Free will/evil/punishment

[Mudhammam]

A useful distinction -for discussion- does not necessitate or demonstrate an -actual distinction- in the thing being discussed, though, eh?  That one allows you the convention of conversation to then -say- that a person has "free will" as distinct from not having it...is not actually any indicator of the reality of the situation.  I am not, in considering this topic, interested in creating a conversational distinction in order to -allow- for something.  I'm looking to see whether or not the thing is actually present.  So, the difference between you and I, for example..if you're the compatibilist in question and I'm the determinist in question...is not semantics, it is in my abject disinterest in creating a definition for free will -based- upon semantics.

I think both camps would agree that a definition of free will should be based on the empirical data. From my perspective, compatibilists think that hard determinism is too restrictive, and hard determinists think that free will is too overreaching. The difficulty is created by our experience of freedom, the nature of causality and the physics of the world, and the moral problems that arise from treating all destructive thoughts and actions as virtually tantamount to miniature brain tumors---which, if it was the case, would eliminate any rational basis for moral outrage or blame to be had on the part of offenders. 

The question is whether or not his volition is free...so I'm not sure how this declaration is supposed to further our understanding of free will, or each others positions?

I don't see a difference between volition and freedom so much as I do between conscious and unconscious volition, the latter more excusable when it commits harm. 

Sure, no one (and maybe not even himself)........but did -some thing-?

Per hard determinism, then yes... every time a person does something there is a mitigating excuse that lies outside the domain of the person themselves.

Like Schopenhauer said, "I can do what I will: I can, if I will, give everything I have to the poor and thus become poor myself—if I will! But I cannot will this, because the opposing motives have much too much power over me for me to be able to.

Which seems to express a situation in which free will is absent.

On the other hand, if I had a different character, even to the extent that I were a saint, then I would be able to will it. But then I could not keep from willing it, and hence I would have to do so."

Which seems to express a situation in which free will is absent.

That's where we disagree. If someone were to intervene and restrain Schopenhauer from doing what his will compelled him to do, then he would no longer be free to do as he willed. Short of that, he is free to do as he wills (free will) even though his will is determined (compatibilism).

My position on will and free will is not a position on morality, as we have morality (or not) regardless of whether will is free....or not.

Actions that we determine---per our morals---to be wrong, on your view are no different than ill-health, which it would be absurd to hold any person responsible or to express outrage at them, rather than the sickness, considering a lack of choice in the matter.