views by individuals: how does the Jew, Hindu, etcetera gain 'different angles' from looking at incompatible views?

No, I don't think positing moral realism helps one distinguish the particular contours of that objective morality at all.  We're thrust back into a situation in which what is considered objectively true is simply that which is most popular. Summation of independent views may work for pencils, but not for moral systems.

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(May 24, 2015 at 1:54 pm)Anima Wrote:

(May 24, 2015 at 12:54 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote: Uh, I have no interest in a group debate, given the requirements of the format.  If Anima wants to choose to debate me alone, I'll oblige, but otherwise count me out.
(Of course, that depends on the format chosen.  I don't imagine a formal debate just being a free-for-all.)

I am good with that as well.  Do we want multiple debates of the same subject?  Or would you like to propose a different subject for debate?

I think you'll find that keeping up with one debate is difficult enough.  You should probably choose an opponent and start negotiating ground rules and question with them via PM.  If you decide later that you want to take on more, there's plenty of time for that.

(May 24, 2015 at 3:01 pm)Stimbo Wrote: Prove it.

Sure! Just as soon as you prove the existence of whom I am to prove it too.

Ah, so now you appreciate the importance of compelling evidence.

(May 24, 2015 at 3:18 pm)bennyboy Wrote:

(May 24, 2015 at 2:45 pm)Anima Wrote: However, I would not state there is no big-M "morality."  Just as theory of general relativity needs an absolute maximum which all are relative to if not relative to anything else (the speed of light) so to is there some absolute maximum of morality that all subjective morality is held as being relative to.

The difference is that in relativity, the terms are defined: gravity is gravity, space is space, etc.  In "morality," the term is not defined, and so while there may be an objective truth for each possible definition, there is no over-arching objective truth that applies to all definitions.

Definitions of "morality" that are good but will lead to a different "objective" truth:
-That is moral which serves the greatest good.
-That is moral which reduces suffering.
-That is moral which tends toward equality among members of a community.
-That is moral which minimizes the negative impact of humanity on the world.

There probably is a behavior, in any context, which would maximally cohere to any one of these definitions.  There is probably not a behavior, in any context, which would maximally cohere to all of them.  Therefore, what is moral is dependent not on an objective truth, but on a choice of semantics.

Benny...NNNNoooooo!!

All of the moral definition provided were simply that of moral/ethical utility. While semantics does indeed change the way in which they are expressed, semantics does not change the meaning of what is being said (a rose by any other name).

However, if I take your intended meaning, which I believe to be that what is moral in one sense may not be moral in another sense we must either state that every act is moral and immoral (which contradicts the principle of the excluded middle), every act shall be moral in a particular sense but immoral generally thus immoral, or that every act is moral in a particular sense but immoral generally and thus moral. In either of those cases we ended up in an untenable position where acts are either undefined or always defined in the negative or affirmative.

Now if the definition of morality is objectively defined (that is to say big-M Morality). Then the determination of morality is not dependent upon the subjectivity or sense and may be complimentary (moral or immoral) without being contradictory (moral and immoral) or bias (all moral or all immoral).