RE: Another Free-will poll, please bear with me!
May 26, 2015 at 5:45 pm
(This post was last modified: May 26, 2015 at 5:46 pm by bennyboy.)
I think in the end a view of free will boils down to this: is a supervenient quality greater than the sum of its parts?
I'd argue that when the supervenient quality is relational (as in mind), the answer is necessarily yes. For every two parts you bring together, you now have 2 kinds of information: that of the original parts, and that of their relation. Where does this information exist? Not in the parts-- it's not actually created by them, or of them, but exists in a superset. Now, take out a part, and the superset collapses, so in that sense it is dependent on its parts-- but they are only placeholders for that relational information.
Mind, then, transcends neurons even though it is fully dependent on them. The same goes for body: physical systems aren't about a collection of QM particles but about their interrelation. I'd argue that to the degree we see a single personal agent as A thing, rather than a collection of things, free will can be seen as the interrelationship of mental processes which themselves need not be free, but which is itself still free.
If we stare at words long enough, we can convince ourselves that there's no free will. But then we step away from the computer and actually live life, and free will is as real as every other part of what it's like to be a living human being.
I'd argue that when the supervenient quality is relational (as in mind), the answer is necessarily yes. For every two parts you bring together, you now have 2 kinds of information: that of the original parts, and that of their relation. Where does this information exist? Not in the parts-- it's not actually created by them, or of them, but exists in a superset. Now, take out a part, and the superset collapses, so in that sense it is dependent on its parts-- but they are only placeholders for that relational information.
Mind, then, transcends neurons even though it is fully dependent on them. The same goes for body: physical systems aren't about a collection of QM particles but about their interrelation. I'd argue that to the degree we see a single personal agent as A thing, rather than a collection of things, free will can be seen as the interrelationship of mental processes which themselves need not be free, but which is itself still free.
If we stare at words long enough, we can convince ourselves that there's no free will. But then we step away from the computer and actually live life, and free will is as real as every other part of what it's like to be a living human being.
